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
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
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
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
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THE BATTLE OF BUNKER'S HILL

For explanation see p. 165.

From a print in the Museum of the  
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# ROYAL UNITED SERVICE INSTITUTION.

DECEMBER, 1913.

## SECRETARY'S NOTES.

### I.—OFFICERS JOINED.

The following officers joined the Institution during the month of November :—

Captain H. F. Bidder, 3rd Royal Sussex Regiment.

Captain Hon. R. L. Pomeroy, late 5th Dragoon Guards.

Lieutenant C. H. Wallace, R.F.A.

Captain F. H. Harvey, East Yorks Regiment.

Captain G. F. Perkins, Hampshire Regiment.

Captain A. P. Heneage, R.F.A.

Second-Lieutenant A. G. Menzies, Scots Guards.

Captain W. P. M. Russell, 10th Bn. London Regiment.

Lieutenant A. S. May, M.V.O., R.N.

Lieutenant F. W. H. Denton, The Queen's Regiment.

Second-Lieutenant R. Davison, Northamptonshire Regiment.

Captain H. N. Jackson, 3rd Bn. Oxfordshire Light Infantry.

### II.—EXTRA ANNUAL SUBSCRIPTION.

A member having expressed his wish to give an extra annual subscription, the Finance Committee desire to draw the attention of members to the existence of such fund. It was commenced in 1894, when an appeal was addressed to every member, which resulted in an increased annual revenue of some £500, since which it has been decreasing annually and is now only £120. The Committee hope, therefore, that this fund will not be allowed to lapse, as owing to increased taxation and rating it is not easy to make the funds of the Institution meet the expenditure.

### III.—REGIMENTAL HISTORIES.

Recently it has been brought to the notice of the Council that sometimes compilers of regimental histories encounter considerable difficulties in carrying out the work, and further, when the record is completed they are somewhat at a loss as to the best arrangements for publication. The Council particularly desire that it should be known that the Secretary and Officers on the Staff of the Institution are always ready and desirous to give the compilers information on these subjects.

### IV.—CHANGE OF RANK AND ADDRESS.

The attention of members is called to the necessity for communicating any changes of rank or address to the Secretary. It is essential that such

notification should be made in writing, and only one change of address can be registered each month. The 9th day of the month is the last day on which such change can be notified in order to take effect for the delivery of the JOURNAL of the current month. If such changes are not notified, members themselves will be responsible if their JOURNALS fail to reach them through being wrongly addressed, and officers are requested to write their names, with initials, distinctly on such communications. Several signatures have recently been received which it has been impossible to decipher, and as there are many instances of members bearing the same name and initials, it is requested, therefore, that they will add their rank. The Council beg to draw the attention of members, who do not have the JOURNAL sent to them, and have not registered an address with the Secretary, to the fact, that they (the Council) cannot be held responsible if such members do not receive any notices that may from time to time be sent out.

#### V.—TRANSLATORS.

The following name should be added to the list of officers prepared to undertake translation work (see page 444 of the April issue):—

COLONEL E. AGAR, *p.s.c.*, late R.E., c/o Messrs. Cox & Cox, 16, Charing Cross, S.W. (French, German and Russian.)

#### VI.—GOLD MEDAL ESSAY, 1913. (Military).

The following additional Essays have been received:—

- (11) "Disciplinā, fide, perseverentia."
- (12) "God will see."
- (13) "Sursum Corda."
- (14) "God and the Right."
- (15) "Leve et Reluis."
- (16) "Mente, Manu, voce et Exemplo."
- (17) "Tis not the whole of life to live nor all of death to die."
- (18) "Tempora Mutantur."
- (19) "Sub Umbra."
- (20) "Every Party Chief should know how to use Enthusiasm, etc."

#### VII.—CHRISTMAS ARRANGEMENTS.

The Secretary's Office and the Library will be closed from Wednesday, December 24th, at 12 noon, to Saturday, December 27th, both dates inclusive.

#### VIII.—KING CHARLES I. STATUE.

At the Council meeting, held on Tuesday, December 2nd, 1913, the following resolution was proposed and carried unanimously, *viz.* :—

"That in the event of it being found necessary to remove the statue of King Charles I., now at Charing Cross, that a suitable site for its re-erection, both historically and from an utility aspect, would be in the centre of Whitehall, immediately in front of the Banqueting House."

A copy of this Resolution was sent to H.M. Office of Works, the London County Council, and the Westminster City Council.

## IX.—THE KING'S OWN YORKSHIRE LIGHT INFANTRY.

The history of The King's Own Yorkshire Light Infantry (51st and 105th) is now being compiled.

The regiment will be very grateful for any information as to the existence and whereabouts of diaries, private letters, documents and papers referring to either battalion; also sketches, caricatures, portraits in oil pastel or miniature; prints, weapons, battle relics, uniforms, etc.

Correspondence to be addressed to:—

Charles R. B. Barrett, Esq.,  
Royal United Service Institution,  
Whitehall, S.W.

## X.—ADDITIONS TO MUSEUM.

- (6612) Officer's coatee, with rich gold lace, dark green plastrons to and shoulder wings; buff cross-belt with plate and sword slings, gorget, crimson silk sash and black satin dress pantaloons; all of the 19th Foot, about 1812.—Given by R. C. Anderson, Esq.
- (6616). Officer's coatee, with silver lace and buttons, and yellow plastrons, cocked hat, buff cross-belt with plate and sword slings, sword knot, pair of silver-laced officer's wings, gorget, crimson silk sash, shako with plate (1820), pair of white dress pantaloons with laced fronts and pair of white gaiters; all of the 77th Foot, of the period of 1812.—Given by R. C. Anderson, Esq.
- (6617) to (6624). Officer's coatee, with silver lace and buttons, and yellow plastrons, cocked hat, buff cross-belt with plate and sword slings, sword knot, pair of silver-laced officer's wings, gorget, crimson silk sash, shako with plate (1820), pair of white dress pantaloons with laced fronts and pair of white gaiters; all of the 77th Foot, of the period of 1812.—Given by R. C. Anderson, Esq.
- (6625). Shoulder belt plate of the Arbroath Volunteers, *circa* 1800.—Given by the Rev. David Fleming.
- (6626). Officer's shako, Cheshire Yeomanry, *circa* 1840.—Given by D. Hastings Irwin, Esq.
- (6627). Sword with scabbard and belt presented to E. H. Columbine, Esq., Commander of H.M.S. "Ulysses," by the merchants and inhabitants of the Island of Trinidad, as a token of their great respect and esteem; also as a mark of the high sense they entertained of his services in protecting and defending that island in the years 1803 and 1804, and of his zealous exertions to promote the interest thereof during his command on that station. Attached also is a document offering him the sum of 500 guineas from the members of His Majesty's Council of the island.

Edward Henry Columbine entered the Navy as midshipman on board the "Lively" at Easter, 1778. The "Lively" was captured in July of that year at the commencement of the action between Keppel and D'Orville off Ushant, and Columbine was wounded. He remained a prisoner in France for 18 months. In 1796, being lieutenant commanding the brig "Resolution," 14 four-pounder guns, he engaged seven French gun vessels off Cape Corse and defeated them, blowing up the flagship. He was sent home and promoted. He became a post captain in 1802 and appointed to the "Ulysses,"

50-gun frigate, and sent to the West Indies, and conducted some important enquiries relative to the Government of Trinidad by General Picton. In 1808 he was appointed Commissioner for the West Coast of Africa, and in the following year Governor of Sierra Leone and Commodore on the Station, commanding the "Solebay," 32 guns. With the squadron under his command he captured Senegal from the French, losing his ship in the enterprise. She was replaced by the "Crocodile," and in command of her he died at sea, in 1810, of yellow fever, aged 47.—Bequeathed by the late Sir John Dorington, Bart.

- (6629). A small bust in marble of General Sir W. Fenwick Williams of Kars, Bart., G.C.B.—Given by Mrs. F. F. Tower.
- (6630). An Aide-de-Camp to Queen Victoria tunic, with shoulder cords and aiguillette, Royal Artillery pattern.—Given by General Sir W. Campbell, K.C.B., late R.M.A.
- (6631). A large coloured engraving being the panoramic view from a field-work near Alexandria, Egypt, in 1801, from a drawing by Lieutenant and Captain Samuel Walker, 3rd Guards, engraved by F. C. Lewis and published in London, 1804, by Mr. Thompson of Newport Street.—Given by Wynn Corrie, Esq.
- (6632). Magazine Rifle, "Chassepot-Hans," 1890 model.—Given by H. H. Harrod, Esq.
- (6633). Officer's belt buckle, cap badge, and buttons of the 2nd West York Light Infantry Militia, worn prior to 1881.—Given by Colonel Sir G. J. Hay, K.C.B., C.M.G.
- (6634). Model of Mr. Richard Cail's patent punch screw-headed turbine projectile for smooth-bore guns, the object being to give the necessary rotating motion by means of gas acting direct on the rifling of the projectile, instead of through the agency of the gun. Bullets on this principle have been tried with remarkable success for smooth-bore muskets. The intention of the invention was to reduce the weakness of rifling the barrel, the projectile doing its own work, and thus reducing the cost of big guns and powder charge.—Given by Colonel Sir G. J. Hay, K.C.B., C.M.G.
- (6635). Group of the following medals awarded to John Curry, of the Royal Artillery, *viz.* :—
  - (1) Crimean Medal with four clasps.
  - (2) China Medal, 1860, with two clasps.
  - (3) Medal for Distinguished Conduct in the Field.
  - (4) Turkish Military Medal for the Crimea.
 Given by Inspector John Curry, Metropolitan Police.
- (6636). Photograph of a recruiting poster of the 7th Light Dragoons, of about 1814.—Given by General Sir R. Biddulph, G.C.B., G.C.M.G.
- (6637). A pioneer's sword, French, Napoleonic period.—Given by Captain K. R. Wilson, 12th London Regt.

(6638) Officer's Lancer cap with red and white plume, silver epaulette, dress sabretache and dress pouch of the Duke of 6641. Cornwall's Yeomanry. This regiment was raised in 1816 and disbanded in 1837.—Given by Messrs. Spink & Sons.

(3401). An old Spanish mahogany circular pedestal, which when open forms an Empire cabinet escritoire, with the usual interior fittings and several secret drawers. It was formerly the property of Admiral Lord Nelson, having been presented to him, and was acquired at the Merton Abbey Sale. It is of English manufacture.—Deposited by L. C. Wakefield, Esq.

(3402). The following medals and decorations, formerly the property of Major-General Sir W. Parker Carrol, K.C.H. :—

- (1) Insignia of the Hanoverian Order of the Guelphs.
- (2) A square gold medal awarded by the Spanish Government for services detailed on it during the Peninsular War.
- (3) A gold cross awarded by the Spanish Government for valour and discipline in front of Pampeloua and Bayonne.

(These medals are a continuation of those recorded under No. 3395).—Deposited by Mrs. Philip Scott.

The attention of members is drawn to the Museum Purchase Fund.

The amount taken at the Museum Public Entrance during November was £32 19s. 9d.

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#### PRINCIPAL ADDITIONS TO LIBRARY.

November, 1913.

**Standing Orders of the 77th Regiment.** Crown 8vo. (Presented by R. C. Anderson, Esq.). (W. Clowes). London, 1812.

**In the Wake of the Eighteen-Twelters.** By C. H. J. Snider. Crown 8vo. 5s. (John Lane). London, 1913.

**Recollections of a Peninsular Veteran.** By Lieut.-Colonel Joseph Anderson. 8vo. 10s. 6d. (Edward Arnold). London, 1913.

**William Augustus Duke of Cumberland.** By Hon. E. Charteris. 8vo. 12s. 6d. (Edward Arnold). London, 1913.

**Scott's Last Expedition.** Arranged by Leonard Huxley, with a preface by Sir Clements R. Markham, K.C.B. 2 Vols. 8vo. 42s. (Smith, Elder & Co.). London, 1913.

**La Guerre des Balkans de 1912—1913.** By Lieut.-Colonel Immanuel. 8vo. 6s. (Henri Charles-Lavaudelle). Paris, 1913.

**Waterloo.** By Major-General C. W. Robinson, translated from the English by Captain Léseble. 8vo. (Presented by Major-General C. W. Robinson). (Henri Charles-Lavaudelle). Paris, 1913.

**A Journall of the Siege and Takeing of Buda in ye Year 1686.** Manuscript. (Presented by Lieut.-Colonel A. Aytoun, late R.A.). Crown 8vo. n.p., n.d.

**The King's Royal Rifle Corps Chronicle, 1903 to 1912.** Crown 8vo. (Presented by the Committee, King's Royal Rifle Corps Chronicle). (Warren & Sons, Ltd.). Winchester.

**Peninsular Recollections, 1811—1812.** By Cornet Francis Hall, 14th Light Dragoons. With a biographical note by E. G. H., and footnotes by C. O. 8vo. (Presented by Professor C. Oman). (Royal United Service Institution). London, 1912—13.

**Cyclist Infantry.** By Lieut.-Colonel B. H. L. Prior. 12mo. 1s. (Presented by the Publishers) (Good, Ltd.). London, 1913.

**Germany and the Germans from an American Point of View.** By Price Collier. 8vo. 7s. 6d. (Duckworth & Co.). London, 1913.

**William of Germany.** By Stanley Shaw. 8vo. 7s. 6d. (Methuen & Co., Ltd.). London, 1913.

**L'Aéronautique Navale Militaire Moderne.** By Lieutenant Charles Lafon. 8vo. 5s. 8d. (H. Dunod and E. Pinat). Paris, 1914.

**Manuel de l'Aviation.** By Hamon and James. Crown 8vo. 2s. 6d. (Librairie Aéronatique). Paris, 1913.

**The Light Dragoon.** By Revd. G. R. Gleig. 2 vols. Crown 8vo. 9s. (Henry Colburn). London, 1844.

**Les Grandes Manœuvres Anglaises En 1913.** By R. de Thomasson. 8vo. (Presented by the Publishers) (Berger-Levrault). Paris, 1913.

**The Soldier's Companion, containing instructions for Drill, Manual and Platoon Exercises as commanded by His Majesty, intended for the use of the Volunteers of this Country.** 15th Edition. (Presented by Colonel J. W. Yerbury). (Minerva Press). London, n.d.

**The Royal Miners—A History of the Stannaries Regiment of Miners, late Cornwall and Devon Miners Royal Garrison Artillery Militia.** By Capt. G. Cavenagh-Mainwaring. 8vo. (Presented by the Publishers). (Harrison & Sons). London, 1913.

**Naval Warfare.** By J. R. Thursfield. Crown 8vo. 1s. (University Press). Cambridge, 1913.

**The Historical Records of the 34th (Prince Albert Victor's Own) Poona Horse.** By Major G. M. Molloy. 3rd Edition. 8vo. 6s. (Hugh Rees, Ltd.). London, 1913.

**Maritime Enterprise, 1485—1558.** By J. A. Williamson. 8vo. 14s. (Clarendon Press). Oxford, 1913.

**The Naval Mutinies of 1787.** By Conrad Gill. 8vo. 10s. 6d. (University Press). Manchester, 1913.

# THE JOURNAL OF THE ROYAL UNITED SERVICE INSTITUTION.

VOL. LVII.

DECEMBER, 1913.

NO. 430.

[Authors alone are responsible for the contents of their respective Papers.]

## THE INTERNAL CONDITION OF GREAT BRITAIN DURING A GREAT WAR.

By MAJOR STEWART L. MURRAY, late Gordon Highlanders.

On Wednesday, November 12th, 1913.

COLONEL SIR LONSDALE A. HALE, late R.E., in the Chair.

**THE CHAIRMAN:** I have much pleasure in introducing to you the lecturer, Major Stewart Murray, who is making his appearance here not at all for the first time. He is an expert in the subject which he is bringing before us—a subject which is not merely of interest to those who are here, but to every inhabitant of these islands. I do not know that you will feel very comfortable after you have heard the lecture—I sincerely hope you won't, but that it may induce you to take action in the matter.

### LECTURE.

#### PART I.—INTRODUCTORY.

AN unknown person had better start by mentioning credentials. So I will begin by saying that I have now been for many years very much interested in, and have given a great deal of time and study to, the question of the internal condition of this our country during a great war. In 1901 I had the honour of reading a paper in this Institution on "Our Food Supply in time of War." This I followed up the same year by a book on the same subject, suggesting a league for further action, copies of which I sent to 3,000 representative men. The late Duke of Sutherland then most kindly offered Stafford House as our centre, and the "Association to promote an official enquiry into our Food Supply in time of War," of which he

became President, was started. Of that Association I acted as joint Hon. Secretary, and gave up three "leaves" in successive years to the work. In 1903, after a great meeting at the Mansion House, followed by a great deputation to the Prime Minister, the Government gave the Royal Commission for which we asked. We then ceased to agitate, and did not hold the 100 meetings in the 100 chief towns which we had arranged to hold. Therein we made a great mistake, as public interest had been thoroughly aroused, and one can see now that we should never have allowed it to drop. But we hoped for a practical result from the Royal Commission, and so made our great mistake and did not hold those 100 meetings. Then came the very lengthy enquiry of the Royal Commission on "Food and Raw Material Supply in War," and the consequent Treasury Committee on "War Risks of Shipping," which did not report till 1908, and during this interval of five years public interest in the question had evaporated.

With the reports of the Royal Commission and Treasury Committee you are familiar, so I will not go into them here. They left us exactly where we were in 1903, with this one exception, that whereas before 1903 the danger was generally regarded as a bogey, and you had to prove it to nearly every man to whom you talked, since the publication of the evidence the danger is universally admitted. Also the evidence has been studied by a great many people, and forms the basis of the better understanding of the question which now prevails. And when we obtain remedial action it is largely on that evidence that it will be based. All this is something to the good.

Our Association has never disbanded, and I think that the time is approaching, directly there is a lull in the political excitement, when we ought to come together again and take the matter up once more.

Simultaneously with the Royal Commission the Tariff Reform controversy broke out, followed in quick succession by the Budget controversy, the Parliament Bill, the Insurance Bill, etc., and now by the Home Rule struggle—so that the public mind has been too full of other exciting things to revert to the question of our Internal Condition during War.

That will, to a certain extent, account for the lack of interest in the matter shown by the public and by the Press for the last ten years, but only to a certain extent. There must be something else.

Probably everyone in this Theatre has often wondered at the extraordinary apathy displayed by successive Governments, by the Press, and by the nation generally in this question. They now have the evidence—the damning evidence—before them—yet nothing is done. Why? Considering that the subject is one which touches, or will touch, the personal interest of every single individual in the nation, one would expect the

Press and public opinion to insist on remedial action. Yet they have not done so. Again, why?

After a great deal of pondering over this "Why," it has occurred to me that the reason is perhaps partly our own fault, and lies in the fact that we<sup>1</sup> have not put the question of the Internal Condition of Modern Great Britain during a European War properly before the public in its *entirety*. We have put it forward piecemeal, in separate parts, not as a whole. We have put it forward as "Consols in a Great War," "Banking Reserves in a Great War," "Commerce Protection in War," "Food Supply in War," and so forth, but in each case the particular subject has been dealt with, owing probably to exigencies of space and time, as if it stood alone. Whereas really not one of these subjects stands alone, but each is part of one great whole, and all are so intimately connected in a regular net-work of cause and effect that it is impossible to properly consider one without at the same time considering all the others. For every one will influence, and be influenced by, all the others. And though each case in itself is bad enough and demands a remedy, yet when all are considered together the accumulative result is so stupendous, so menacing, so convincing, that when put in its entirety before the country it must surely rouse public opinion to insist upon instant remedial action.

That is the object of this paper. I wish to put forward a plea that we shall no longer speak or think of banking reserves in war alone, or commerce in war alone, or food supply in war alone, but always think and speak of "The Internal Condition in War," of which each forms an intimately connected part. For neglect of any one part will intensify the difficulties of every other part, while conversely the palliation of one part will lessen the strain upon every other part. I would call it the "Banking-Commercial-Industrial-Labour-Food Supply" question, but that is too long, so I suggest as shorter "The Internal Condition" question.

The great and far-reaching political, naval, and military changes which have taken place since 1903 compel us to reconsider the whole question in the light of the actual European situation of to-day. Some of those changes are the rapid rise of foreign navies, notably the German, and the comparative decline of British naval power; the substitution of a One-Power standard for the old Two-Power standard; the disappearance of the Navy from the trade routes and its concentration in home waters; our entry into the Triple Entente, with its attendant probabilities of all the great monetary Powers being simultaneously engaged in war, and of our Regular Army being engaged upon the Continent and therefore unavailable to preserve order at home; the great rise in the cost of living since 1903; and lastly the rise to complete organization of the Labour Party in Great

---

<sup>1</sup> The term "We" is here used to connote all workers in this field.

Britain. Every factor in the question has been deeply affected by these changes.

The urgency of the Internal Condition question, the necessity of bringing it from the realm of talk into that of practical politics, from consideration into action, is amply proved by the speech of Sir Edward Grey on April 7th, when he stated in Parliament that the Skutari agreement had been reached "Only just in time to preserve the peace amongst the Powers."

"Only just in time."

It is usually admitted that owing to general considerations of the balance of power a war between any two great Powers cannot be confined to those two, but will develop into a conflict between the Triple Alliance and Triple Entente. That in many ways renders a war less likely, because in each case it must be for a cause that appeals to all three allied Powers—but at the same time it brings before us the prospect of an eventual war on a scale never yet seen. That forms the basis of all naval and military consideration of the subject, and therefore should equally form the basis of any consideration of the Internal Condition question, which is a part, an important part, of the naval and military question.

The Skutari agreement was reached "only just in time" on the authority of the one man best qualified to know, to preserve us from being unexpectedly involved in such a war. It is, therefore, beyond dispute, that we escaped "only just in time," but as long as the present grouping of the great Powers remains what it is, an equally unexpected cause may suddenly involve us in an equally unexpected war. As Mr. Lloyd George said in the House of Commons on August 13th, "Few people realize how near we were to it even in the last 12 months."

It may be at once admitted that the effect of such a general European war will be so catastrophic to the economic life of Europe that probably no statesman will dare to take the responsibility of bringing it about if he can possibly avoid doing so. But wars are not always the outcome of calculation or reason. As the far-seeing Clausewitz put it nearly a century ago: "The passions which break out in a great war must be latent in the people." And as Bismarck said: "Popular passion is becoming more and more a dominant factor in politics," as each State becomes more democratized. But popular passion feels neither responsibility nor fear of consequences, economic or otherwise. Popular passion in one nation insisting on action may force all the other nations into war against their will. It is popular passion that we have to fear. Popular passion is the firebrand which may at any time fire the European powder magazine.

We therefore arrive at this as our subject for discussion: "The Internal Condition of Great Britain during a War between the great Naval, Military and Monetary Powers of the Triple Alliance and Triple Entente forced on by irresponsible popular passion in one Nation."

Such a war, which may at any time come, will be destructive in the highest degree to the industrial life of Europe, and will produce explosions of varying intensity in all the countries concerned. I wish here to make a very important point. It is this: Foreign nations are much better prepared and organized to meet such a crisis than we are. Being each able to mobilize as a nation-in-arms each will be in a position to deal confidently, firmly, and, above all, promptly with the internal troubles and civil tumults which may occur, whilst we have no such safeguard. As a condition of the Entente with France our Regular Army will be required on the Continent by the 16th day, just when we shall want it to guarantee order at home. It therefore behoves us in a quite peculiar degree to adopt palliative measures to *prevent* tumults that we shall not have the machinery to promptly *repress*. This is one of the most important of the new factors.

In considering the Internal Condition question one great difficulty is the conflict of evidence. In matters so speculative as the happenings in a great war quite beyond experience we are bound to find extreme optimistic and extreme pessimistic opinions held by men of nearly equal weight. It should not surprise us, nor daunt us. I submit that we ought not to be influenced unduly either by the one or the other. We should assume that either *may* be right and take the middle between the two, see what it comes to, work it out, and prepare at least for that. As an instance, it was thought by some witnesses of great experience and expert knowledge before the Royal Commission that a rise of 80 or 90 shillings per quarter of wheat was not impossible in war, while others thought it would not be nearly so considerable. Let us assume the medium, say a rise of 40 shillings as possible, and work out our preparations on that. And so also as regards the other constituents of the question, the financial and commercial sides.

I can now proceed to roughly state "the Internal Condition" proposition if things are left as they are. It is this:—

A war, such as we have now to consider, between the great monetary and naval Powers of the Triple Alliance and Triple Entente has never yet been fought and will create conditions of exemplified severity. Every department of our national life will be affected to a dangerous degree. The confusion in banking and commercial circles will be extreme, and the downfall of the modern international credit system itself is not considered beyond possibility. A banking panic, of greater or less intensity, is to be feared, leading to wide-spread ruin, impoverishment and unemployment. The disorganization of industrial and commercial circles due to the above and other causes, will be enormous, and many factories will have to close or partially close and dismiss or partially dismiss their workmen. The interruption of our commerce due to the delayed arrival of cargoes owing to *fear* will play havoc both amongst

our employing and employed classes. The price of food, owing to various war causes, will rise to famine heights, and the result will be that millions of our poor will be forced on to the rates, which are quite unprepared to deal with such multitudes. The sudden loss of the markets of Germany, Italy and Austria will throw our export trade into confusion at the outset of war, add to the banking panic, and throw further multitudes out of work. All of these causes will act and re-act upon each other. If adequate precautions are not taken beforehand it is probable that this state of affairs will produce an explosion of those volcanic forces which underlie every modern democracy, and may perhaps even force us to submit to a disastrous peace.

The Internal Condition picture thus roughly drawn in its entirety may perhaps seem to some people almost too black, too alarmist. But it is merely the medium statement of the case, obtained by adding together the medium of what has been repeatedly stated in separate parts by well-known banking authorities, by authoritative lecturers in this Institution, by expert witnesses before the Royal Commission and Treasury Committee. I submit that it is as moderate a statement of the case as can with any justification be put forward.

But black though the Internal Condition question appears when thus regarded in its entirety, it is not beyond remedial action, as has been repeatedly shown in this Institution and elsewhere, if only the Government will make up their minds to grasp the nettle and prepare such remedial action in time.

In time, that is the crux of the matter.

Our difficulty in this connection is that our countrymen and our Parliament, grown too careless during a hundred years of unexampled peace and prosperity, are, as a rule able in peace time to take only a peace-view and not a war-view of war matters. A peace-view I would define as one which shirks difficulties, is much affected by the loss or gain of private interests, by difficulties of administration, questions of expense, and so forth. A war-view is the contrary view, that war consists in the adjustment of efforts to obstacles, that all difficulties can, must, and shall be overcome, and must not be allowed for a moment to stand in the way of the desired end.

As an instance in point the reports of the Royal Commission and Treasury Committee were merely peace reports and not war reports at all. Had we been really on the very eve of war both those reports would have been very different. They would have hurriedly recommended instant action instead of inaction.

When putting forward our case, therefore, I think that we should always preface it by a reminder that in war-time peace difficulties will be brushed aside as not relevant, for otherwise these little peace difficulties will always crop up again and again and seem to the civilian mind insuperable.

Another difficulty which we should try to eliminate is the search for schemes of impossible perfection that will meet all cases and please everybody. Such search is a mere waste of time. Having regard to the multiplicity of interests involved, no schemes free from all objections and trespassing on no interests can possibly be devised. It is impossible to think of any scheme to which some amongst a number of witnesses will not take objection. If we try to please all we shall end by pleasing none and safeguarding none. Perfection we cannot obtain, nor expect it, nor desire it. It does not exist in war. But what we can hope for and expect is a necessarily imperfect but practically workable scheme that, setting aside private interests, will fairly meet the supreme war necessities. Such schemes to be selected, carefully thought out and prepared in administrative detail, and kept ready by the Committee of Imperial Defence for production and application during national emergency.

Rapidity of application is a chief point we have to aim at. For how long after the opening of war the state of panic, confusion, and high prices will last it is not possible to say, depending as it will do upon so many war causes. It is estimated by some that the critical period will be one of weeks, by others as one of months. Take a medium. But all are agreed that the period of worst crisis will be at the opening of war. All will then depend upon the rapidity with which our Government can take the necessary remedial measures effectively. If we can only get what Commander Dewar, R.N., calls a "breathing time" to do this all may end well. Such a breathing time should, therefore, be our first aim in preparation. We shall accordingly require the instant application of palliative measures, and such promptitude can *only* be effectively obtained if they have been previously prepared during peace.

The great point to drive home again and again and again, is that if such scheme or schemes are allowed to remain matters of controversy till war suddenly comes, if they are not got ready carefully beforehand in peace, they will *have perforce* to be done hurriedly on the eve of war, for self-preservation. And if done hurriedly on the eve of war they will be done badly, in the roughest manner, in the most expensive manner, in the least efficient manner, and will probably break down.

#### **PART II.—THE CONSTITUENT PARTS OF THE INTERNAL CONDITION QUESTION.**

The constituent parts of the Internal Condition question, for each of which a mutually helpful palliative measure is required, are, so far as it is possible to disentangle them, five in number, namely :—

- (1) The financial confusion and its consequences.
- (2) The necessary deflection of our export trade caused by the loss of the markets of Germany, Austria and Italy.
- (3) The interruption of our commerce due to fear.
- (4) The famine price of food.
- (5) The working class voters and the great hardships of war, together with the danger of bread riots developing into civil strife.

On each of these constituent parts I propose to offer a few, a very few, observations as a peg on which to hang discussion. I would not attempt thus to rush through five such great subjects if they were not all questions which have been previously often discussed in this Institution, and with which, with the exception of the two first, we are all more or less familiar. But time leaves me no option.

#### I.—The Financial Confusion.

It is hardly necessary to observe that, not being a banker, I approach this most abstruse and difficult yet most important part of the subject with great diffidence. Yet it has to be done. On the whole I think that I cannot do better than just to recall to your recollection what that most eminent and cautious of statisticians the late Sir Robert Giffen said to us on the matter in this Theatre in 1908. Assume if you like that his opinion, however well-considered and cautious, is the extreme of pessimism and may be contradicted by extreme optimistic opinions of equal weight, and take only the half and work on that and see what that means.

Sir Robert Giffen in 1908, as you will remember, considered then a purely hypothetical case of a war between two or more of the great monetary Powers of Europe. The only difference is that to-day that previously hypothetical situation has become the actual situation, in so far that it now forms the basis of all naval and military calculations. So that what he said in 1908<sup>1</sup> has become in 1913 of the very gravest importance.

He pointed out that the international credit system, on which the whole industrial life of Europe at present depends is almost a thing of yesterday, having grown up during the last 75 years. It has never yet had to stand the ordeal of a great war in which all the chief monetary Powers, including Britain, the centre of the system, shall be simultaneously engaged, so that they cannot derive monetary aid from each other in emergency. Such a war will be, as he said, totally unprecedented. When it breaks out it will "bring upon us, as well as upon the whole community of civilized States to which the system of international credit extends, quite unprecedented calamities and

<sup>1</sup> "The necessity of a War Chest in this Country, or a greatly increased Gold Reserve." By Sir Robert Giffen. Sir Felix Schuster in the Chair. R.U.S.I. JOURNAL, March, 1908.

dangers. This would result from the *breakdown* of the credit system itself and the interruption of international commerce. Nowadays there would be vast indirect, as well as direct, effects if any important factors in the international circle were to be displaced, still more if two or three great commercial communities were affected by a general suspension of payment." He continued, "I would mention first of all the stoppage or great contraction of the volume of imports and exports between enemy States and the States dependent on them. Result that the commotion in the whole banking world would be quite unexampled. Next, there would be a run for cash and withdrawal of deposits from banks that would also tend to bring about a general failure and bankruptcy. On the nature and effects of a great banking panic there is no need to enlarge. Apart from the miseries resulting to depositors and shareholders who are suddenly impoverished, there is no more potent cause of widespread bankruptcy and unemployment. It is difficult to realize the magnitude of the evil it may be necessary to deal with, and especially the extent of the civil tumults that may occur. All these tumults would further help to strain credit to the utmost and intensify the banking panic itself." He then proceeded to examine the question of our gold reserve in Great Britain to meet such a really serious monetary crisis, a question which has attracted much attention of late years and has been the subject of various papers and addresses by banking authorities. The inadequacy of our gold reserve to meet such a tremendous crisis appears to be generally admitted. The figures, of course, vary somewhat at different times, but as far as one can roughly average them, it appears that the deposits in our banks (deducting liabilities of banks to each other) are in round figures £1,000,000,000 or more, and the reserves at the Bank of England, upon which all the other banks depend, are only 45 or 50 million pounds, including bullion retained against the note issue, or about four or five per cent. This may be, and no doubt is, sufficient for times of peace, supported as it is by what Mr. Hartley Withers in his book on money<sup>1</sup> calls the "Psychological Reserve" due to the great reputation of our bankers as the best bankers in the world. But it is impossible to suppose that it will be sufficient, or nearly sufficient, to meet a great financial panic, such as must characterize the opening of a war between the great monetary Powers of the Triple Alliance and Triple Entente. Furthermore, as Sir Robert Giffen puts it, "Should a great war break out and business be widely interrupted, the demands upon English banks, quite apart from panic at first, might easily become overwhelming, and the paltry 25 or 40 million pounds, or say 50 million pounds, which is all we have to show, would dwindle to nothing in a day or two." Though much has been said *nothing* remedial has been done, so it appears that we must look forward to a

<sup>1</sup> "The Meaning of Money." By Hartley Withers.

financial panic and a general run upon the banks as one of the *first facts* we shall have to face in the event of a European war in which we are involved.

Can anything be done to prevent it?

To quote Sir Robert Giffen again, "Investigating this problem we are met at the outset by the suggestion that no preparation can be adequate—that whatever we do the confusion at the outbreak of a great war will be indescribable, and that the Government could hardly do anything but order a general suspension of specie payments, as was done in 1797,<sup>1</sup> until the country adjusted itself to the new conditions. It is, indeed, much to be feared that something of the sort may happen. But *less inadequate preparations* than are at present made may nevertheless be useful. The possibility of avoiding a resort to *inconvertible paper* is surely worth aiming at." I would go further than Sir Robert Giffen in this and say that, for reasons connected with food supply it is a necessary war preparation. To leave things just as they are is to run a fearful risk merely from apathy. A perfect scheme is not required, but only a necessarily imperfect but workable scheme to minimise the panic. It is said that the Germans have such a scheme ready. Surely, with the greater experience and knowledge of our bankers we also could prepare one.

I therefore venture to suggest that :

(a) A joint Treasury and Bankers' Committee be appointed to draw up the best financial scheme they can work out at leisure, and deposit it with the Committee of Imperial Defence for production in emergency. It need not be published, but merely kept ready.

(b) That the subsidiary causes of a banking panic should be attacked, guarded against and remedied. These are the dislocation of our commerce due to the loss of the markets of Germany, Austria and Italy. The interruption of our trade due to the fear of capture or sinking by armed liners. The civil tumults due to the famine price of food. For each of these is part, a subsidiary part, of the banking question, and each must be minimised if a banking panic is to be avoided on the outbreak of war.

One of the most instructive lessons of the Balkan War this year has been the financial results due to the mere fear of its spreading, such as the great hoarding on the Continent, the business collapse in Vienna, the bank failures in Austria and America, the demand for gold in Germany, the drain of gold from London, the increase in the German war chest, and in the gold reserve of the Imperial Bank, and so forth. If all this happened from a mere temporary apprehension of the possibility of a great European war, what will happen when it

<sup>1</sup> Vide Alison's History of Europe.

actually occurs? Time, however, does not permit more than a hope that this object-lesson will be illuminated during the discussion. I will finish by quoting the statement of Herr von Glasenaph, acting President of the Imperial Bank, on June 13th in the Reichstag that "The entire credit foundation of our economic life would be shattered by an outbreak of war."

#### II.—The Loss of the German, Austrian and Italian Markets.

This is the first cause mentioned by Sir Robert Giffen as tending to bring about financial confusion and banking panic. He added that "The stoppage and contraction would extend yet further, the customers of all the countries primarily affected being unable to escape the effect of the losses of those countries. The commotion in the whole banking world would be something quite unexampled."

Such stoppage and contraction followed by such financial confusion and possible panic will obviously throw large numbers of working men out of work, wageless, and thus greatly add to the food supply difficulties. The alarm thus caused will also add to the commerce protection difficulty, as everything tending to panic will tend to raise the rates of war insurance, and the probability of our tramp steamers, or a large portion of them, being ordered by telegram to lie up in port.

Such being the case the question of how we can most rapidly deflect our exports from the lost enemy markets to neutral markets becomes a question of very great importance. And for reasons previously mentioned, in order to obtain a breathing space rapidity becomes the essence of the matter. Apparently the unassisted course of international trade in finding new channels will be something like this:—Germany, Austria and Italy will lose the greater part of their sea-borne trade. As soon as their customers begin to fear or feel the shortage they will enquire by telegram for alternative supplies from all available sources, Great Britain included. Similarly our merchants who have lost their export trade to Germany will enquire by telegram where there is a demand for similar goods. In time, therefore, new channels of trade will automatically be found. In time, but what will that time be, and can it in any way be shortened by State action, considering that rapidity is the essence of the case? That is the question for discussion.

In this matter I have not been able to avail myself of previous studies of the question, as I am not aware of the existence of such. In the August number of the *Nineteenth Century and After* I have attempted to deal with the subject in greater detail than I can at present afford, and from that journal I am allowed by the kindness of the editor to quote.

One of the chief difficulties in the matter is the engrossing nature and increasing strain of modern business life. It requires all a man's available time and thought, and leaves him little

leisure and less inclination to consider the possibilities of a war which may not come. The strain of business routine is so great that it would be held by most to be a waste of business time to undertake detailed enquiries based on a mere hypothesis of a future war. The busy man leaves such matters to the Government, as was sufficiently proved by the evidence before the Royal Commission of 1903. If this be correct it follows that we cannot expect the firms engaged in the export trade to Germany, Italy and Austria to undertake in peace the detailed enquiries necessary for its prompt deflection in war unless the initiative be taken by Government. I submit that the prompt deflection of our lost trade with the Triple Alliance will, for reasons given before, be so important that *any* helpful preparations towards that end which Government possibly can make beforehand *should* be made. For anything which can even partially help to minimise the confusion will then be worth its weight in gold.

Directly war breaks out we shall lose the following exports of manufactured or partly manufactured goods, using the 1911 figures:—

To Germany	...	...	£57,500,000 worth
„ Austria	...	...	6,000,000 „
„ Italy	...	...	14,500,000 „
Total			£78,000,000 „

This works out to a rough monthly average of about £6,500,000 worth, which will require to be *at once* deflected.

This should not be very difficult if it is properly thought out and arranged beforehand, but otherwise it will be difficult. There will be plenty of channels available, owing to the loss by the Triple Alliance of the greater part of their own oversea trade, but the question is how can we manage it with the greatest rapidity and with the least loss? We have 45 per cent. of the world's carrying trade, which should be a great aid to us in deflection.

Let us consider the German trade as an example. The oversea export trade of Germany is roughly £300,000,000, of which 25 per cent. or £75,000,000 is carried in British ships, all of which she should lose; 50 per cent., or £150,000,000, is carried in German ships, most of which she should lose also, as we stand across the gateway of her trade; the other 25 per cent., or £75,000,000, is carried in neutral ships.<sup>1</sup> Perhaps with high freights she may get enough of the scarce neutral shipping to carry another 10 per cent., or £30,000,000, making £100,000,000 in all carried by neutral ships. She should thus lose something about two-thirds of her sea-borne export trade. The gap of

<sup>1</sup> For greater detail vide the Naval Prize Essay for 1913, by Commander Dewar.

£200,000,000 worth thus left in the world's commerce it will be for us, and for France, and for neutrals to supply. Surely we ought to be able to get enough of it to make up for the £78,000,000 we shall lose in the Triple Alliance markets.

Looking only at the Import and Export lists it would at first sight appear as if our own home market depleted of goods "made in Germany" could absorb a great deal of our lost exports to Germany. But it would in reality be very unwise to rely upon this, because, for reasons previously given, everything will be in confusion in this country, the home market shrinking, buyers very scarce, etc., etc. So we must rely upon neutral markets, not upon a shrinking home market.

Taking a rough weekly average we shall have in our ports ready to start for Germany the day war is declared about £1,000,000 worth of goods. And every week a similar amount will be coming forward for the lost market demanding new ones. Where is all this to be sent?

Germany exports a large number of articles similar to those which we send to her. The difficulty lies in obtaining and collating accurate information regarding the extent and distribution of the German supplies to neutral countries of those articles which we ourselves export to Germany, and of which we desire to prepare the deflection. This information may be to a certain extent in the hands of each trade concerned, but, to a certain extent only and not in sufficient detail to form the basis of a great trade deflection *directly* war breaks out. This information can, however, no doubt be obtained by our commercial attachés and consuls in the countries concerned and collated by the Government. This is a consular question. Another difficulty is that of the comparative danger or safety of the trade routes on to which merchants may propose to deflect their trade. This is an Admiralty question.

We therefore arrive at this—that the deflection of our export trade in war requires conjoint commercial, plus naval, plus consular consideration, and that the Government should take the initiative.

I therefore put forward the following suggestion for discussion and improvement:—

I suggest that the Government should appoint a small Trade Deflection Committee. It should sit at the Admiralty, because only in an environment, in an atmosphere of constant war preparation, will it do its work with the required whole-heartedness and enthusiasm. As regards numbers the smaller the better, and probably one naval officer and two commercial attachés would be sufficient. Its procedure would be to take the required opinions and evidence of all the chief firms engaged in the export trade to Germany, Austria and Italy, and to call for and collate reports from our consular service in neutral countries regarding the demand in their districts for goods "made in

Germany," two-thirds or so of which will fail to arrive in war time, and the deficiency in which we shall hope to supply.

The evidence thus collected, the results thus arrived at, should not be published, as that might be offensive to the Powers of the Triple Alliance, but should be available for reference by the exporting firms concerned. Such firms might be further invited to study the results arrived at and to distribute by agreement amongst themselves certain channels of deflection so as to avoid overlapping and undesirable competition at a time of national emergency.

Such a committee should be a permanent one, in order to keep up to date and in touch with the ever-changing conditions of international commerce. Beyond this bare outline of the functions of such a Trade-Deflection Committee it is not desirable to venture. Such a committee, if appointed, will arrange its own procedure and get matters into shape pretty soon.

I think that after two or three years' work the collated information kept ready for reference by such a committee would be found a valuable assistance towards the prompt deflection of our lost export trade when war breaks out. I submit it for discussion, in the hope that it may be improved upon, and, after improvement, bear fruit which will prove useful.

### III.—**Interruption of our Commerce by Fear.**

This is part of the banking question, and also part of the food supply and labour questions. To quote Sir Robert Giffen again, "Every month, every week, every day, bills are becoming due in great centres and especially in London, which cannot be met if the regularity of trade is interfered with. A merchant, in order to meet a bill becoming due, relies upon his ability to discount a new bill against goods to arrive, and when neither goods nor bill are received he must fall back on reserves, which it has not been the practice to maintain. Interruption of the regularity of trade means, accordingly, wide-spread ruin to merchants and bankers together."

The question of commerce protection has been so often and so thoroughly discussed in this Institution that I need not bring forward any statistics,<sup>1</sup> as you are all familiar with the data. It is well known that our trade is now about 20 times greater and vastly more vulnerable than during our last naval war. It is now carried on by about, on an average, at least 6,000 vessels<sup>2</sup> at sea scattered over 100,000 miles of exposed trade routes. The great majority of these vessels are slow tramp steamers,

<sup>1</sup> "Commerce and War." First Prize Naval Essay, by Commander Dewar, R.U.S.I. JOURNAL, April, 1913.

"Commerce and War." Second Prize Naval Essay, by Commander Dugmore, R.U.S.I. JOURNAL, June, 1913.

<sup>2</sup> *Lloyd's General Report*, 1901.

helpless prey to any fast liner carrying even the lightest guns. They cannot fight and are too slow to run away. Yet on the uninterrupted arrival of these slow tramp steamers our industrial life, and all that it means, depends.

The new naval situation is well-known to you. I will not therefore enter upon it.<sup>1</sup> Neither do I propose in any way whatever to examine or criticize the arrangements made by the Admiralty for commerce protection. We may rest confident that the utmost which can be done with the inadequate means placed at their disposal certainly *will* be done. But the Admiralty cannot do the impossible. They cannot make our limited number of cruisers be in two places at once, in front of the enemy in the North Sea and far away on the ocean trade routes simultaneously. And the nation cannot or will not afford enough cruisers for both purposes. Therefore the nation must cease to count its cruisers twice over, must recognize the fact of great deficiency, and prepare to face the consequences of that fact.

My point is that the time has come when we must base our preparations on an axiom new to our history, namely, that until the critical period of naval war is over our ocean-borne commerce will have to look after itself. As Lord Sydenham pointed out in his Memorandum in the Report on War Risks of Shipping, the naval evidence "plainly intimated that the whole force of our fleet ought to be brought to bear upon the fleet of an enemy in war, and that no special arrangements to safeguard commerce would be made, at least in the early stages." So it was in 1906—but if it was so then it is still more so now, since the rapid growth of foreign navies and the re-admission of privateering. The concentration of our Navy in home waters no doubt has been unavoidable—but it has left the ocean trade routes unprotected. It will be many years before the projected Dominion fleets at the other end of those routes are actually "in being" in sufficient force to protect them. Meantime how do we actually stand? The race in naval armaments amongst Powers has resulted and will continue to result in an increasing equality of naval strength in regard to the Triple Alliance and Triple Entente. We, therefore, can no longer expect our Navy to do more than contain and eventually defeat the hostile fleets. Our Navy may be able to look after the enemy cruisers; but it will not be able to hunt down armed liners on the trade routes thousands of miles away. At least not till the critical period of the war is over. The duration of this critical period is a matter of uncertainty, as it will depend upon the strategy of our

<sup>1</sup> Memorandum of Naval Defence Requirements prepared by the Admiralty for the Government of Canada. R.U.S.I. JOURNAL, December, 1912.

Mr. Borden's speech, R.U.S.I. JOURNAL.

Standard of Naval Strength. R.U.S.I. JOURNAL, June, 1904, December, 1906, February, 1909.

enemies, who may, and probably will, play a waiting game, and it may therefore be a period of weeks or one of months. But a period of weeks only will be sufficient to cause a most disastrous interruption to our commerce due to our sailors and many of our slow ocean tramp steamers lying up in port through fear of capture or sinking by armed liners.

Therefore we must get rid of the fear. That is the crux of the whole matter—we must get rid of the fear.

How can we get rid of the fear? There is one way and one way only, and that is by a scheme of national guarantee against war risks of shipping. As you all know this was recommended by the 1903 Royal Commission on Raw Materials and Food Supply in War Time, and was put on the shelf by the consequent Treasury Committee, though a majority of the witnesses were in favour of some form or other. But both the political and naval situation has so completely altered since then, that there seems to be now, under the circumstances of to-day, no other way. If it was necessary in 1903, before the rapid rise of the German, Austrian and Italian Navies to their present strength, it is ten times as necessary now.

It is all very well for optimists to say "Oh, there ought not to be fear." But there *will* be fear, great fear, as Mr. George Renwick pointed out from a tramp steamer owner's point of view in his admirable lecture here last year. How can it be otherwise? Our ocean trade routes are now practically unprotected. On the whole Pacific coast of America there are only two sloops; for the whole west coast of Africa and South Atlantic only 3 cruisers; for the whole east coast of Africa only three cruisers, and so on. And half of the great German fleet of fast liners, manned by ex-naval sailors, and convertible by the Declaration of London into commerce-destroyers at sea, will be on the trade routes or in neutral ports close by, when war breaks out. Imagine a slow eight-knot tramp steamer setting out on her 33 days' voyage home from the River Plate under these circumstances. There *must* be fear, and there is only one way to get rid of it.

The Hague Conference and the Declaration of London have been often discussed in this Institution, so I need not refer to its provisions.<sup>1</sup> Whether we approve or not, whether we finally ratify it or not makes no difference. For that Declaration clearly shows what our enemies' *conduct* will be. When war breaks out all the German liners at sea or in neutral ports will infest the trade routes, using to the full their claim to convert

<sup>1</sup> "The Hague Conference and Naval War," by Professor Lawrence. R.U.S.I. JOURNAL, April, 1908.

"England's Threatened Rights at Sea," by H. F. Wyatt, R.U.S.I. JOURNAL, January, 1910.

"The Merchantman and its Cargo in Naval Warfare." R.U.S.I. JOURNAL, August, 1910.

themselves at sea into naval commerce-destroyers, and to capture or to sink.

A few such sensational captures or sinkings at the outset of war, and up will jump the rates of war insurance. A minimum five per cent. war rate on ships and cargoes will, in face of the keen foreign manufacturing competition of to-day, be practically ruinous to our export trade to neutral markets.

The Declaration of London, ratified or unratified, renders national guarantee or indemnity no longer a debatable, an academic question, but a necessity, an absolute necessity for us. We know indeed that the Admiralty has organized an admirable scheme of world-wide intelligence, which must prove most valuable in every way. And this year we have begun to arm some of our merchantmen. This, of course, is a most welcome, most admirable departure in every way—as far as it goes. The more the better. But it does not go, and cannot go, far enough by itself. It will take many years to arm our 10,000 merchant steamers. And it will not affect the question of our slow tramp steamers. For them we still must have national indemnity.

We have to aim at the regular uninterrupted arrival of our tramp steamers in war as in peace. And we can only get this if we get rid of the fear at the outset of war. It has to be remembered that managers of steamship companies are now in the great majority of cases no longer owners but only trustees responsible to their shareholders. As such they cannot take patriotic risks which if private owners they might take. They must work on purely business lines. Such being so, I have been informed by good authority, that under the naval conditions of to-day, unless we have national indemnity, on the outbreak of a war such as we are considering we may take it for granted that telegraphic orders will be sent to nearly every tramp steamer on its way home to at once lie up in the nearest port of safety till further orders. Other witnesses no doubt will think that the number of vessels ordered to lie up in a port of safety will not be so large. Take the medium. Assume that without a national guarantee in some form, about *half* of our tramp steamers will be ordered to lie up till the situation clears itself—and work on that.

That means a more or less complete interruption of from a third to a half of our supplies of raw material and food for

NOTE.—For confirmation “the First Lord of the Admiralty in 1894 expressed the opinion that on the outbreak of war all British sailing vessels and all British steamers of less than 12 knots speed, or about 80 per cent., would have to be laid up.” Evidence Royal Commission. If so then, still more so now.

NOTE.—About 30 per cent. of our imports and exports are carried in foreign vessels, which we may consider as carried by neutrals in war.

an uncertain period, conditions equivalent to the Lancashire cotton famine over the length and breadth of England for an uncertain period. That we cannot and *will* not risk. Therefore national indemnity in some form, with its possible objections, we must risk.

In any scheme of national guarantee or indemnity, difficulties and objections, of course, there must be, as the Treasury Committee reported. But such objections in war time will be swept aside as nothing compared to the over-ruling necessity of the uninterrupted arrival of our raw material and food supply cargoes. In war time it is certain that the nation, the people, will clamorously, wildly, furiously *insist* that national indemnity, however crude, be at once proclaimed. Let us therefore prepare it carefully and well *now*, instead of hurriedly and badly *then*.

I venture to suggest that a joint Admiralty and Lloyds committee be appointed to draw up a scheme of national indemnity and deposit it with the Committee of Imperial Defence till required, even if it be a scheme which is only to remain in operation for a short and strictly limited period, say for three or six months. Such a limitation in time seems a compromise which may content those who see the necessity but fear the objections. Such a compromise will be sufficient. It will get rid of the fear.

#### IV.—Our Food Supply.

Previous to the Royal Commission of 1903, the question of our food supply in time of war was generally regarded as a "bogey," both in Parliament and in the Press, though the danger had been pointed out by many. In 1901 it struck me that the best way to get over that strange idea of its being only a "bogey" would be to get the corn merchants, who knew the truth, to sign a round robin stating the danger of prohibitive war prices. This, after a lot of consideration and consultation, was done, as you know, and the manifesto signed by all the leading corn merchants stating that in event of war we must expect to see wheat, and consequently bread, at "Famine Prices" was published in all the newspapers. The statement in that manifesto formed the bedrock of the demand for an official enquiry. That statement was amply proved by the evidence before the Royal Commission. That statement the report of the Royal Commission practically endorsed but did *nothing* to remove. That statement remains to-day the bedrock of the question. In event of war—famine prices.<sup>1</sup>

The evidence before the Royal Commission was and is most instructive and of the greatest value; the report, however, was merely a peace report, shirking the difficulty of decision, postponing everything. Since 1903, however, the situation as

<sup>1</sup> Vide Appendix.

before mentioned, has changed so greatly to our disadvantage that a decision cannot be much longer postponed, remedial action cannot be much longer delayed without criminally jeopardizing the national safety from pure carelessness.

These adverse changes :—

- (1) The new naval situation which has arisen since 1903 with the advent of the new German Navy.
- (2) The abolition of the two-Power standard.
- (3) The disappearance of our cruisers from the trade routes.
- (4) The Declaration of London *re* captures, sinkings, mines, etc.
- (5) The re-admission of privateering.
- (6) Our entry into the Triple Entente.
- (7) The prospect of all the great monetary Powers being at war.
- (8) Our obligation to send our Regular Army to assist France by the 16th day, so that there will be practically no troops left to repress bread riots, tumults, or civil strife.
- (9) The great rise in the cost of living.
- (10) The growth of a strong hooligan population in our great cities.
- (11) The growth of socialism and syndicalism.
- (12) The tension between the Triple Alliance and Triple Entente.

All these adverse and far-reaching changes necessitate a reconsideration of the question, based on the evidence of the Royal Commission *plus* these changes, and intent on a practical remedial decision.

The evidence is available to all in the Blue Book, and with the details of the changes you are familiar, so I will not labour them here.

The whole food supply question is a question of Price. As long as our Navy is not defeated, food will come to satisfy our commercial demand, at a price, a war price. That price, as the corn merchants stated, will be practically a famine price. Those who can afford to pay a famine price will be able to get it, those who can't won't. And those who "can't" will include about 10,000,000 people. And those 10,000,000 people will not starve quietly. That is the whole matter in as small a nut shell as I can put it.

When considered a little further the food supply question divides itself into three parts :—

- (1) The actual stock of food in the country on the outbreak of war, its replenishment and its price.
- (2) Measures for permanently increasing the available stocks of food at the ports and on the land.

(3) How to get the food actually available in the country on the outbreak of war into the mouths of the 10,000,000 who will not be able to pay famine prices, and thus prevent riots and civil strife.

—The evidence before the Royal Commission gave details of the available stocks of food, but as it is rather voluminous I may as well give a very brief survey for the benefit of those who have only read the report. I divide the stocks into A and B. A, those of months (at our present rather wasteful rate of consumption), B, those of weeks or days:—

*A—Meat Supply*: If we kill one-third of our cattle, sheep and pigs we have about seven months' supply, without the imports.

*Potatoes*: Enough for ordinary consumption without imports.

*Tea*: Six months.

*Coffee*: Six months.

*Rice, etc.*: Four months.

*Tinned Provisions*: Four or five months at ordinary consumption.

*B—Sugar*: Four or six weeks.

*Bacon—Ham*: 12 or 14 days.

*Cheese*: Six to ten weeks.

*Eggs*: Seven to ten days.

*Butter*: Seven to ten days.

*Bread-stuffs*: About four or five weeks' supply available at our weakest time, the rest being "bottled up" for a rise, and another four or five weeks' supply would appear when wheat rises to 70s. or 80s. a quarter.

*Oatmeal, Barley-meal, Maize-meal*: Another four or five weeks' supply as a partial substitute for bread.

All sugar, bacon, ham, eggs, butter, and tinned meats will disappear during the first week of war, being bought for domestic storage or for a rise. In a month the available stock of flour will begin to give out, the rest being bottled up.

Then, if we have national indemnity in being, our fresh ocean-borne supplies will arrive to replenish our stocks, at war prices—at famine prices.

It is to be noticed that our position is worst in the matter of ham, bacon, butter, cheese, eggs and milk, and it is to these that we require to turn our practical attention. At present they come largely across the North Sea, so that during a war with the Triple Alliance their arrival will be spasmodic. Ireland, however, could and should be able to supply our needs to a great extent, and we must try and substitute St. George's Channel for the North Sea.

In the appendix I have placed the chief food supply statistics up to date, from 1903 up to 1912, for reference. The alterations since 1903 are not important. The unfortunate tendency of the trades concerned to hold a minimum of stocks in this country continues. There are only two alterations to which I can with any pleasure direct your attention. The first of these is the growth of the agricultural co-operative movement in Ireland and of probable Irish supplies. The second is the great increase since 1903 in our Empire-grown supply of wheat. In 1903 the supply grown in the United Kingdom and Empire combined amounted on a three years' average to only 47 per cent. of our consumption; it now, on a three years' average, amounts to 60 per cent. It is necessary always to take an average because the crops in any country vary so from year to year that if you only take one year the result is misleading.

We have, usually, in addition to our stocks, about a month's supply of bread-stuffs at sea, widely scattered over 100,000 miles of unprotected trade routes. The slow tramp steamers bringing it will be ordered by telegraph to lie up in port unless we get national indemnity into actual operation.

In the evidence before the Royal Commission you can find the details of the various proposals designed to increase permanently the stocks of food in this country. They divide themselves into two categories: (a) proposals for increasing the absurdly small agricultural produce of the British Isles; (b) proposals for increasing the stocks at the ports.

It is obvious that in the limited time available I cannot attempt even the shortest summary, still less to adjudicate between them. The point is that there are several proposals any one of which if resolutely carried out would much improve our position. To each, however, there are minor objections. We want, in my opinion, one scheme from each category selected and put into operation.

The two chief difficulties are: first, that of decision amongst several good proposals; secondly, that of the money required to carry out the decision. We want first of all a decision by the Government.

We now come to the practical point to which I would wish to direct this discussion, namely, how to deal with the food actually available on the outbreak of war so as to avoid bread riots, looting, and civil strife. For such riots and civil strife by increasing panic will enormously increase our difficulties. This is, therefore, part of the banking question, part of the industrial and labour question, part of the commerce protection question.

We have 25,000,000 people, men, women and children in our cities, who are urban to such a degree that the figures worked out for London by Sir Charles Booth and by Mr. Rowntree for York apply to them. This gives 30 per cent. in normal poverty, *i.e.*, dependent on wages of 23s. a week and under.

Which works out to a total of 7,000,000 as a low estimate, who have no margin for further economies and who will not be able to pay war price—the famine price—of food. These figures I arrived at in 1901 in consultation with Sir Charles Booth's secretary, Mr. Jesse Ergyle, and to my 1901 lecture in this Institution Sir Charles Booth telegraphed his agreement with the general result arrived at.

In addition, there will be a further two or three million souls thrown out of work wholly or partially by the unpreventable dislocation of commerce and industry caused by the war. This makes a total of about 10,000,000 souls who will not be able to afford the famine prices, and who will, therefore, be unable to get food. But if they cannot buy it they will take it by force. Who is to stop them, for our Regular Army will be on the Continent?

Famine prices will act thus: The first week the very poor will be able to buy food by pawning their belongings. So also the second week. By the end of the second week many will have nothing left to pawn and they will begin to pour on to the rates. According to the Poor Law no person can legally starve in this country—the rates are bound to feed him. By the end of the third week they will begin to pour into the work-houses in vast multitudes demanding food. By the fourth week the Guardians will find probably something like 10,000,000 souls clamouring for their legal Poor Law relief. Whether eight or ten or twelve millions does not affect the argument.

The Poor Law is accustomed in its routine work to deal with about  $2\frac{1}{2}$  per cent. of the population, and, as I was informed by the secretary of the Associated Guardians of England and Wales, might in an emergency deal with 5 per cent., even perhaps with 7 per cent. But, unless a special war organization of the Poor Law is prepared beforehand, to deal with a greater proportion will be beyond its capacity. Yet it will have to deal somehow with 30 per cent. Clearly, therefore, such a war organization of the Poor Law should be got ready, for it is upon the Poor Law that the actual strain will *legally* fall.

That is the point which I wish to press again and again and yet again.

Can such an organization be started in an extemporary manner on the spur of the moment when war breaks out? No, it cannot, and if attempted the attempt will end in failure and riots. During the early part of the Irish famine of 1846, and in Lancashire during the cotton famine of 1863, and in London in 1885, in the unsuccessful administration of the Mansion House fund, we had examples of the failure which follows hurried extemporary efforts at great extension of relief. We cannot, we *dare* not risk another and suicidal example of failure on a gigantic scale. The secret of success lies in foresight and

preparation, and organization beforehand, ready for application when required. So, and so only.

Have we had practical experience to prove the feasibility of and guide to us in the application of relief on so gigantic a scale? Yes, we have had. The successful methods adopted by the Burgoynes Commission in 1847 during the Irish famine supply the required guidance of successful experience. And as the adoption of a similar system would save a vast amount of thinking, argument and trouble, I would suggest that this successful system be adopted as our model.

Prior to the Burgoynes Commission two schemes had been tried, the first providing for the provision of food at cheap prices to those who could pay for it, and the giving it to those who could not, *public works* being started to enable the people to buy the food; and the second also providing for public works on a somewhat different system. Both ended in failure, the result of the first scheme being that from March to August, 1846, £800,000 had been expended; and of the second scheme, that from August, 1846, to August, 1847, £4,800,000 had been expended for the relief of about 3,000,000 people, at an average of £400,000 a month. The system adopted by the Burgoynes Commission enabled them to relieve 3,000,000 people for eight months at a total cost of £1,700,000, or an average of £200,000 a month, that is, at *half the cost* of the previous attempt.

The Burgoynes system worked out to not more than £70,000 a month per 1,000,000 souls relieved. So that on a similar system we could relieve 10,000,000 souls for somewhere about £700,000 per month, a mere bagatelle in a great war Budget. This is not theory but experience. We know from experience that it can be done, and how to do it. That is a point which I wish to press home.

In evidence before the Royal Commission I suggested:—

(1) That each Board of Guardians should be required by order of the Local Government Board, or by Act of Parliament if necessary, to prepare a scheme upon outlines to be laid down by the Local Government Board, for the coping with the least possible delay, by the granting of relief, indoor and outdoor, with the very great additional distress which must inevitably occur upon the kingdom being involved in a great maritime war. Such schemes to be forwarded to the Local Government Board and to be kept revised by the respective Boards of Guardians at, say, intervals of every three years. The outlines to be laid down by the Local Government Board should, I think, require, *inter alia*, arrangements to be made for the provision of extra indoor staff and relieving officers, extra relieving stations, and extra accommodation for those seeking indoor relief, either by the marking down of existing buildings which could be obtained, or by the planning of temporary iron buildings to be run up when required.

(2) That a short Act be passed through Parliament on the outbreak of war abrogating during the war the pauperization clauses of the Poor Law.

(3) That Boards of Guardians should be empowered by Order in Council, or by Act of Parliament if necessary, to grant from a date to be notified by the Local Government Board, and for such period as may be fixed by the Local Government Board, out-of-door relief to persons who, though not destitute, may, in the opinion of the Boards of Guardians, require such relief owing to the increased price of the necessities of life caused by the war as aforesaid, or owing to being thrown out of work in consequence of such a war, the Local Government Board having power to curtail or extend such period from time to time.

The above only deals with England, but both in Scotland and in Ireland preparations should also be made to deal with the extra distress caused by war.

My general idea here roughly outlined is that just as the Army and Navy are so organized that on the outbreak of war they can at once expand from a small peace strength to full war strength on the mere order to "Mobilize," so also should the Poor Law be organized so as to be able at once to expand in emergency from peace to war strength, and that everything should be so thoroughly prepared beforehand that only the issue of an order shall be necessary in the latter case as a telegram is in the former.

As all unions will be hit by the war poverty, some more and some less, and as the war taxes will be very heavy, trade very bad, etc., etc., it would seem fair that a State grant-in-aid should be given to enable the national war relief to be carried out and to distribute the burden equally over the whole country; I would, therefore, suggest that the State should repay to each Board of Guardians the amount which they must pay for war relief solely (*i.e.*, over and above the average ordinary relief), such amount to be certified by the Local Government Board.

It is plain that such a general scheme of national war relief supported by State funds must be a common system applicable to every district, with common tests, common limitations, and common methods of relief, under a common State supervision and control. Also that the relief given must be the smallest possible, to prevent waste of public money, and to prevent those applying for it who can in any other way support themselves.

Under the Burgoyne Commission relief was permitted to be given to four classes of persons:—

- (1) Destitute helpless impotent persons.
- (2) Destitute able-bodied persons not holding land.
- (3) Destitute able-bodied persons holding land.
- (4) The able-bodied employed at wages insufficient for their support at the high price of food.

To the first three classes food was to be given gratuitously, and to the fourth it was not to be given gratuitously under any circumstances, but they were only *to be assisted by food being sold to them cheaply*. The quantity of food to be issued was decided by the Commission, and it was laid down that as far as possible the rations were to be issued in a cooked form, as a check upon abuses and as more economical and wholesome.

If the general principles, the classes to whom relief may be granted, the limitations, the tests, were thus all settled beforehand, and made known to every union, then it seems to me that the Poor Law authorities in each union would soon have their detailed scheme for their own particular union worked out, printed, all cut and dried, and ready for the emergency when it arrives and an Order in Council directs the scheme to be put into force.

If this be done then we can rest confident that however great the distress caused by a war between the great Powers of the Triple Alliance and Triple Entente may be, yet it will be met by all that long preparation and forethought and system can do in the hands of experienced authorities.

So can bread riots and civil tumults, which, with our Regular troops in France we shall not have the means promptly to suppress, be prevented. So can the worst problem of our food supply in time of war, the avoidance of suicidal civil strife, be got over.

Extract from the report of the Parliamentary Committee of the Association of Poor Law Unions, January 7th, 1904: "Your committee agree with Captain Murray's premises, and are of opinion that the scheme proposed by him is feasible, and that it is most desirable that it, or some modification thereof, should be carried into effect."

This was in 1904, yet we are no nearer to it than we were then.

Under such a system it would be to the interest of the State as well as of private individuals to keep the war price of food within limits. For this purpose a Law of the Maximum might be utilized. The French Law of the Maximum of 1793 was a complete failure, and hungry mobs filled Paris with horrors, because the maximum was put so low as to leave trade no profit. Therefore any Law of the Maximum must leave a liberal war profit to traders if it is to be successful. Especially so with us, because we must keep ourselves certain of attracting food to the United Kingdom by the certainty of a good profitable market. I would suggest a Law of the Maximum, or Assize of Bread, at, say, double the average peace price, tentatively say 70s. a quarter for wheat, the price of 1847, the Burgoine Commission year, and 10d. per quartern loaf, the price of bread that year. At this liberal price also we could fairly apply the right of pre-emption if necessary to all food cargoes for the Continent passing our shores, as suggested

by Mr. Douglas Owen in his able lecture in this Theatre in 1909. For neutral shippers would be quite content if they got such a good war price quickly, as all they would want would be their money safely and quickly. They would not care who paid it to them.

By such means the cost of the necessary national war relief could be kept well within reasonable bounds. By applying the Law of the Maximum at the price of 1847, the Burgoynes Commission year, we should know exactly the maximum that our war relief would cost us per million souls relieved, *i.e.*, exactly what it cost the Burgoynes Commission.

The question of our food supply is undoubtedly a difficult one, but amidst the somewhat conflicting evidence one fact at least is clear beyond dispute. That fact is, that whatever may be eventually done to increase the stocks at the ports or upon the land, the onus of a great European war will first fall upon the Poor Law, and that it should accordingly organize itself so as to become capable of performing its duty in war time, which at present it is not capable of doing.

The necessary preparations are simple. All that is necessary is an order from the Local Government Board to Guardians directing the formation of a voluntary Poor Law reserve similar to that issued by the Home Office to Chief Constables in 1911 directing the formation of a voluntary police reserve.

#### V.—The Working Classes and War.

I do not wish to make too much of the explosive forces underlying every modern democracy, neither do I desire to make too little of them, as did the writer of the report of the 1903 Royal Commission. I therefore merely propose to call attention to a few important points in connection therewith:—

(1) In 1903 the Trades Councils of the 120 chief towns in the kingdom passed a joint resolution stating that there are 7,000,000 people in the country who will not be able to pay famine prices during war, and that this will form a very grave national danger. This was published in all the newspapers and laid before the Royal Commission. It forms an important addendum to the manifesto of the corn merchants, coming as it does from the representatives of the working classes in each great town.<sup>1</sup>

(2) Many people forget that hunger was one of the chief causes of the horrors of the French Revolution of 1789. A succession of very bad harvests and very severe winters and food at famine prices preceded the Revolution. In 1784 an Intendant reports "whole families two days without food; the hungry lie in bed most of the day to diminish their sufferings." In 1792 prices had doubled; in 1793 they had trebled or quadrupled. Other causes as well contributed, of course, but with-

<sup>1</sup> Vide Appendix.

out the spur of hunger, without hungry mobs for the revolutionary orators to appeal to, there would probably have been no Revolution. Let us not from pure apathy risk the fury of hungry mobs in our own streets.

(3) The present complete political organization of the working classes is to-day a commonplace fact, to which we have already got accustomed. But it did not reveal itself to the public till 1906, when it surprised nearly everyone by the election of 40 working-class Members of Parliament. It was not known in 1903 to the Royal Commission. Had it been known or appreciated at its real power the report would hardly have swept aside the labour evidence as it did.

(4) The working-class organizations are at present controlled by moderate men. But underneath are many sincere, eloquent and fanatical extremists who believe in violence. At present these extremists are not listened to, but give them hungry mobs to address and it will be a different matter. History shows that in times of great excitement the moderate leaders lose their influence, and are supplanted in leadership by the extreme men. If we negligently allow the hardships caused by war to become intolerable to the very poor it will not be with the present moderate leaders that we shall have to deal, but with new extremist leaders preaching violence.

(5) The strikes during recent years have revealed to us that in about 20 of our chief cities a hooligan population has grown up, so strong in numbers that if it reinforces any discontented mob the resulting riots become quite beyond the power of the police to suppress. In 1911, not less than about 130,000 troops were required to guard the social and industrial edifice.

(6) But if we are to maintain the Triple Entente all the troops of our striking force, all those 130,000 troops required to keep order in 1911, will have to be on the Continent by the 16th day, leaving practically nothing behind the police except recruits, for the Territorials as a force are not available to preserve order.

(7) Serious bread riots are to be expected, and unless promptly repressed, they will grow with impunity and spread. It will be necessary to raise a very strong force of special constables as a police reserve in all our great cities.<sup>1</sup>

(8) But even then we shall be in a far worse position as regards the preservation of internal order than our nation-in-arms enemies will be. From which it follows that we must take peculiar precautions adequate to our peculiar danger to prevent intolerable war hardships and consequent disorders which we shall not have the means to promptly suppress.

(9) This is part of the banking question and part of the commercial question, as was recently illustrated by the strike

<sup>1</sup> Vide Home Office circular to Chief Constables, September, 1911.

riots of last July at Johannesburg. The reports read: "Johannesburg is in a state of deep depression, and business is almost at a standstill in consequence of the labour unrest—shops are empty and the public is spending money only on necessities. The banks are ordering their customers to reduce their overdrafts, with the result that stocks held as security are being sold at almost panic prices." And this though there were 10,000 troops available to preserve order.

(10) We have always to remember that the hardships of war are always most severely felt by the working classes.<sup>1</sup> It is no use our attempting to ignore this fact. On the contrary we must admit it and try to remedy it. Under our peculiar conditions the State is bound, by taking thought and making preparation beforehand, to mitigate those hardships as far as it is possible to do so.

(11) Otherwise there is also the further danger, emphatically stated by the very moderate Labour evidence before the Royal Commission, that unless steps are taken to prevent the hardships of war pressing intolerably upon the new working classes, the whole organized political power of labour *may* be used to demand the cessation of the war, even at the price of submission to our enemies.

(12) All of which leads to the following axioms:—1st, that in a modern industrial State such as Great Britain, work and food at reasonable price the State *must* be able to guarantee, or it cannot hope to fight successfully even the most just of wars. 2nd, that for Great Britain internal organization for war is as necessary as external (*i.e.*, naval and military), and that to neglect the former may well be to nullify the latter.

### PART III.—CONCLUSION.

My time is up. In dealing with five such great subjects in the short space of one hour I have, of course, not been able to deal adequately with any one of them. It was not intended to do so. This paper is merely meant as a sort of summary, as a peg on which to hang discussion. For any unavoidable omissions I must, therefore, beg your indulgence.

Our greatest difficulty has always been how to get over the Treasury "*non possumus*." I have endeavoured in this paper to concentrate attention on the methods by which that difficulty *can* be got over. I have tried to show that sufficient preparations can be made, not perfect preparations, but preparations that will fairly meet the supreme war necessities, without costing the State a single *penny* during peace. That is my great point.

I have suggested the appointment of four simultaneous small committees:—

A joint Treasury and Bankers Committee.  
A joint Admiralty and Lloyds Committee.

<sup>1</sup> Alison's History of Europe.

A joint Local Government Board and Guardians Committee.  
A possible Naval and Commercial Trade Deflection Committee.

Each committee to decide upon a definite scheme within six months, work out the administrative details, and deposit it with the Committee of Imperial Defence for production when a national emergency arrives.

It is decision that we want, not consideration, but decision.

The answer will doubtless be that these matters are under consideration by the Committee of Imperial Defence. But that, I maintain, is *no* answer. These matters have been under consideration for many years, for the last ten years at least, and yet we are no better off as regards actual real preparation for actual real war than we were ten years ago. So much for consideration. And actual war came very near indeed to us this very year—it may come in all its reality any year now when we least expect it. Consideration therefore is *no* answer.

The answer that we want, and which the nation should never rest until we receive, is that the Committee of Imperial Defence have actually *got* emergency schemes dealing with the financial, commercial, and food supply difficulties all *ready*, worked out in complete administrative detail for instant application when required. No other answer is any use. Further consideration is no use, for as wise Lord Bacon put it long ago: "Good thoughts are no better than good dreams except they be put in action."

The mere knowledge that such schemes are in existence all ready for instant application will go far to prevent the panic that we have to guard against, and to obtain for us the "breathing space" at the outset of war which must be our aim. Nothing else will. It can be done without expense. It can be done without trouble. It can be done without interfering with the ordinary life of the community in any way whatever. If it can be done it should be done. I trust that soon the Press, that public opinion, that all classes of the nation, will insist that it *shall* be done *pro patria*. We are all equally concerned, individually, and collectively as a nation. This very year we have had what may perhaps prove our last warning. The next European crisis may not end so fortunately or so peacefully as the last. If the storm of war should break upon us, let us at least be ready for it as regards our internal condition, so that its unavoidable hardships may be tempered to our people.

#### APPENDIX I.

##### The Warning of the Corn Merchants, published in all the Newspapers of the Kingdom in 1903.

"We, the undersigned, concur in the opinion that, if Great Britain should become involved in a European war, the country must be prepared

to see bread at practically famine prices. We base our opinion upon the following reasons:—

1. The experience of the Napoleonic and Crimean Wars, in each of which, though we possessed full command of the sea, the price of wheat rose enormously.

2. As late as the Crimean War we were almost self-supporting, but we now import four-fifths of our wheat.

3. The chief source of supply is the United States; but the price of wheat on the American corn-market can be raised artificially, and in the event of a European war in which Great Britain was involved, it is quite possible, indeed probable, that it would be so raised.

4. The corn trade on both sides of the Atlantic would expect to make war profits commensurate with war risks.

5. The capture of a few food-ships such as, having regard to the relative strength of our Navy, appears inevitable, would still further drive prices up.

6. It is not possible to specify the height to which the price of wheat, and consequently of bread, would rise, for it would depend upon the degree to which it was influenced by each of the five factors before enumerated. Taking, however, into account the vast importance of the question of our Food Supply in Time of War, we feel that the country ought to know that in the opinion of corn merchants it must, in the event of such a war, prepare to see wheat, and consequently bread, at what would be to the poor *Famine Prices*.

"Signed by the seventy-four leading Corn Merchants  
of the United Kingdom."

#### APPENDIX II.

##### The Warning of the Trades Councils.

The following resolution was passed in 1903 by the 120 chief Trades Councils of the Kingdom, and was published in all the newspapers.

"That this Trades Council is of opinion that, should this country become involved in a European war, bread would rapidly rise to famine prices. Such a state of affairs, if nothing be done beforehand to guard against it, will prove a source of the very gravest National danger. The immediate result of bread rising to such famine prices will be the greatest possible distress and misery, and semi-starvation amongst the working classes.

"Our reasons for this opinion are: (1) The changed industrial conditions of the present day, and the vast poverty-stricken masses congested in our great cities. (2) There are nearly 7,000,000 people to-day living in poverty so dire that they can hardly eke out a subsistence even at present prices. They will not be able to pay famine prices. (3) The disruption of trade, which must accompany a European war, will throw a further very large number, how large cannot be foreseen, out of work—wageless. They will not be able to purchase food. (4) It is not necessary for us to point out that the prolongation of the war means the starvation of the poor and not of the rich. And as week by week the pinch of hunger is felt more and more we will not picture the consequences, which cannot fall short of a National calamity. We therefore call upon the Government to institute an inquiry into the present perilous position of this country in regard to its food supply in consequence of our dependence upon foreign countries, and to take measures to remedy this dangerous state of affairs."

## Passed by—

The Lancashire Federation of Trades Councils, The Yorkshire Federation of Trades Councils, and by the Trades Councils of London, Birmingham, Manchester, Glasgow, Leeds, Newcastle-on-Tyne, Sheffield, Bristol, Bradford, Wolverhampton, Leicester, Preston, Oldham, Dundee, Cardiff, Norwich, Southampton, Derby. Also by:—

Accrington, Ashton-under-Lyne, Barrow-in-Furness, Bath, Brighouse, Battersea, Birkenhead, Blackburn, Bournemouth, Burnley, Burton-on-Trent, Bury, Carlisle, Cheltenham, Chester, Chatham, Chorley, Coalville, Coatbridge, Colne, Coventry, Crewe, Croydon, Darwen, Deptford, Durham, Eccles, Erith, Farnworth, Glossop, Gloucester, Govan, Grantham, Greenock, Grimsby, Hartlepool, Harlingden, Hastings, Heywood, Horwich, Huddersfield, Hull, Ilkeston, Inverness, Ipswich, Keighley, Kettering, Leigh, Lincoln, Llanelli, Long Eaton, Loughborough, Maidstone, Middlesbrough, Newark, Newmarket, Newport, Northwich, Oswestry, Oxford, Paisley, Peterborough, Perth, Plymouth, Poole, Poplar, Portsmouth, Radcliffe, Ramsbottom, Rochdale, Rotherham, Runcorn, St. Albans, Scarborough, Shields, Shildon, Shipley, Southampton, Spen Valley, Stalybridge, Stanningley, Stockton, Stourbridge, Stroud, Sunderland, Swansea, Swindon, Todmorden, Tunbridge Wells, Warrington, West Bromwich, Wigan, Woolwich, Worcester, Workington, Worksop.

## APPENDIX III.

## Meat Supply.

Average annual import, alive and dead: Period 1906-1908, 1,080,082 tons; 1907-1909, 1,063,914 tons; 1908-1910, 1,053,324 tons; 1909-1911, 1,071,608 tons; 1910-1912, 1,084,090. Total for five periods, 5,353,018. Average for five periods, 1,070,604.

Authority: *Statistical Department of the Customs.*

## APPENDIX IV.

## Meat Supply.

Approximate home production, Agricultural Returns, 1912: Cattle, 12,000,000, killed for food, 804,000 tons; sheep, 29,000,000, killed for food, 362,000 tons; pigs, 4,000,000, killed for food, 278,000 tons. Total, 1,444,000 tons.

The home production, owing to varying weights of beasts, is very difficult to estimate. I have followed in this Table the method adopted by Mr. Crawfurd in his paper on "Notes on the Food Supply of the United Kingdom, Belgium, France, and Germany," read before the Statistical Society, 1899. Extract: "The home production is based on the assumption that for every 1,000 living cattle of all ages, enumerated annually for the purpose of the Agricultural Returns, about 67 tons of beef and veal are available for consumption in a year; for every 1,000 living sheep enumerated, 12½ tons of mutton and lamb; and for every 1,000 living pigs enumerated 69½ tons of bacon, ham, or pork." We kill annually about one-third of our live-stock, the other two-thirds being reserved for store purposes and for milk and breeding.

## APPENDIX V.

## Meat Supply.

Home and imported: Home production, 1,444,000 tons (seven months roughly); imports alive and dead, 1,070,000 tons (five months roughly). Total, 2,500,000 tons.

## APPENDIX VI.

Comparative supplies of English and foreign wheat, the population of United Kingdom (in thousands), and the average price of English wheat are as follows:—

Cereal years.	U.K. Wheat crop Area. Acres.	U.K. Wheat crop (less seed). Qrs.	Wheat & Flour Imports. Qrs.	Available for Con- sumption. Qrs.	Corrected. Popula- tion.	Annual average.
1911-12	1,961	7,436	27,528	34,964	45,217	—
1910-11	1,856	6,542	26,873	33,415	44,902	31/9
1909-10	1,858	7,307	27,701	35,008	44,507	31/8
1908-09	1,867	6,236	25,383	31,603	44,113	36/11
1907-08	1,663	6,537	25,826	31,992	43,728	32/2
1906-07	1,664	7,009	26,512	33,083	43,353	30/7
1905-06	1,801	6,979	26,875	33,879	42,974	28/4
1904-05	1,836	6,965	28,157	35,122	43,217	29/9
1903-04	1,408	4,550	28,104	32,654	42,793	28/4

## APPENDIX VII.

## The World's Wheat Crop, 1913 to 1911.

(Compiled specially for "Dornbusch's List" from official sources when practicable).

EUROPE.	1913 Qrs.	1912 Qrs.	1911 Qrs.
France	40,000,000	41,746,000	38,060,000
Russia, European, 63 Govts.	88,900,000	78,090,000	55,964,000
Russia, Asiatic, 26 Govts.	20,000,000	22,250,000	14,577,000
Hungary	18,000,000	21,220,000	21,913,000
Croatia and Slavonia	1,500,000	1,858,000	1,904,000
Austria	7,000,000	8,717,000	7,374,000
Herzegovina and Bosnia	400,000	374,000	350,000
Italy	25,000,000	20,425,000	24,042,000
Germany	18,500,000	20,589,000	18,671,000
Luxemburg	90,000	83,000	78,000
Spain	14,000,000	13,744,000	18,557,000
Portugal	1,000,000	1,000,000	1,483,000
Rumania	10,500,000	11,194,000	11,353,000
Bulgaria	8,000,000	7,981,000	9,014,000
Servia	1,600,000	1,800,000	1,917,000
Turkey	10,000,000	17,000,000	17,000,000
Greece	650,000	700,000	700,000
United Kingdom	7,500,000	7,175,000	8,039,000
Belgium	1,900,000	1,921,000	1,830,000
Holland	650,000	690,000	681,000
Switzerland	440,000	398,000	441,000
Sweden	900,000	950,000	1,031,000
Norway	35,000	39,000	33,000
Denmark	500,000	469,000	537,000
Cyprus and Malta	300,000	320,000	350,000
Total Europe	277,365,000	280,733,000	255,899,000

## Appendix VII.—Contd.

AMERICA.		1913	1912	1911
		Qrs.	Qrs.	Qrs.
United States	...	91,000,000	91,287,000	77,667,000
Canada	...	27,000,000	24,905,000	26,981,000
Mexico	...	1,200,000	1,200,000	1,300,000
Argentina	...	25,000,000	24,900,000	20,806,000
Chile	...	2,200,000	2,250,000	2,282,000
Uruguay	...	1,200,000	1,250,000	748,000
Peru	...	650,000	700,000	650,000
<b>Total America</b>	...	<b>148,250,000</b>	<b>146,492,000</b>	<b>130,434,000</b>
<hr/>				
<b>ASIA.</b>				
India	...	44,785,000	45,797,000	47,064,000
Persia	...	1,800,000	2,000,000	1,700,000
Japan	...	3,400,000	3,211,000	3,106,000
China	...	700,000	700,000	700,000
<b>Total Asia</b>	...	<b>50,685,000</b>	<b>51,708,000</b>	<b>52,570,000</b>
<hr/>				
<b>AFRICA.</b>				
Algeria	...	4,000,000	3,402,000	4,582,000
Tunisia	...	700,000	530,000	1,010,000
Egypt	...	4,000,000	3,869,000	4,703,000
The Cape	...	300,000	300,000	300,000
<b>Total Africa</b>	...	<b>9,000,000</b>	<b>8,101,000</b>	<b>10,655,000</b>
<hr/>				
<b>AUSTRALASIA.</b>				
New South Wales	...	3,900,000	3,767,000	2,573,000
Queensland	...	150,000	156,000	140,000
South Australia	...	2,750,000	2,687,000	2,637,000
Tasmania	...	100,000	100,000	98,000
Victoria	...	3,000,000	2,893,000	3,041,000
Western Australia	...	1,200,000	1,197,000	504,000
<b>Total Commonwealth</b>	...	<b>11,100,000</b>	<b>10,800,000</b>	<b>8,993,000</b>
<b>NEW ZEALAND</b>	...	<b>800,000</b>	<b>642,000</b>	<b>1,050,000</b>
<b>Total Australasia</b>	...	<b>11,900,000</b>	<b>11,442,000</b>	<b>10,043,000</b>
<b>Grand Total</b>	...	<b>497,200,000</b>	<b>498,476,000</b>	<b>459,601,000</b>

## APPENDIX VIII.

## Origin and Details of Wheat and Flour (as Wheat) Imports of the United Kingdom.

*In the Current Cereal Year, and Totals of Ten Previous Cereal Years,  
in qrs. of 480 lb.*

Exporting Countries.	United States.	Canada.	Russia.	India.	Germany and Austria.	Danube & Turkey.	Australasia.	Argentina	Other Countries	Total.	
1912-13.											
September	Qrs.	Qrs.	Qrs.	Qrs.	Qrs.	Qrs.	Qrs.	Qrs.	Qrs.	Qrs.	
September	470,775	561,138	162,050	695,030	15,537	13,696	244,466	331,130	80,327	2,574,149	
October	708,179	631,160	513,387	640,547	19,377	15,150	247,872	208,219	57,750	3,120,304	
November	744,126	572,508	313,973	439,460	16,700	14,003	130,287	208,747	19,703	2,406,808	
December	918,652	546,598	188,650	510,486	19,897	6,697	181,689	279,880	30,206	2,682,755	
January	985,017	357,946	19,973	353,617	22,198			102,243	142,050	46,544	2,029,583
February	880,010	326,963	69,284	236,297	21,699	47	79,467	215,276	20,314	1,849,267	
March	717,988	329,030	62,393	225,050	36,927	164	208,140	662,833	13,434	2,254,959	
April	716,689	324,355	26,789	105,023	44,963		262,753	907,483	24,813	2,414,865	
May	754,604	474,704	88,830	118,860	24,828	—	281,537	699,397	29,560	2,462,120	
June	848,666	698,365	142,500	497,700	20,654		252,604	462,693	68,407	2,993,083	
July	859,608	886,639	80,733	768,203	15,237		320,286	196,056	62,640	2,939,402	
August	889,992	592,276	53,223	811,814	14,045		284	169,923	102,434	22,473	2,626,412
Tl. 12 mths.	9,226,969	6,241,485	1,721,813	5,402,017	271,854	24,991	2,481,167	4,407,198	476,172	30,253,696	
1911-12.											
September	474,739	391,010	175,584	488,110	8,233	91,373	527,321	227,360	51,553	2,435,283	
October	585,615	437,907	116,877	316,935	14,215	126,350	357,040	124,280	59,683	2,138,908	
November	440,144	459,076	506,544	240,940	16,383	146,604	378,264	113,849	64,960	2,366,764	
December	587,828	589,940	265,883	326,784	13,563	73,593	264,210	94,290	89,594	2,305,085	
January	403,706	444,363	183,376	354,107	6,653	39,876	201,983	55,603	44,438	1,734,105	
February	389,327	392,208	8,796	358,096	6,714	21,443	320,777	3,740	34,114	1,535,215	
March	425,286	297,325	161,863	250,927	45,240	38,966	311,829	60,970	40,967	1,633,343	
April	473,510	408,397	218,330	432,833	46,707	46,247	390,380	607,687	71,240	2,666,611	
May	473,268	461,271	17,546	332,733	17,383	29,727	309,459	921,241	13,820	2,606,448	
June	431,368	866,761	132,440	212,782	12,767	21,793	212,243	612,637	61,486	2,564,415	
July	348,911	645,897	87,267	609,537	13,653	7,257	152,129	641,330	17,622	2,523,808	
August	317,025	545,288	113,517	1,085,233	15,381	1,377	372,198	484,964	54,107	2,989,090	
Tl. 12 mths.	5,350,697	5,930,443	1,988,023	5,009,106	216,892	644,806	3,797,833	3,948,001	633,764	27,528,365	
1910-11.											
September	215,347	383,493	621,740	577,010	29,593	85,913	133,287	309,113	30,617	2,375,412	
October	305,628	328,524	701,260	337,167	26,877	52,337	207,817	273,973	51,774	2,285,357	
November	406,782	553,704	748,580	342,697	20,839	63,723	209,510	374,167	38,643	2,655,645	
December	428,658	484,460	771,750	418,899	26,483	18,433	216,570	153,720	33,464	2,552,827	
January	308,745	250,412	487,293	270,717	14,627	4,177	99,440	213,390	14,214	1,663,255	
February	293,408	216,620	266,573	305,690	18,980	17,943	165,754	146,463	8,329	1,382,663	
March	366,196	386,423	377,281	289,283	10,733	22,610	169,880	431,088	9,600	2,022,277	
April	249,063	299,256	375,857	468,182	14,084	20,587	278,957	478,523	25,853	2,311,713	
May	323,129	379,410	331,933	359,047	12,110	16,680	385,200	454,363	15,180	2,205,992	
June	326,453	406,310	622,860	278,658	7,482	8,470	310,026	401,764	24,137	2,381,768	
July	263,016	278,480	415,753	621,123	7,713	2,333	394,117	607,570	21,100	2,611,215	
August	376,265	378,596	324,753	749,537	7,963	21,420	348,173	197,797	35,457	2,439,951	
Tl. 12 mths.	3,962,712	4,216,096	6,003,199	5,007,346	192,725	333,876	2,806,101	4,011,866	309,841	26,872,764	
1909-10.											
Sept.-Aug.	5,501,018	5,265,223	6,512,644	3,751,370	316,054	100,099	3,018,970	2,083,529	551,720	27,700,627	
1908-09.											
Sept.-Aug.	6,874,314	4,174,247	2,209,643	2,544,359	241,610	371,046	2,498,802	5,751,741	717,669	25,383,431	
1907-08.											
Sept.-Aug.	9,271,875	3,682,202	1,039,596	2,445,330	194,396	353,849	1,543,654	6,596,517	698,317	25,825,786	
1906-07.											
Sept.-Aug.	7,834,408	3,143,779	2,996,701	3,409,653	291,964	1,186,849	1,875,272	5,196,821	574,650	26,512,087	
1905-06.											
Sept.-Aug.	7,332,274	3,237,807	4,286,083	2,739,965	289,180	1,002,331	1,937,534	5,983,548	663,833	26,874,556	
1904-05.											
Sept.-Aug.	2,272,546	1,247,376	6,725,263	6,786,034	507,563	82,343	3,041,642	5,619,715	1,774,089	26,156,591	
1903-04.											
Sept.-Aug.	7,300,527	2,927,551	4,510,337	5,400,151	390,569	959,116	1,533,118	4,061,024	1,003,107	26,105,490	
1902-03.											
Sept.-Aug.	12,799,948	3,303,076	3,201,422	2,778,521	323,206	599,806	18,322	2,766,303	465,169	26,255,783	

## APPENDIX IX.

## Comparative Survey of Wheat.

5th Week of Cereal Year 1913-14.	Last Week.	Month Ago.	Last Year.	Two Years ago.	Three Years ago.
Wheat Imports, U. K. ....	333,153	456,003	557,550	526,166	312,067
Flour (as wheat) Imports, U. K. ....	69,134	135,700	100,800	48,267	154,366
Aggregate Imports ....	402,287	591,703	658,350	574,433	496,433
Estimated Imports required weekly	530,000	530,000	530,000	530,000	530,000
Average Weekly Imports since 1st Sept. ....	534,000	567,000	611,155	610,000	542,000
Estimated Deliveries of British Wheat ....	152,248	170,382	129,172	141,002	176,984
Aggregate U. K. Supply for the Week	554,535	762,055	787,522	715,435	673,427
Estimated Weekly Consumption at this season ....	625,000	625,000	625,000	620,000	615,000
Wheat Imports since 1st Sept. ....	2,230,480	1,897,827	1,054,877	2,793,093	2,266,437
Flour (as Wheat) Imports since 1st Sept. ....	438,633	369,499	187,433	259,600	442,866
Total Imports since 1st Sept. ....	2,669,113	2,266,826	1,222,310	3,052,692	2,709,303
British Wheat delivered since 1st Sept. ....	709,960	557,712	259,230	491,364	1,399,542
Imports and Home Supply since 1st Sept. ....	3,379,073	2,824,538	1,481,540	3,844,056	3,808,845
Foreign Wheat and Flour in U.K. Ports ....	2,450,000	2,500,000	2,945,000	1,955,000	1,965,000
British Wheat undelivered ....	5,291,000	5,443,000	5,741,000	5,259,000	5,650,000
Official Visible Supply in U.S. and Canada ....	8,085,000	7,318,000	6,241,000	4,851,000	7,789,000
Wheat and Flour Afloat for U.K. and Orders ....	1,710,000	1,805,000	1,720,000	2,305,000	2,295,000
In Farmers' Hands, U.K., ports, Afr. & Am. V.S. ....	17,516,000	17,066,000	16,647,000	14,350,000	17,779,000
Wheat and Flour Afloat for Continent direct ....	1,885,000	2,180,000	2,350,000	2,190,000	1,470,000
Gazette Deliveries of English Wheat Average Price per 480 lb. ....	76,124	85,176	64,588	70,501	88,497
	31/3	31/6	31/9	31/8	30/1

## APPENDIX X.

## The World's Barley, Maize, Oats and Rye Crops.

(Corrected from Final Returns.) In Qrs., 000's omitted.

BARLEY # 400lb. 1912			BARLEY # 400lb. 1912			
COUNTRIES.	Qrs.	Qrs.	COUNTRIES.	Qrs.	Qrs.	
United Kingdom	7,276	7,225	7,881	Denmark	3,150	2,649
France	6,037	5,912	5,266	Switzerland	55	54
Russia, Europ'n	55,591	49,280	54,251	Ottoman Empire	17,000	15,000
" Asiatic" .....	4,922	3,948	4,117	Cyprus	300	300
" Finland	600	626	600	Algeria	4,009	5,824
Hungary	8,898	9,356	6,418	Tunis	588	897
Austria	9,559	9,073	7,866	Japan	11,654	10,472
Herzegov. & Bosnia	343	356	319	China	800	800
Italy	1,025	1,327	1,135	U.S. America..	27,728	20,032
Germany	19,499	17,695	15,995	Canada	5,502	5,080
Spain	7,315	10,582	9,138	Peru	500	500
Rumania	2,576	3,169	3,556	Mexico	900	1,000
Bulgaria	2,240	2,478	1,689	Australia	400	257
Servia	750	553	815	New Zealand ..	100	157
Portugal	1,000	1,000	1,250	Argentine		
Egypt	1,323	1,428	1,372	Republic	650	800
Belgium	514	561	466	Chile	300	299
Holland	409	414	376	Cape of Good Hope	100	120
Sweden	1,600	1,662	1,663	Total .....	205,485	191,027
Norway	363	348	351			186,701

## APPENDIX XI.

MAIZE # 480 lb. 1912 1911 1910				MAIZE # 480 lb. 1912 1911 1910			
COUNTRIES.	Qrs.	Qrs.	Qrs.	COUNTRIES.	Qrs.	Qrs.	Qrs.
Russia, Europ'n	9,301	9,572	8,977	Uruguay .....	1,000	425	772
Asiatic..	1,697	1,550	2,886	Mexico .....	17,000	20,000	21,637
Hungary .....	24,632	18,862	24,881	Peru .....	—	—	735
Austria .....	1,782	1,432	2,027	Australia .....	1,117	1,628	1,346
Herzgov. &				New Zealand .....	50	32	71
Bosnia	998	982	1,000	Natal .....	300	300	275
Italy .....	11,546	10,926	13,960	Orange Free State	700	600	625
France .....	2,500	1,971	2,817	Transvaal .....	1,200	1,000	1,000
Spain .....	2,929	3,356	3,192	Cape of Good Hope	400	500	179
Portugal .....	1,000	1,000	1,119	Egypt .....	8,169	7,934	8,214
Sweden .....	1,500	1,400	1,400	Algeria .....	44	39	60
Rumania .....	10,350	13,411	12,558	Tunis .....	38	32	28
Bulgaria .....	6,440	3,574	3,308	Japan .....	414	376	449
Servia .....	3,750	3,100	3,856	China .....	—	—	1,211
Ottoman Empire	—	—	5,164	Chile .....	200	143	170
U.S. America	367,617	297,846	339,560	Total .....	532,943	407,743	486,250
Canada .....	1,700	2,193	2,341				
Argentine Republic	34,569	3,549	20,432				

## APPENDIX XII.

OATS # 304 lb. 1912 1911 1910				OATS # 304 lb. 1912 1911 1910			
COUNTRIES.	Qrs.	Qrs.	Qrs.	COUNTRIES.	Qrs.	Qrs.	Qrs.
United Kingdom	20,600	20,367	21,974	Switzerland ...	430	497	511
France .....	37,679	36,880	35,224	Servia .....	500	518	542
Russia, Europ'n	103,127	84,000	95,623	British Columbia	181	174	250
Asiatic.	12,300	8,804	11,623	Prince Ed. Island	712	655	847
Finland	2,000	2,000	2,350	Canada .....	38,077	36,651	42,559
Hungary .....	8,221	10,280	7,661	U.S. America	149,298	97,084	124,878
Austria .....	17,739	16,371	15,330	Chile .....	300	189	196
Herzgov. &				Cape of Good Hope	200	300	300
Bosnia	502	570	291	Orange Free State	200	200	200
Italy .....	3,028	4,312	3,006	Australia .....	1,500	1,194	1,842
Germany .....	62,794	54,423	57,275	New Zealand..	2,000	1,265	1,262
Luxemburg .....	350	346	349	Argentine Republic	12,396	7,429	5,048
Spain .....	2,616	3,503	3,054	Uruguay .....	200	187	200
Portugal .....	1,500	1,500	1,450	Algeria .....	1,321	1,203	1,405
Rumania .....	2,285	3,176	3,591	Tunis .....	221	464	336
Bulgaria .....	1,290	2,187	1,106	Japan .....	583	468	448
Ottoman Empire	3,000	3,000	3,163	China .....	100	111	100
Belgium .....	3,766	4,241	4,150	Total .....	508,629	420,297	465,103
Holland .....	1,862	2,095	2,185				
Sweden .....	8,700	7,688	8,620				
Denmark .....	5,688	4,956	4,884				
Norway .....	1,363	1,059	1,270				

## APPENDIX XIII.

RYE # 480 lb.	1912	1911	1910	RYE # 480 lb.	1912	1911	1910
COUNTRIES.	Qrs.	Qrs.	Qrs.	COUNTRIES.	Qrs.	Qrs.	Qrs.
France .....	6,092	5,736	5,338	Ottoman			
Russia, Europ'n	118,128	86,742	96,982	Empire	1,900	2,000	2,196
" Asiatic.	4,655	3,073	3,923	Bulgaria	1,386	1,723	1,055
Finland	1,500	1,495	1,400	Belgium	2,688	2,697	2,575
Hungary .....	6,623	6,318	6,373	Holland	1,853	1,854	1,860
Austria .....	13,684	12,752	13,628	Sweden	2,800	2,886	2,775
Italy .....	618	621	635	Norway	122	115	108
Germany .....	53,351	49,894	48,264	Denmark	2,148	2,320	2,354
Luxemburg ...	80	77	71	Japan	5,000	4,654	4,165
Spain .....	2,204	3,370	3,218	U.S. America	4,458	4,140	4,362
Portugal .....	450	450	450	Canada	361	315	193
Switzerland ...	199	213	188	Servia	175	199	176
Rumania .....	421	604	955	Total	229,238	194,248	203,244

## APPENDIX XIV.

## Raw Material, Stocks and Operatives.

From Evidence, Royal Commission, 1903.

## Cotton Trade.

Weavers }	500,000	1,000,000 operatives. 3 for families (a low estimate).
Spinners }	500,000	
Dyers }	500,000	
Bleachers }	500,000	
Finishers		3,000,000

Stocks at ports, three to five months.

Stocks at mills, five weeks.

*Note.*—3 is used here for families, to allow for the large number of female operatives in the cotton trade.

## Woollen Trade.

Stocks, 4 months...	... Operatives...	244,000	4½ for families.
		1,098,000	

## Iron and Steel Trades.

Stocks, one month's foreign ore.	
Iron and Steel—Mining Coal	... ... 600,000 operatives.
Engineering, dependent on Iron and Steel	800,000
	1,400,000
	4½ for families.
	6,300,000

## Silk Trade.

Stocks practically nil ...	... ...	... 40,000 operatives.	4½
		180,000	

## APPENDIX XV.

## The Normal Poverty in our Great Cities.

Sir Charles Booth, in his authoritative work on "The Life and Labour of the People," divides the population of London as follows:—

- (a) *The Lowest Class*: Occasional labourers, loafers and semi-criminals.
- (b) *The Very Poor*: Earnings under 18s. a week, casual labour, hand-to-mouth existence, chronic want.
- (c) and (d) *The Poor*: Including alike those whose earnings are small because of irregularity of employment, and those whose work, though regular, is ill-paid (under 23s.).
- (e) and (f) : *The regularly employed and fairly paid working classes* of all grades, earning 23s. a week and upwards to 50s. a week.
- (g) and (h) : *Lower and Upper Middle Classes* and all above this level, including the professional classes.

The proportions of the various classes given for London are:—

(a) : <i>The Lowest</i> ... ...	'9 per cent.	= 37,610	In poverty,
(b) : <i>The Very Poor</i> ... ...	75 "	= 316,834	
(c) and (d) : <i>The Poor</i> ... ...	22.3 "	= 938,293	30.7 per cent.
(e) and (f) : <i>The Comfortable</i> } Working Classes ... ...	51.5 "	= 2,166,503	In comfort,
(g) and (h) : <i>The Middle, Professional, and</i> } 17.8 "	= 749,930	69.3 per cent.	
<i>Upper Classes</i> ... ...			
Total ... ...	<u>100</u>		

## APPENDIX XVI.

These figures are applicable to 25,000,000 of our urban population, thus:—

(a) : <i>The Lowest</i> ... ...	'9 per cent.	= 225,000	In poverty,
(b) : <i>The Very Poor</i> ... ...	75 "	= 1,875,000	
(c) and (d) : <i>The Poor</i> ... ...	22.3 "	= 5,575,000	= 7,675,000.
(e) and (f) : <i>The Comfortable</i> } Working Classes ... ...	51.5 "	= 12,875,000	In comfort,
(g) and (h) : <i>The Middle, Professional, and</i> } 17.8 "	= 4,450,000	69.3 per cent.	
<i>Upper Classes</i> ... ...			= 17,325,000.
	<u>100</u>		

Representative Budget of Classes A, B, C, and D, from Mr. Rowntree's "Poverty, a Study of Town Life"—father, mother and three children.

## In Peace, at Peace Prices.

Food ... ... ... ...	£0 12 9	Rowntree, page 296, compare the Budgets, also pages 56 and 133.
Rent (say) ... ... ... ...	0 4 0	
Clothing, fuel, light, etc. ... ...	0 4 11	
	<u>£1 1 8</u>	

NOTE.—7,000,000 in towns dependent on wages of 23s. a week and under.

*In War, with Price of Food Doubled.*

Food	...	...	...	...	...	£1 5 6	Out of 23s. or 18s. a week and under. Evidently impossible.
Rent	...	...	...	...	...	0 4 0	
Clothing, fuel, light, etc.	...	...	...	...	...	0 4 11	
<u>£1 14 5</u>							

## DISCUSSION.

**The Chairman:** I have now to invite discussion on this thought-creating paper which we have heard from Major Murray. I have listened to I don't know how many discussions in this theatre in my time, and I have found that the tendency of speakers is to deal with the whole of the paper—to fly about from one part of the subject to another in a sort of superficial way, thus leaving the audience very little wiser than they were before. I would therefore suggest that each speaker who may favour us with remarks should confine himself entirely to that branch of the subject which he knows and in which he is an expert. That will be a real contribution to the discussion. I also understand from Major Murray that we have present here this afternoon representatives of the London Trades Council. On behalf of the Council of the Institution I beg to give them a hearty welcome, and I express the hope that some of them will contribute their share to the discussion, because, after all, it is that class, comprising the great majority of the people of the country, who would be most affected by the evils which Major Murray has put forward.

**Mr. Christopher Turnor:** I approach this subject from the agricultural point of view. What can the land do to solve this problem? As Major Stewart Murray has said, "We must get rid of fear." I would like to give you a few figures just to show what can be done upon the agricultural side. We consume about 400 million pounds worth of food altogether per year (I am not talking now of things that come from tropical countries, but of the mainstays of life) and we produce in the United Kingdom about 200 million pounds worth per annum—that is, one half. I want to lay great stress upon that, because it is not realized in this country that we produce one-half. These figures are altogether final figures; they are the ones worked out by Mr. Rew of the Board of Agriculture, which he put before the British Association last year. When it comes to wheat, we are producing only one-fifth of our supply. But we could produce far more than one-fifth. At the time of the Napoleonic Wars our farmers went "wheat-mad." They had about 9,000,000 acres under wheat. That was too much. But to-day we have only 1,700,000 acres under wheat, which is far too little. After much study of this question I think I am on the safe side when I say that there are undoubtedly about 5,000,000 acres in this country which could produce wheat profitably to the farmer, provided he uses the most up-to-date methods of cultivation. Just think for a moment what 5,000,000 acres under wheat would mean. It would mean, taking four quarters to the acre, 20,000,000 quarters of wheat. Our consumption in this country is about 35,000,000 quarters, so that 20,000,000 quarters would go a long way towards making us safe from the point of view of defence and food supply. I have every hope that with the progress of science we shall soon have an average crop, not of four quarters, but of five quarters to the acre—that is the average in Denmark to-day—that would mean 25,000,000 quarters of wheat produced in this country, which

should greatly help to solve the problem put before us to-day. In many other respects we do not realize the possibilities of English land. Three years ago a friend of mine induced a farmer to plough up 80 acres of very wretched grass-land that was not producing £1 worth of food stuff to the acre for the nation; he put it under wheat, and the year before last he obtained £10 of wheat per acre. In other words, that area which, at the time he ploughed it up, was not producing £80 worth of foodstuff a year, produced at the end of one year £800 worth of wheat. A further point: At 30s. or, at any rate, 35s. a quarter, it pays the farmer well to grow wheat—there is absolutely no doubt about it if he produces five quarters to the acre. Mr. Edward Strutt's most interesting figures on this subject show that for a period of 19 years, his profit, after paying rent and all outgoings on his wheat land, was £3 19s. od. per acre, which speaks for itself, and that was on average land, not on wonderfully rich land. I want to concentrate public opinion on the idea of the possible productivity of our soil, and the part it can play in providing food for the people. I would like to put one or two questions: Why is it that in spite of the increasing prices of all agricultural produce—because they have been increasing in the last four or five years—the yield of our land has been gradually going down? That is a very serious matter. If you refer to the official returns you will see that 227,000 acres that last year were under arable cultivation, this year have been laid down to grass, and when it is put down to grass, as the average English farmer puts it down, it is practically saying it is going out of cultivation. These 227,000 acres more grass do not mean more sheep, more pigs, more cattle. The same official list will show you a decrease in sheep and in cattle—in everything except horses. Again, why is the yield of the land of England, the richest land in the world, with one of the best climates in the world for farming (I speak as a practical farmer, and though we have some bad years, taking it year in and year out, I think it is one of the very best climates)—why is it that the yield from the industry that the nation must depend upon, the industry which not only is to give us our food supply in time of war, but which is essential to the whole well-being of the nation, is decreasing? If we once again have a large number of men engaged in arable cultivation it will relieve unemployment in the towns, and it will provide the food supplies we require.

**Mr. H. F. Wyatt:** It would be difficult to exaggerate the debt of gratitude which we all owe to the lecturer for one of the most able and interesting papers that has ever been read at this Institution. One cannot resist the wish that the five subjects which he has put so concisely before us to-day could be made the dominant topic of consideration by His Majesty's Government, and one cannot but think they might be well substituted for other matters to the advantage of the nation. Remembering the extremely pertinent advice of the Chairman I will endeavour to speak upon only two of the main points in the few minutes I have in which to address you. The first is that of naval protection. It is curious to see the change which has come over the method of allusion to naval protection. Had this discussion taken place a few years ago, probably every speaker would have referred to naval protection as something which was absolutely assured. We should have been told that the Navy could not fail us, and that it was upon the Navy and the providence of God we depended for everything. We have changed all that. No longer is there any of that assured note, or any note of reliance at all, not because of any failure

in the spirit or the ability of our naval officers and men, but simply through the vast decline in our relative naval power. I may just mention this, which is, I think, pertinent to the discussion : that in the year 1906 we could show 86 protected cruisers—cruising cruisers I may call them—to 26 German ; and that according to the corresponding return for this year, at the beginning of this year we could only show 69 against 49 Germans. The falling off is vast, and it is characteristic. And in another department, also equally essential to naval protection, destroyers, whereas we had 149 against the few possessed by the Germans in 1906, we have this year, January last, 114 against 111, taking those ships which were of sea age, that is, under 12 years of age. This falling off in naval protection vitally affects the subject to which the lecturer refers—the internal condition of this country, because the internal condition of this country during a great war must evidently be largely determined by external conditions—amongst which is the relative strength of the British Navy to the Navies possessed by other Powers. The vast falling off of our Navy in that regard has an intimate bearing upon our topic to-day. The last speaker has most ably suggested the possibilities of increasing the yield of corn in this country. I share the hope, which no doubt everyone feels, that that possibility may be fulfilled, but I venture to doubt whether it can be done for a good many years. I venture to doubt whether it is possible to increase the yield of British corn to the vast extent which he desires within the next five or ten or even more years, and until that has been done we must still rely upon foreign countries, the supply from which, owing to our naval weakness, is threatened in the event of strife. Also I would venture to suggest that, even supposing we had greatly increased the yield of food in this country, it by no means follows that we shall keep prices down. The rise of prices in war is not really determined under present conditions by the amount of food in the country, although no doubt the knowledge of the amount of food is a contributory factor, but by no means a decisive factor. For instance, in the days of the War of Independence between 1775 and 1783 we certainly had a vast deal more land under cultivation than we have now, and yet according to Admiral Mahan and other authorities the price of corn rose to 100s. a quarter, and upwards. Therefore you cannot say that the mere increase of food in this country will determine the prices of food. Prices are determined, I think the lecturer will probably agree with me, by a variety of causes. They are determined by the fear, by the panic, which is felt, by the desire that is felt by those who own the corn to make their profit, by competition in wartime, when you have the rich competing with the poor for the purchase of food. Notwithstanding that there may be adequate supplies in the country, still you would have prices going up to an enormous extent unless some organized and well-thought-out endeavour was made to prevent that result from following. How can you prevent that result from following? Every man has a sort of special regard, I suppose, for his own child, and in the same way, I suppose, I cannot help having a sneaking regard for a scheme of which I have ventured to be the author, and that is that an Act of Parliament should be passed now—and could be passed as soon as Parliament meets—providing that the Government, upon the outbreak of war should become automatically, without any fuss or bother, the owners of all the food within the country at the market rates previously obtaining. It would not rob the people who own the food, but it would seize all the food in the country at the market rates obtaining. That alone would make an enormous difference. It

would give the Government the right to regulate prices and to say at what price different articles of food should be sold. You have heard from Major Stewart Murray that we have from eight to ten weeks supply of provisions in the country at the worst time, and somewhere about seven months meat supply. With bread and meat you could get along, if you are rationed, and the population of this country should be supplied during war as a besieged city is supplied by the Government which controls that city—the population should be rationed. I have ventured to propose means by which the distribution could be effected; they have been published in a pamphlet. The particulars of the distribution could be arranged in peace time without much expense, and the scheme could be put into operation with voluntary aid, under voluntary conditions, so that the moment war broke out, with the food owned by the country the appalling risk and the black cloud which at present overhangs us in this matter would be to a very great extent dispersed. It would not be met altogether, but it would be immensely palliated. I venture to ask the lecturer to give some attention to the possibility of that suggestion as supplementary to his own scheme, as an addition to the various committees which he has himself suggested. Coming to the main point, what is the use of all these discussions by various people who possess knowledge and keen interest unless they produce some effect? All the various people who are interested in this subject have been discussing it for years past; it has been discussed with infinite ability by speakers at this Institution, but the result is that we are still in the deplorable condition in which we find ourselves, and in which we were ten years ago. Now my suggestion is that an effort should be made to get a combined application or appeal made to all the principal authorities and interests; that great mercantile firms and people in every department, and other bodies should be asked to combine in signing a memorial, of which memorial you would despatch two copies, one to the Government in power, and the other to their political opponents, who hope to succeed them. This is a non-party matter; it is a national matter, and you should appeal, therefore, equally to both political parties. Then the strongest possible appeal should be made to both sides. The Government should be asked to attend to it; on the other hand the opposition leaders should be empowered to see that the Government did attend to it. The present leaders should be appealed to to put the whole matter before the country, and the audiences which they address ought to try to bring political pressure to bear. It is a perfectly legitimate function for the opposition to see that the Government of the day does its duty. That applies equally whichever party is in power. It is the legitimate function of the opposition to endeavour to induce the Government of the day to do its duty to national defence and safety. Let an organized appeal be made to both sides, and to the Unionist cause asking the leaders to bring political pressure to bear in the country at large and in Parliament. If that course were followed, it seems to me that at last these discussions, which are attended by only a few people out of the population of London—there is only a handful here to-day compared with the whole population of London, although it is composed doubtless of men of weight, knowledge and influence, but how few compared with the millions of London—then these discussions, characterized by knowledge and keenness may produce an effect, and at last it may be the proud boast of the Royal United Service Institution that it has succeeded in making England safe.

**Mr. F. Knee** (Secretary, London Trades Council): Sir: I do not know that I should have ventured to take part in this discussion had it not been

for the pointed and friendly invitation which you yourself gave. The working classes are so interested in war that they dread it, and I think if the organized workers of London had had the opportunity of listening to Major Stewart Murray's paper they would have dreaded it more than ever. The prospect given by the Major of bread at 10d. a quartern loaf is not inviting, and I am quite assured that the Major and anyone who feels at all inclined to dally with war will find that such a prospect will make the working class movement more vehemently to oppose war than ever. We have no interest in war; we have nothing to gain by it; we have everything to gain by peace. I hear a note to the left that we have a great deal to lose by it. I am very much afraid that, although that may be my own personal opinion, there are many tens of thousands of the organized workers in London and in the country whom you would have very great difficulty indeed to persuade that that is so. There is a feeling abroad among the workers of this country that really it does not very much matter under what kind of master they serve so long as they have to serve under a master, and it is just as well I should be here this afternoon to tell you that. You ought to know, and ought to be in possession of these facts. Although this is my maiden speech here, I hold such very strong views on the question of national defence myself that I should be very pleased indeed to discuss that matter with you at another time. But this afternoon we want, I think, seriously to consider what is likely to occur in time of panic; that is what the threat of war would mean. Before the war actually broke out prices would rush upwards, partly because of the fear of the people themselves, partly because of the fear of the middleman that if he did not sell out quick at a big profit he would not get anything. No matter what the thing was worth he would make his profit while he could, and, of course, the one big price would lead on to the other bigger price, and that would mean—do not make any mistake about it—this: It is all very well to loosely suggest 10d. a quartern loaf as the possible maximum, but that would mean serious starvation—more starvation than we have now—because we have got enough of it at present among a very large section of our population. I want to call your attention to the fact that the very low-down people, the people who never have any chance, who never have any hope at all—those people are not so likely to rebel; they are not so likely to make a row at such a crisis as the better paid, the better-fed mechanic and artisan who, having been used to something like decent conditions, suddenly drops. That man will kick, and the organization, the State, which is going to stand idly by and let a man and his family suffer will lose something. The average mechanic, the average artisan, who has been in the habit of getting something like decent wages, and able to get his food at something like a reasonable price, when he is face to face with probably no wages, or half wages, and with prices at double their usual amount, will not sit idly down; he will make a row about it, and frankly speaking, as man to man, I do not think you would blame him either—taking the human point of view, apart from the question of class at all. I agree that the question of class does come in, because the working classes feel more than ever that whatever section of the community is going to suffer we are suffering the most, and therefore we are going to have a row about it. That would be the thing. In order to prevent that, it seems to me you must have something like State organization—State organization, not for repression, because if you go in for repression you will presently defeat your own ends. You cannot defend a State against other antagonistic States by a system of repression.

It is no use having half your people in revolt if you expect to succeed against the enemy; you will not do it. I do not know very much about banking, and I am not going to talk about it. I occasionally see the colour of a sovereign, but that is a rarity. But what I would say is this: I have seen in books that when there has been a panic in a bank or about a bank, that the best way to stave off the panic is to show some money, so that when people have come up demanding coin in payment for their paper they have been able to see a great deal of it, and have gone away satisfied. That is how the thing is done. Possibly you know more about that than I do, but that may be so in real banking life. At any rate I should be inclined to think that the best way for the State to stave off a panic in regard to food would be to show that at any rate there was a good deal of it, and that as long as there was a good deal of it, so long should the people have some of it. If you secure that, then if there was a feeling on the part of the community at large that our liberties are in danger because of any foreign Power, supposing war to have broken out, then, provided that we were not starved while other people were fed, I believe you might get something like cohesion for the maintenance of the British power. You must understand what you have got to face in the future whether you like it or whether you do not. It is all very well for Major Murray to talk about our political power being complete. It is not; it is nowhere near complete. But for the present we do oppose war; we do not want war, and I do not think you do either. But if war comes, or the threat of it, the best thing you can do with us, at any rate, is to make your peace with us by organizing the proper feeding of our wives and our children.

**Mr. E. B. Tredwen:** I will endeavour to keep my remarks as strictly as possible to the subjects with which I am familiar: from an experience of mercantile life for forty-five years. The Defence Committee of the London Chamber of Commerce have discussed this question and one thing always comes to the front: that we must have an adequate command of the sea. The paragraphs I want to refer to particularly in the paper read to-day say: "Our Navy may be able to look after the enemy's cruisers; but it will not be able to hunt down armed liners on the trade routes thousands of miles away." "But there will be fear, great fear (As Mr. George Renwick pointed out in his admirable lecture here last year) from a tramp steamer owner's point of view, if the oceans are left practically unprotected." This is used in support of the theory that we must have a national indemnity enacted beforehand for all the losses that may occur from capture at sea, so that merchants and shipowners may despatch their cargoes and their ships irrespective of any dangers upon the trade routes. I have held this opinion for many years, but I think none the less the trade routes should be adequately protected, because to leave them unprotected, to let our naval strength fall utterly below what it ought to be, and then to agree to pay all the consequent losses, will throw upon the country an immense pecuniary responsibility, and will not prevent the starvation of its workers. Would it not be possible—here I want to appeal to the naval experts present—to minimise the danger by having about a dozen very fast cruisers, burning oil fuel, that could keep the sea for a great length of time, to patrol the trade routes? One each based on Madeira, Capetown, Buenos Ayres, or the Straits of Magellan, in the West Indies, and Halifax; they would control every Atlantic route, being in touch with all the merchant vessels on those routes, by wireless

telegraphy, and would be prepared to hunt down any of the enemy's armed merchantmen that might be attacking our ships on these routes. In the Indian Ocean, four based on Aden, Colombo, Singapore and Fremantle, West Australia, would be a very good patrol for the Indian Ocean, and three could control the Pacific, based on Hong-Kong, Vancouver and one at Fiji. Those vessels would not cost a very great deal, but they would give a great deal more security to the trade routes than they have at present, and should be able to account for any armed merchantmen of the enemy in time of war, being superior in speed and in armament to the enemy's vessels. The proposal of one speaker for a law that in case of war the Government should immediately become the owner of all the wheat in the country might have some disadvantages. We want a larger stock of wheat in this country, and we have been considering how that can be attained. Such a law would be rather prejudicial to storing food stuffs in this country as compared with keeping them in other countries, because anyone bringing them here would know that in the event of war he would not get much profit, because he would be compelled to sell his stocks to the Government. In war time the Government would doubtless pass such an Act, but I think it would be a mistake to do so in advance so as to discourage the storage of wheat in this country. The storage of wheat involves the cost of the warehousing and the interest on the capital invested. If the Government give free storage for wheat it would interfere with the business of existing warehousemen, and the Government would take over their business and become a monopoly of wheat storage. If the Government were to make advances free of interest up to 75 per cent. of the market value of any cereals stored in English granaries, there would be more inducement to hold large stocks in our granaries because of advances free of interest, whereas in the ordinary way if they held for an advance in the market, or any other reason, the owner has to go to a banker and pay interest for any advance. That I think is one of the cheapest ways in which a larger food supply can be maintained in the country: but above all is the necessity for a strong Navy. It is perfectly absurd for our Labour friends to say, "We do not want war and therefore we will not have war," because if every nation in Europe were to disarm, by international agreement, how would they deal with the immediate Yellow Peril of Japan and the coming Yellow Peril of China? You working men of this country, who now begrudge national service, would be made the serfs and slaves of the Japanese and the Chinese; you would be the coolie labourers for them instead of being the masters of industry that you claim to be to-day.

**Mr. Williams** (Member of the London Trades Council): Mr. Chairman and friends. I must admit that I did not come here with the express purpose of taking part in this discussion. I did not know my name was upon the table; I came here to be instructed. My friend—if I may be allowed to say so—Major Murray, asked me to attend here, and I decided to do so because we Socialists now and then keep respectable company, you know. I think you will admit that. I had not seen the paper before it was read to-day. I have been asking myself why all this fear was being propounded here this afternoon on the question of war. After all, the people who do suffer from war are the working classes in this country, and the people who have the least voice in making war are the working classes of the country. We have no voice whatever in the making of war. I really believe that the old resolution that I struck many years

ago, that no war should be declared without the whole of the Members of Parliament having a say in it, would be a very good idea. I was rather amused at the latter portion of the paper where the Lecturer talked of the working classes. I was pleased at the interest he took in us, and I will tell you why—because there was a sort of fear there as to what would be the position of the working classes when war comes round. It is very pleasing. You have never consulted us before; you have never thought of us before when you have indulged in war. If anything we have done has made you think of our class, then, after all, our work has not been in vain. It is a question as to whether the working classes will starve. Let me tell you, without wishing to use threats at all, that the new Labour movement that has arisen will, in my humble opinion, see to it that we do not starve when times of war come round. We shall unload goods for ourselves, not for the other classes. Who is to say, when war comes—(I am talking of the rank and file under the present conditions and the present opinion of Labour men)—who is to say that a general strike shall not be declared, and that we will refuse to work any goods whatever on behalf of the classes who proclaim war? We have the right to do it, we have the power to do it. You are not far off now a general strike; in my humble opinion it is coming to that. So far as the question of my class starving is concerned, there is a better spirit abroad now at this moment than was abroad at the time of the Crimean War, or was abroad at the time of Waterloo; and there is a better spirit abroad now than there was even at the time of the Boer War. In my humble opinion we shall not starve; we shall take what we want. I remember the words of Lord Haldane some years ago who said at the Guildhall, "It is not danger from without this country has to fear; it is danger from within." You have got to fear danger from the class which has been neglected so long, and if you think that you can have a war with another nation, whether it be Germany, or Austria, or Russia, or France, or whatever nation it may be, without consulting the working classes, you are very much mistaken on the point. That is my opinion. I may be wrong, but that seems to me to be the trend of opinion at the present time. I was sorry to hear one jarring note in the paper read by Major Murray. He spoke of the "hooligans" who were in the working class movement. The men who are in the Trades Union movement to-day are the very pick of the working classes; they are the best of the working classes, and as a matter of fact they also know that although they are the pick of the working class movement they are not consulted so far as war is concerned. But they are not going to be so submissive as they have been in the past.

**Major Stewart Murray:** I was not referring to the Trades Unions as hooligans for a moment.

**Mr. Williams:** I thought it was just as well to draw you out on that point. As I have said, I did not come here for the express purpose of taking part in the discussion, but my honest belief is this—that Lord Haldane's words are correct: It is not danger from without we have to fear; it is danger from within. You gentlemen who really fear what the position of the workers will be at the time of any outbreak, it is just as well you should make peace with the working classes first. It is just as well that the Government of the day, whether it be Tory or whether it be Liberal, should make peace with the great bulk of the working classes over this particular question. I may say here and now it is

suicidal policy on the part of the Government not to prepare food supplies for their Army and for their Navy and for the poor people. Socialist as I am I stand here and say that, because I can see what will happen when war comes. The Statesmen who are at the head, the men who occupy the big offices in this Empire to-day, who never know the moment when war may come along—I say it is their duty to get together such an organization as will not only secure food for the Army and Navy, but secure it for the people who are the producers of the wealth of the whole of the Empire. If you have the people fed in time of war you will have a much greater chance of victory against the enemy. You will have a much greater chance of victory when inside your own gates there is peace and contentment so far as the food supply is concerned. I do not desire to say any more. I did not desire to speak at all, but my name has been handed up by somebody—who, I do not know. I am not a connoisseur on this point. All I say in conclusion is this: so far as any Government movement or any organized movement to secure food in time of war for the people of the whole nation, rich and poor alike, is concerned, without the poor having to pay any more than the rich pay for it, or even as much—I say that is the duty of the nation, and even Socialists, if must be, must come to the rescue.

**Dr. Miller Maguire:** I should be sorry to pretend that I could say anything in ten minutes, which is all I can possibly devote to the study of these tremendous topics, that could in the least degree be fruitful of legislation. That I cannot do, but I think in the time it is possible to remove some false impressions with regard to the notion that in time of war the "class" question—if there be a "class" question at all—will have to be taken into consideration. I have lived in this country a considerable time now, I am sorry to say, and I lived in another branch of the United Kingdom before that, and I felt it quite possible to look at these immortal questions, these perennial questions, these questions of life and death of the nations, without remembering at the moment whether my father was a parson, or whether he was a baronet, or whether I was a private soldier, or a private barrister, or both. What class is a cavalry soldier, what class is a shopkeeper? Is working with your hands "class," or is working with your brains "class"? I happen to have been a private soldier, and I was not a bit ashamed of it; I happen to be a lawyer, and I am not a bit ashamed of it; I happen to be a kind of nondescript unemployed person at the present moment, and though I am very angry, I am not very much ashamed. I do not believe that these labour representatives are on the right tack when they talk about classes. My sympathies are entirely with people who earn their bread by some form of toil, whether as Generals or as the people to whom everything in the nation is due, that is to say, agriculturists, next to priests and soldiers, the highest of all classes. It is a very curious thing that as to the speech of the gentleman who spoke about agriculture, Mr. Turnor, you will find almost word for word in its advice and its importance in Bacon's "Essay on the True Greatness of Kingdoms and Estates," where he points out that agricultural wealth is the best and safest kind of wealth, and wants Great Britain to become *terra potens armis* as well as *in ubere terrae*. But we are here to-day to consider what might be the internal condition of this country almost immediately, within a year or two, before two harvests are garnered. We are not here to discuss the far bigger and broader question of whether in our desire to get rich,

whether in following the fatal tenets of Manchester schools we have not been driven away from the wiser tenets in regard to agriculture of Lord Bacon, Virgil, and other important writers. I have known Mr. Wyatt for many years, and I am perfectly certain he will repudiate the idea that there was any notion amongst either the Navy League or the Maritime League, or any patriotic leagues to ignore the working "classes," or not to put the interests of the poorer "classes"—I prefer to say the people who live by the sweat of their brow from day to day—in the forefront of the consideration of these questions. Major Murray most decidedly said that the richer capitalist "class" can endure the horrors of a war longer than any other class, and he urged upon us that there are a considerable number of the people—I think Major Murray said 33 per cent.—always on the verge of misery, who, whether it be through a civil war or foreign war, would be reduced with their families to a very sad state forthwith. It is to remove the possibility of the fear which might lead to such a state of panic, as might lead to such a state, that we are here to-day. The lecture and the facts contained in it are well worthy of this assembly, and are distinctly in the interests of the poorest of the poor in this land. But it is not so easy to get the people alive to these considerations. I rejoice that Mr. Jack Williams, whom I have heard on the plinth of Nelson's Column with great interest, would follow the teachings of Major Murray in regard to Nelson. I liked a great deal of his speech, but—I do not care a bit about either Radical or Tory—we have this morning Mr. Winston Churchill turned into the greatest contempt possible almost—this morning that illustrious name of one of the greatest of our Generals is turned into contempt by a leading paper simply because he is a member of a Radical Government, and because he wants to maintain our naval supremacy in a crisis of our nation! That crisis is imminent, and far more dangerous than it was a hundred years ago, when Wellington was carrying the banner of St. George over the Pyrenees. Because Mr. Churchill wants in this crisis of our nation to avoid the panic which we know is imminent, and because he is a member of a Radical Government he is treated with the greatest contempt by the Radical leader writers. With regard to the question of panics in cities, and dangers from rioters, nothing too strong was said about them! You will soon find special constables and all these addenda of the art of war pressed into your services. I do not know whether Mr. John Williams was a special constable against Mr. John Burns. Apparently he was not. No? Well, I was. When a boy I commanded 100 special constables against Mr. John Burns. I can support Major Stewart Murray in what he has said on the poverty point, being conversant with the condition of the abysses of misery in nearly every city in Europe. We are nearly always on the verge of these panics and riots, and every man who tries by a strong self-confidence, real force, to put a stop to panic deserves well of this country. With regard to the question of pawning, why even now in Dublin two-thirds of the property of the poorer classes is taken care of by the money-lenders who put three balls over their front doors. The very same thing is now going on, and you are in danger. But remember you have three times the resources that you had one hundred years ago. If you were true to yourselves you could as easily raise an army of a million men as you did 400,000 men then. Then you were able to command, not two Powers at sea, but every Power at sea. What is the matter with you? You must have degenerated strangely when you require all these

councils and so much advice to ensure yourselves at a very small price indeed, and to ensure those poor people who in Dublin have left all their things at the pawnshop, and who are always, in London, as the lecturer said, on the verge of misery. I was with the poor only a week ago in Plaistow—whole miles of people on the very verge of ruin and misery. Alas! We want to do something to enable those people to rise up and be true to themselves and to their children, as their grandfathers were a hundred years ago. Cant is at the bottom of our whole infamy. I do blame the gentleman who says it is not in the interests of a working man to be true to his country. The German Emperor told Europe wisely that if Europe disarms and Asia arms you come to the same standard as the coolies—not labourers in the London Docks—and God knows that is bad enough—but the standard of a Canton coolie. How would you like it? I would not—and I am a working man. I agree with every word Major Murray said. I have read the book of Colonel Lonsdale Hale on "The People's War." What did the people of Paris suffer six weeks after the declaration of war in 1870? I advise you all to read that book of our Chairman, and if you read it you will come to the conclusion that Major Murray has said too little, that he ought to come here again, or go to the street corners, or into the shade of the Guildhall, or the precincts of the Parliament House, and cry aloud and spare not, or your fate will be that of France in the year 1870 at Sedan, and in 1871 at Le Mans. Vain are the lessons of history if all classes or ranks are not in earnest about readiness for war.

**Commander W. C. Crutchley:** I would like to express my thanks to the lecturer for the very able way in which he has dealt with an extremely abstruse subject. The great misfortune is that few people will pay attention to it; and yet the paper is of such merit that it is bound to come to the notice of the powers that be, and perhaps something will come of it. Remembering what the Chairman said, I propose to confine my remarks to the point which I do understand a little about, and that is the question of food supply with relation to our supremacy at sea. We hear a lot talked about a national indemnity for ships. It is safe to say that whether it is decided upon before the occurrence of war or afterwards, national indemnity must come about. It is no use saying it will not, because the British public will see that their wheatships, and, indeed, their supply ships, are able to get to sea, expense notwithstanding, and a national indemnity will come as sure as we are standing here. Then, again, with regard to the enemy's cruisers, I cannot make it out myself where they are supposed to come from. I was under the impression that we must know where the enemy's cruisers are, that our own ships would shadow them and bring them to action. There may be one or two of our own ships available, but apart from that we are told that the destruction is to be done by armed merchantmen, to run down our ships without hindrance. This is a very big subject. We have got guns on board some of our ships now, and I cannot help thinking that the destruction of merchantmen is a game that two people can play. If foreigners can destroy grain ships and other ships surely we can do the like. We have taken upon ourselves the right to arm our ships—not that we ever wanted the right, because merchant ships always did arm themselves, and they will do so in the future. Furthermore, I do not think we should get any the worst of it. The passenger trade naturally will suffer, but I think that the young men of the present day, the trained Naval Reserve

officer, will put up a much better fight than is commonly expected, and I do not think that the fear in connection with our food supply from oversea is nearly as serious as is anticipated.

**Mr. A. H. H. Matthews** (Central Chamber of Agriculture): I had not intended to take part in this discussion this afternoon. I asked Mr. Christopher Turnor to come and speak in my place, because he would speak with greater authority from the agricultural point of view. But I should like to endorse all he said. I was first brought to take an interest in this vital question from the fact that I have more or less to live with agricultural statistics, and it was borne in upon me how more and more we were becoming dependent upon our oversea food supplies. But I never realized, until I read Major Stewart Murray's paper, the whole question as he has brought it before us this afternoon. Like many others I have only looked at it from one point of view. I hope that this paper will get a very wide circulation, so that others may realize the mistake of approaching it from a single standpoint. There is one point on which I am not quite sure that I am altogether in agreement with Major Murray, and that is this question of indemnity. It appears to me that the proposals of the Royal Commission, if given effect to, would have the result of paying an indemnity for those cargoes of food supplies and of raw materials which never arrived. That it would be doing nothing to prevent a shortage of food supplies and raw material; but the taxpayer would have to pay for what he did not get. I do not know whether I read the Report of the Royal Commission aright—I hope I do not; but that is the impression I have got. Any recommendation that may go forward from any public bodies that consider this question will, I hope, make it quite clear that we cannot agree to pay an indemnity for such material as does not actually arrive in our ports. It appears to me that something of this sort might happen: A tramp steamer with a cargo of wheat starts from Buenos Ayres for Liverpool. At the time she starts the price of wheat is, we will say, to-day's price, 35s. a quarter. War breaks out directly after that ship has started, and by the time she gets within Marconi distance of this side the market price of wheat has gone up to 80s. a quarter. The master of the ship gets instructions from his employers at Liverpool to try and get in. We will assume that it is Germany against whom we are fighting. Germany is also within Marconi touch of that ship, and offers the master of that ship 100s. a quarter for his wheat. They will send out their cruisers, capture the ship, and pay him 100s. a quarter for his cargo, while the owner draws the indemnity from our Government. I think the master of the ship would be justified when that happened in "winking the other eye." That is a possibility which must be guarded against. At this late hour of the afternoon I must not trespass further on the courtesy of the meeting.

**Commander W. F. Caborne, C.B., R.N.R.**: We have listened to an extremely able and valuable lecture. Without doubt, if we are to be successful in a war against some great naval Power, or a combination of naval Powers, we must previously have been prepared for it in all its eventualities, including the question of our food supply and the protection of our sea-borne commerce, and the real meaning of Major Stewart Murray's paper is—adequate preparation in all its branches for war. I am sure that none of us desire war; in fact, it is the very last thing in the world that we do wish for; but war is sometimes quite unavoidable,

and circumstances may arise where death or total annihilation would be preferable to submission to national dishonour.

I should not have spoken at all this afternoon had it not been for some of the remarks made by preceding speakers. With regard to National Indemnity, or National Insurance—and they seem to be one and the same thing—while generally approving of the idea, if carried out with adequate safeguards against fraud, I argued here in 1912, during a discussion on "Our Supplies of Food-Stuffs and Raw Materials in Time of War," that the fundamental principle should be to make the safe arrival of the ship far more profitable to all concerned than would be her capture, and also put forward some views as to how in part that should be done, which I will not now repeat. With the intention of preventing panic prices, and the consequent risks involved, I, in the course of a discussion of a paper in this Institution in 1903, on "Food-Stuffs in Time of War," advocated—and I am one of the last people in the world to be suspected of Socialistic tendencies—that upon the outbreak of war, and as a purely temporary precaution, steps should be taken for the nationalization of all the food in the country. But in order to carry out this policy, a carefully considered scheme would have to be drawn up and arranged for in time of peace: otherwise, in time of emergency, it would be too late to be effective in relieving the tension.

**The Chairman** (Colonel Sir Lonsdale Hale): I have said once or twice already this Session that when we have an important subject brought forward at this Institution by an expert the Council always tries to obtain as Chairman an expert of greater experience in the subject. Therefore when Major Murray brought forward this lecture—a lecture which deals with finance, banking, the work of the Navy and other big subjects—our Secretary did his best to try and obtain the services in the Chair of some naval officer of high rank, or of some statesman, or of some banker. That all fell through; we could not get them; and then at the last moment my friend here asked me to take the Chair, and it is simply for that reason that I occupy this position. I purpose to make only a few remarks upon this very big subject. The whole military history in the past with regard to the sieges of fortresses shows that all estimates as to a fortress holding out, based on the actual amount of food in the fortress, are absolutely fallacious. Major Murray in his paper says: I will divide the stocks into A and B—A, those with months of supply at our present rather wasteful rate of consumption, and B, those with weeks and days of supply. I daresay they do that when a siege is commenced; I have little doubt that they did it in Paris in 1870, when Paris was invested. I imagine that their estimates as to the time that food would last were very low indeed. But somehow or other that fortress, which was supposed to be likely to fall in a few days, held out for four months. Why? I commend it to my friends on the right—because the people in Paris, including the unemployed, from the highest to the lowest, were so determined to prevent the enemy taking what belonged to them that they went through any amount of misery, suffering and hunger; they went on approaching the door of death, and they did not give way until they with their wives and children were absolutely at the door of death itself. That same question arises in regard to the invasion of this country. Here we have an estimate of the amount of food in this country. We are told, "All sugar, bacon, ham, eggs, butter, and tinned meats will disappear during the first

week of war,"—now listen to these words, please—"being bought for domestic storage or for a rise." Do you suppose the working people will stand that? You will have to take all the supplies in any place and put them to the common good. That is the only way. I have been thinking this matter out with regard to my own district of Camberley. It is an urban district, and I am perfectly certain that what we could do there could be done all over the country (I am only talking of a case of invasion, not of war in which the defence of the country is not necessary), namely, confiscate all the food in the place. I am quite certain that in Camberley we might confiscate it, and that is what I would do in case of invasion—I would confiscate all the stores. I would let the authorities go into my own little house where I may have some tinned meat stored up; I would have that handed over to the control of the Council, and in that way you would get the whole of the people in the urban district to see that everybody was being treated exactly on the same footing. I would "nationalize" the existing store of food. There would be no case of the rich man buying up more food for himself than the poor man. I believe that there is a certain amount, but a very little, of what might be called the unemployed there, and you would get the whole population to help you in that way. The great point is that everybody would feel that they are exactly on the same footing as regards food, not only with regard to themselves but with regard to their wives and their children; and in that way you could make the supplies which exist in this country last in case of invasion for an infinitely longer time than otherwise they would do. But supposing the moment invasion takes place I am allowed to do this: I am not a rich man, but I have just a little money and I do not have to buy my food every day; supposing I were to go to my grocer and buy up all the tinned meats or anything else. Then my unfortunate fly-driver goes into the shop and wants a tin and there is none there. "Oh," says the shopman, "Colonel Hale bought it all this morning." If such a thing as that can take place, then all I can say is you deserve to fail, absolutely. Reference has been made to one thing which I am very sorry to have to refer to, but I know the feeling exists. One of the first speakers said that there was a feeling in the country that the working classes (I hate that word, because I have been one of the working classes all my life) are so very badly off at the present time that it does not matter if the Germans did come; they would be no worse off than they are now. There is that feeling in the North of England; it is in the West of England; it is in the Chertsey constituency; it is in Liverpool and elsewhere. Well, gentlemen, if that is the idea—and I fear it is very prevalent—it is an utterly, hopelessly erroneous idea. It is the result of complete absence of knowledge of the facts. You do not know unless you study the subject what it is to have an invading force in your own country. If you did you would do your best to keep the enemy out. But if that feeling does exist in the country, and the working classes—if you like to call them so—take that view to any extent of the situation, then I say simply that we are doomed, absolutely doomed. It is very necessary to try and wake up the population of the country and educate them as to what occupation by an enemy means; and it is only by the united determination of all classes from the very highest down to the very lowest to resist invasion, to hang out as long as possible, and the determination of all to suffer equally on the same footing all round, whether it be duke or crossing sweeper, cotton-mill owner or cotton-mill hand, as to the amount he shall have for his daily food—it is only by united

determination of that kind permeating the country, and by everybody working to that end, that a different state of affairs will be brought about. Then I think we may be confident that the food supplies of this country would last sufficiently long until the threat of invasion is over and until the tide turns.

**Major Stewart Murray**, in reply, said: Mr. Chairman, ladies and gentlemen. The time has passed very quickly so I must not keep you long, but I should like to reply to one or two of the observations which have been made. First of all I would like to refer to our friends of the London Trades Council who are here to-day. I need hardly say that we are all extremely glad to see them, because it cannot but be for good that the working classes should come to these discussions of ours. I think the more they come the better, because the more they come, the more we see of each other, the more we learn each other's point of view, the more shall we get rid of misunderstandings, if any such really exist. I am perfectly certain that there is no real difference in our point of view. That has been my experience, and I have met a great number of working class men. I find when we get rid of misleading phrases, when we come really down to bottom and talk things out we are all of the same opinion, although we differ about words and definitions. I am perfectly certain, as Mr. Knee and Mr. Jack Williams put it, that if the country takes proper and adequate precautions that the hardships of war shall not press intolerably upon the working classes, then if war be forced upon us we can rely upon the patriotism of the working classes, exactly as we can rely upon the patriotism of everyone else in the Kingdom. Therefore I hope that we shall see them here often in this theatre. I will not go into the agricultural question beyond saying that I thoroughly agree with what was said, and that I only wish we could get it done. The small amount of food that is produced on the land at present is absurd, and there is not the smallest doubt that a great deal more should be and could be produced from it. Another point which one of the speakers emphasized was that our great cities at the present time are kept at a fair average of efficiency owing to the fact that we get from the country a continuous stream of emigrants into the towns; that is to say we get fresh blood, and we have been getting it all through the Victorian era. But now the country is becoming depopulated in proportion, and what is to happen to our great towns in the future if that life-giving stream of fresh blood, which has continued through the Victorian era, ceases? I say that the agricultural problem has to be approached, not only from the point of view of our food supply, but from the point of view of our blood supply. The Chairman, Mr. Wyatt, and other speakers favoured the view of nationalizing the food supply—taking possession of it and doing it out in war time. I myself am very much in favour of that if it could be done. In 1901 I suggested a scheme in this theatre for doing that, but I have dropped it since, because no notice was practically taken of it. The Government did nothing, and it seemed to me the best thing to do, therefore, was to turn one's attention to remedies which could be found which would cost not a penny. I am afraid that as long as we ask for anything which will cost any money we shall not get it, so that I have devoted the whole of my present paper to remedies which would cost nothing. I am certain that nationalizing the food supply of the country in time of war could be carried out by a strong Government, as by the Committee of Public Safety during the French Revolution; things would be very much safer in

that way, and, as the Chairman said, the food of the country could then be made to last about four times as long as it would do now. With regard to the suggestion that was made that some fast oil-burning cruisers should be built and stationed on the trade routes, I think that is a most admirable proposition if it could be carried out. But that, again, is a question of money, and there, unfortunately, comes the difficulty. The only way to get it done is for the London Chamber of Commerce to press the matter forward and forward again and again. If they can get it done in that way then so much the better. All power to their elbow. Dr. Miller Maguire referred to the Yellow Peril. That, gentlemen, is a subject I think we ought to turn our very serious attention to; because if we have this suicidal war between the Triple Alliance and the Triple Entente, at the end of it we shall be helpless, absolutely exhausted, unable to send an army or a ship to the Pacific, and what is then to prevent—I will not name any particular nation—a certain nation from making a decisive move in the South Pacific and taking possession of North Australia for the Yellows? I believe that is the great peril we have to guard against, and I think for that reason every single means of preserving peace in Europe that can be adopted should be brought into play. Commander Crutchley said that two people can play at commerce destruction; if the enemy destroy our commerce we can destroy theirs. We are all ready to admit that. The only thing is that we stand to suffer most, because it is our absolute life-blood, and it is not their life-blood. Therefore it is necessary for us to take much greater precautions than it is necessary for them to take. They have the international railways to help them and we have not. Then the subject was mentioned of the risk of fraud in national indemnity, and ships getting paid for being captured intentionally at sea. I quite admit that is a possibility, but I say that the absolute necessity of getting our food supplies and raw material *uninterruptedly* into this country is so great that we must overlook any possibilities of fraud. The frauds, if they do occur, will be small in comparison; a few scoundrels may make a few thousands out of it, but what of that? It does not matter. To national indemnity we can add drastic penal clauses for fraud. If we catch them we will hang them; if we do not catch them it does not matter. They have simply made a little money. What does matter is that the *uninterrupted* arrival of our food supply and raw material shall be assured. I do not think there is much else to be said in answer to the various remarks which have been made by the different speakers, because I agree with nearly everything that has been said. We practically all agree together; we are practically all of one mind. The only thing I hope is that we shall be able to get the Government to do something, because that is really the crux of the whole matter. I think the whole of the educated classes of the country are aware now of the great danger we are in; the whole of the educated classes of the country are at one in desiring a remedy. I am certain the working classes are strongly of opinion that something should be done. Two years ago there was a conference called by the working classes and by the Socialists of Great Britain to discuss the matter of our food supply in time of war. I was present at the conference, and so were Mr. Knee and Mr. Jack Williams. I know that at that conference the subject was discussed with great earnestness and a considerable amount of knowledge. That is a new factor since 1903; it occurred only two years ago, and I believe the conference is going to meet in future every year or so. That shows that the whole of the classes of the Kingdom are practically of

one mind in this matter, that something should be done. The only people, apparently, who appear to be of a different opinion are the Government, and they will not move till they are forced by public opinion. It is our business to induce public opinion to try and force them to do something, and to persevere until we succeed.

**The Chairman:** It only remains for me heartily to thank Major Stewart Murray in your name for his most admirable lecture. I also on behalf of the Council have to thank those members of the audience who have been present and who have spoken here for the first time. It is everything for us to get at our discussions not only people who know things thoroughly, but fresh blood.

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### FRONTISPICE.

#### THE BATTLE OF BUNKER OR BUNKER'S HILL.

This action was fought on June 17th, 1775, at the time when the British troops under General Gage were in occupation of Boston, and Greene, the American commander, was concerting measures to dispossess them of that town. Boston was liable to bombardment by guns placed on two elevations: the one was Dorchester Heights on the south-east, which was somewhat remote, the other was Bunker's Hill, in the peninsula of Charleston. Gage had made up his mind to occupy the latter of these, but was forestalled by Greene, who, on the night of June 16th, sent a strong party of Americans, who threw up a redoubt—not, however, on Bunker's, but on Breed's Hill, a height on the same peninsula, but nearer to Boston. The presence of the enemy was not detected until early on the 17th, when Gage determined to assault the works in front, ignoring the possibility of cutting off the garrison in rear, and, not making all he could of the assistance he might have obtained from the guns of the fleet. Twice was the attack beaten back with great slaughter, and Fortescue describes the return of the British infantry to the third attack after two such bloody repulses, as "one of the greatest feats ever recorded of them, and points to fine quality among the men, grand pride in their regiments, and supreme excellence of discipline." The troops engaged under Howe were the 5th, 38th, 42nd, 47th, 52nd, two weak battalions of marines, and the flank companies of the 4th, 10th, 18th, 22nd, 23rd, 35th, 59th, 63rd, and 65th Regiments: they numbered some 2,500, and the total casualties were about 1,150. The loss of the Americans was acknowledged to be 450 killed and wounded.

The picture probably represents the final success of the British and the death, just after the American retreat commenced, of Doctor Joseph Warren, President of the Provincial Congress, and the active spirit of the Committee of Safety; the other prominent figures are probably Colonel Prescott, on the American, and Major Pitcairne (wounded), of the Marines, on the British side.

*Below: a detail of the picture of the Battle of Bunker's Hill, showing the death of Dr. Joseph Warren.*

## THE PRESS IN WAR.

By H. A. Gwynne, Esq. (Editor *Morning Post*).

On Wednesday, November 5th, 1913.

R. H. BRADE, Esq., C.B., in the Chair.

**THE CHAIRMAN:** Gentlemen, I think the editor of the *Morning Post* requires very little or no introduction anywhere, but perhaps he will bear with me if I briefly remind this audience of his many and varied experiences as a correspondent, mostly with armed forces in the field, in such different parts of the world as the Balkans; Ashanti, 1895; Egypt, 1896; the Turco-Greek War, 1897; Berber; Peking; and last, but not least, throughout the South African War. I will now ask Mr. Gwynne to be good enough to read his lecture.

### LECTURE.

IT is all to the good that the Royal United Service Institution should encourage a discussion on this most important question. It is distinctly a matter which requires full ventilation in time of peace since the chances are that a system hastily devised just before or at the moment of an outbreak of hostilities, may do more harm than good. It would be idle to disguise the fact that there are very great difficulties to surmount in evolving a plan which would satisfy the requirements of the naval and military authorities, and at the same time not be too onerous to those who would have to submit to its regulations. The reasons are fairly obvious, for the business of the Press is to buy and sell news, and any arbitrary restriction of its business is likely to be unpopular and would come as a shock, at any rate in the first instance, to most of the profession. On the other hand, as good citizens we have to remember that war is the *ultima ratio*, and that *inter arma silent leges*.

It is necessary to insist on this fact because any interference with the everyday work of any portion of the inhabitants of Great Britain is and can only be justified by the fact that the nation is at war, or is likely to be at war, or, in other words, that the nation has deliberately made up its mind that for its own safety it must have recourse to brute force, pure and simple. This appeal to arms may in very many cases leave undisturbed a

great portion of our population. Our sailors and soldiers obviously are immediately affected. It may, or may not, affect our industrial life. That depends upon the nature of the war in which we might be engaged. But the subject that we have to discuss is in what respect it shall affect that great profession and that vast industry which we call the Press.

#### WAR. OPPORTUNITY TO THE JOURNALIST.

Remembering that this great organization exists for the purpose of purveying news to its customers, it is easy to see how a great war in which Great Britain might be engaged would be a matter of supreme importance, for it would provide material for nearly every kind of journalistic enterprise. It would at the same time be a matter in which every individual in the country would be intensely interested. Furthermore, to speak in terms of trade, an opportunity would be provided for selling its wares—news—such as no living journalist has experienced. It has to be remembered that we have not been engaged in warfare with a great Power since the Crimean War, and at that time the means of gathering and transmitting news were quite primitive compared with the facilities available to-day. Now every big newspaper in England is equipped with a staff and organization and apparatus which would enable it to cope successfully with almost any event of importance, and I imagine that the whole of the profession—as a profession—would regard a great war as providing a magnificent opportunity for demonstrating the perfection of its machine.

It is a profound mistake to think that newspapers welcome war in the ordinary way as a means of enabling them to increase their circulation and, consequently, their profits; for, as a matter of fact, there is hardly a single instance in recent years of a newspaper, however well it has been served in the field, having made up by increased prosperity the money it has expended in its war service. In the case of a war with a great European Power, where it would not be necessary to send correspondents great distances to gather news, and where, indeed, some of the news might be at one's door-step, so to speak, and in addition, when it is borne in mind that every man and woman in the country would be eagerly looking for the most trivial particulars of the great conflict, the Press would stand to gain enormously.

#### PUBLICITY v. SECRECY.

We, therefore, begin with this contrast: the nation has decided to appeal to arms, and its success in that appeal will depend to a very great extent upon the concealment of its plans and their operations. On the other hand, we have a great organization wielding enormous power, able to influence Governments and even to affect generals in the field, seeing before

it the greatest opportunity that journalism has ever had in England of collecting and conveying to its readers the news of an all-absorbing conflict. This picture, which I do not think is overdrawn, gives some idea of the difficulties of the problem of devising a system which would reconcile these apparently incompatible needs.

#### BEFORE THE OUTBREAK OF WAR.

As, however, everybody will concede that the needs of the nation must override the needs of any part of it, we would consider first of all the point of view of those who have charge of our naval and military operations, and try to find out as far as possible what their requirements are likely to be. Here we are at once confronted with difficulties. A Government that has made up its mind that war is likely to come, or that the only way out of a situation is an ultimate declaration of war, must obviously keep its views and its intentions to itself, for on the secrecy of its preparations may depend the success or failure in the initial—often the most important—stages of the war. On the other hand, the Press, if not taken into the confidence of those in authority, would go gaily on and, unconsciously perhaps, give away the most profound secrets and the most valuable information to our potential enemy, simply because it would not recognize the significance of the news it was giving.

What is the Government to do? It cannot take every newspaper editor into its confidence, for that ultimately would be giving away the whole secret; for though I claim on behalf of the Press that its members are the best keepers of secrets in England, yet a secret which is shared by two or three thousand men, all of whom may have strong views as to the utility or futility of the Government's policy, would no longer be a secret. The Government of the country could no doubt by an Order in Council prevent the Press giving any information of a naval or military character, or, indeed, any information likely to be of use to the enemy; but here again the difficulty would be by no means solved, for the issue of such an order would be taken by our potential enemy as an indication of the Government's intentions, and the remedy would probably be worse than the evil.

What then is the solution? Confidential communication with every editor in England is almost impossible; an Order in Council would do more harm than good; and yet in those critical weeks or months before a war was declared, information of the utmost value to the enemy would be freely though unconsciously circulated in the columns of the Press. The remedy, it seems to me, lies in the hands of our naval and military authorities. In the first place they should exercise a strict control over their own people of every rank, and render it very

difficult, if not impossible, for information, divulgance of which would endanger the State, to reach the newspapers. There are additional precautions which they should take, but their nature is such that I think they are best left undiscussed in public.

#### THE ACTUAL CONFLICT.

In the case of a conflict with a great Power it is generally conceded that the first few weeks of the campaign are the most important. Indeed, there is a general opinion that campaigns will be decided more rapidly to-day than they were in the past, and at any rate we can eliminate from the list of possibilities a war which might last for a year or so. It is well to bear in mind the fact that we have not been engaged in a European war for such a great number of years that the public is unaccustomed to restrictions on the news supplied to it by the Press. And in addition, too, the public has been accustomed to have it hot after the event. The wonderful progress in means of communication which have enabled newspapers to serve their public with such speed is also, it must be remembered, open to the spy when he wishes to communicate to his superiors. And for the same cause the precautions to be taken to prevent news of advantage to the enemy reaching him will have to be much greater and more careful and more rapid in their effect.

There can be little doubt that the public would readily acquiesce in almost any restrictions as regards news after, say, a month or six weeks of a campaign, for they would by that time have realized the enormous importance of keeping secret the operations of war; but the difficulty will be in the most important stages of the war, the beginning, for we shall have to deal with a public unused to limitations of news and uneasy because of them.

#### THE PRESS SUBORDINATE IN NATIONAL EMERGENCIES.

It is, therefore, necessary at this juncture to realize that a state of war means the abrogation of all the ordinary amenities of life, provided that abrogation is found necessary in the national interest, and I lay it down as a principle that the members of the Press must subordinate themselves to the needs of the national safety in the same way as other interests or individuals do. But there is no other section of the public which possesses power in such concentrated form and in a form so easily available to act as the Press, and while it would be comparatively easy to exercise restrictive jurisdiction over private enterprises, and to set a limit to their energies, where they might be in opposition to the national good, to do this with the Press requires careful thought and a good deal of tact. Every man, woman, and child in England, directly or indirectly, relies upon the Press for its daily news, and in the event of a war

this dependence upon and eagerness for news would be intensified one hundred-fold because of the war's universal appeal to the national interest.

#### CO-OPERATION SUGGESTED.

In order to satisfy the demands of the authorities for secrecy and the natural desire of the people for news, it seems to me that the best way would be, as it were, a half-way house. That newspapers would readily agree to omit all reference to movements of troops on the outbreak of war I have no doubt whatever. But that during the early stages and the most critical stages of the war, the Press and the public behind the Press would be content with an arbitrarily enforced blank silence, I doubt very much. It therefore remains to discuss how the necessary information should be given. I am not now dealing with the question of war correspondence, which subject, I think, is outside the purview of this paper, and besides, it is a subject with which, I believe, the authorities are now dealing. In addition, correspondents in the field will be under the orders of the officers commanding the military operations, and will, therefore, have to conform to their desires and wishes.

#### A COMMITTEE OF JOURNALISTS.

It seems to me that co-operation between the Press and the authorities is essential in order to satisfy the public demand for news and the military need for secrecy, and I would suggest that a small committee of not more than ten be formed, composed of eminent journalists, and elected by the profession, or selected by the Government, as the case may be. This committee should enjoy to the very fullest extent the absolute confidence of the newspapers of England, and not only that, they should be names which would carry respect with the general public. To this committee should be given a place in the Admiralty or War Office on the outbreak of war, and they should work in close co-operation with either one officer or a committee of officers appointed by the authorities. These Press representatives should be men of such a stamp that they could be told a good deal more than could be confided to the Press generally, and it would be their business to prepare every day an account of what is going on, or to refrain from saying anything at all, in conjunction with the naval and military authorities. Acting with a full knowledge of the issues at stake they would be less likely to do anything which would be harmful to the country's interests.

It seems to me that in this way two objects would be gained: First of all it is reasonable to suppose that the public would be content with no information at all if they were assured that the silence was approved by the representatives of the Press; and in the second place, all information that would be

given to them would have added value in coming through the representatives of the Press and would not be calculated to injure the operations of the Navy or Army inasmuch as it would have the approval of the authorities.

#### THE ADVANTAGES OF THE SUGGESTION.

There are other advantages in the proposal which are worthy of consideration. In the first place the War Office would no longer be harassed at a most critical period by Press importunities. Such matters being left to the committee, they could rest assured that whether information or no information was vouchsafed to the public, the Press would be satisfied and therefore, to a great extent, the public also; and they could go on with their plans without any pre-occupation regarding publicity. My own conviction is that there would be no trouble whatever in establishing such a system, although, of course, in times of peace the suggestion is bound to meet with a good deal of criticism; but I feel more and more assured that in case of a great national emergency such as a war with a great European Power, it would work smoothly, and the Press would carry out the arrangement loyally.

#### OTHER SOURCES OF INFORMATION.

It is well, however, to remember that the Press is not the only sinner in regard to the circulation of information which may be useful to the enemy. If the authorities are going to ask the Press to co-operate in the matter of restricting information, they must on their side see to it that information which it has been their custom hitherto to circulate, shall no longer be given. I refer to the casualty list. An astute enemy, on the principle of *ex pede Herculem*, knowing that Private Jones, No. 19130, of the 104th Lancers was killed or wounded, will reconstruct from that little item the fact that Private Jones belonged to the 104th Lancers, that the 104th Lancers belonged to the Third Cavalry Brigade, and that there was a scrap at Backstadt, in which there were one or two casualties among the British cavalry. This might give him some valuable information; and in cases where cavalry screens have come into serious conflict and heavier casualties have ensued, the whole plan of campaign might conceivably be given away in the most innocent way possible by immediate publication of casualties. Then there is the question of officers' and men's letters. A local paper may publish a letter which has been brought over by a wounded friend or a returning transport, and in all innocence may give away most important information. To meet this, I think that great care will have to be exercised by the authorities, and the public will have to be educated to possess their souls in patience during the operations. This would be all the more easy if my suggestion was adopted. Without such a committee

sitting I am afraid the public might get uneasy, and this uneasiness might have a serious effect upon those in charge of the operations of war.

#### THE NECESSARY DETAILS.

Such is a very brief outline of a scheme which in my opinion will help to meet the need of regulating information in time of war, and so keep the enemy in ignorance of what is going on; but, of course, it would have to be accompanied by regulations, the details of which need not be discussed in this paper. An Order in Council would have to be promulgated forbidding all newspapers to publish any information regarding the operations at all except those items which come from the authorities through the Committee of Journalists, and this prohibition should be rigorously enforced. Otherwise the whole system would break down.

#### PROBABLE CRITICISM.

In one respect the suggestion I have put before you will receive severe criticism at the hands of many of my colleagues on the Press. They will no doubt declare that the proposal will have the effect of destroying, for the time being, newspaper enterprise, and of reducing all journals to a dead level of dull official information. To such critics I would suggest that the alternative systems which have been suggested are mostly of a strong repressive character, which, of course, failing any other workable scheme, would be absolutely essential. And I would put it to those in authority that such alternative schemes of iron suppression of all news relating to the war, have the disadvantage of antagonizing at the beginning, and therefore at the most critical time of the operations, both the Press and the public. I submit that my suggested Committee of Journalists would not only tend to remove distrust and resentment on the part of the journalist or the public, but it would have the added advantage that all regulations would be carried out not only in the letter but in the spirit, and the Press would be on its honour, as it were, to play the game.

#### THE WAR CORRESPONDENT.

As regards newspaper enterprise, the measures I have suggested need not interfere in the slightest degree with it. Newspaper enterprise in time of war up to the present has generally been measured in terms of speed, *i.e.*, the correspondent who despatched the first news of a battle or of some big operation was considered to be doing the best service for his paper. When you come to think of it, this is the very thing that the conductors of modern warfare would least desire, for early information, even in the case of a successful battle, might rob a commander

of the fruits of his victory. Anybody who has seen modern warfare will realize how difficult it is to perceive the difference between an engagement which is part of a bigger scheme and the battle which is to definitely decide the day, and, perhaps, the campaign. There is a certain amount of relaxation among the sternest of press censors when the troops to which he is attached have gained a victory, and it is conceivable that news might be telegraphed home of an action, which, though a bloody and prolonged one, might yet only be a part of a bigger scheme; and the premature announcement might spoil altogether the plans of the British Commander-in-Chief.

I would therefore urge that Press correspondents in the future, if they are allowed on the field at all (which I presume is still a debatable question), should not be allowed to send off their despatches until the General commanding thinks that the time is ripe. And this brings me back to the question of newspaper enterprise. The man who is the finest observer, the readiest and most powerful writer, will altogether justify his newspaper by sending good, connected and brilliant descriptions of operations, which otherwise, under the old system, only came out in scraps and snippets. Speaking as a journalist myself, I certainly would be quite content with such a plan, and I hold most strongly that it would not in any way debar a newspaper from gaining as much, if not more, credit than the old system produced.

#### THE RELIEF TO THE SAILOR AND SOLDIER.

I would reiterate the fact that the British public are quite unaccustomed to any restrictions in their news, and that this is really the chief difficulty with which the authorities will have to contend. Hence trouble and time could not be better expended than in making arrangements which will permit the authorities on the outbreak of war, and possibly before it, to be freed from pre-occupation regarding the publication of war news.

Some objection may be made to the proposal by sailors and soldiers because I have not indicated what would happen were the naval and military authorities on the one hand and the Committee of Journalists on the other to disagree. The answer is very simple, and I have indicated it in my paper: in such a case the Government possessing the right, would override the decision of the journalists, and could by administrative order forbid the publication of any news whatever of any kind regarding the operations then proceeding.

I have purposely refrained from going into details of any of the schemes which are possible or probable in connection with this subject of the Press in War. It seems to me that such details, when once a principle is established, could be much better worked out by those in the Admiralty and at the

War Office whose duty it will be to deal with this matter. I am quite convinced that although many obstacles must present themselves to the smooth working of such diametrically opposed ideals as are presented by both the parties to the contract, yet a really sound, workable system can be evolved by the exercise of a little give-and-take on both sides.

To my fellow journalists I would suggest that they should bear in mind that this matter requires adjustment in time of peace because in the moment of a national emergency there would be one obvious way out of the difficulties which would confront those in charge of our naval and military operations, and that is absolute prohibition. They would, therefore, find it altogether to their advantage to ask for an early consideration and a quick disposal of the matter.

To the sailor and the soldier who will have to consider this question, I would like to say that they would do well to bear in mind that their deliberations concern an organization whose whole aim and object are to provide news, and in a time of emergency, and therefore a time of extraordinary public interest, they will be forced to ask this huge and powerful news-gathering organization to restrict its energies in the very direction to which its whole attention is turned and where it hopes to achieve most. It is therefore essential that a comprehension of each other's difficulties should form the best basis of any negotiations which I hope may speedily ensue.

#### DISCUSSION.

**Captain Harold Fisher:** It seems to me the first question that arises in connection with the lecturer's suggestion is: Is it practical? Is a committee of ten journalists, however carefully selected, really going to command the complete confidence of the entire Press of the United Kingdom? The lecturer tells us that it will, but it is rather hard for the outsider, at least, to believe that. I do not know enough about journalism to be able to give a definite opinion. Then, again, you must remember that for many years it has been held to be perfectly respectable for anyone dealing in fire-arms to sell fire-arms, which they know, in all human probability, will be used against their own countrymen; and how, if that is going on, can you justly prevent people from satisfying what they consider to be legitimate demands of their own country for news of their own country's war? It seems to me that is rather a difficult position to get round. Then, again, is doctored news—because under this suggestion it must be doctored news—better than blank silence? That, again, is a point which might be argued. Personally I should prefer blank silence, because there is always something suspicious about news which has been garbled or doctored by the Government. Then, again, I think one of the weak points in the lecture is that we are not given any cases in point where the dissemination of news by the Press has been proved to be of any material advantage to the enemy. It has often been said that such has been the case, but proof is rare; and do those rare examples in any way outweigh the advantages which have been brought about by the letters which have been published in the

papers from their correspondents at the Front? The lecturer himself has given us no instances, and I therefore should like to be allowed to choose one for myself. Take Russell, in the Crimean War; he undoubtedly made a very great error as a correspondent when he wrote home and said exactly where a powder magazine was. But it was not Russell who published it; it was Delane, his editor, who passed it for publication. According to Mr. Gwynne's suggestion Delane would most certainly have been on that committee of ten, and he and the other nine no doubt would have put their heads together and said: "We will not publish this about the powder magazine." But then, would they have published anything about the hospitals; and, if not, should we have had the Army Medical Service as it exists to-day, or should we only just be getting it into that position? So that I am not sure that the suggestion is practical, and I am almost sure that it is reactionary. And, again, is it necessary? I do not think so. The lecturer said that journalists would welcome this idea as demonstrating the perfect working of their machine. Would not the very best way of demonstrating that perfection be by showing their discretion in disseminating news, and not by having the bit put into their mouths by the State?

**Major Stewart Murray:** I am not a journalist, but it seems to me that the previous speaker did not seem to quite realize the gravity of the situation which would arise if we were involved in a great European War, which is the war we have to consider. The one war we have to bear in mind is a war between the Triple Alliance and the Triple Entente. That is the present situation, and that would be a situation of gravity such as has never arisen in our history before. The previous speaker spoke of minor journalists not being content in such a case with the decisions of the proposed committee; but I think the country would peremptorily sweep all such discontented journalists aside, and would not take any notice of their objections. That suggestion is not to be thought of for a moment. I think in such a war drastic measures will be taken, and that it will rest between a total prohibition of all news and such a compromise as the lecturer has suggested. I think the compromise suggested is a most valuable one, and I hope it will be thoroughly considered, because it seems to me to be a compromise which meets the situation very well indeed. Otherwise there will be nothing but an absolute total prohibition. Then the previous speaker also said that he thought total silence would be better than what he called doctored news. I do not agree at all. I think that total silence would perhaps tend to produce panic. What we have to guard against if war breaks out is panic. We want to keep the people quiet at all costs. We want to prevent panic during the first two, three, or four weeks of war; we want to instil confidence, and to get a breathing space in which we can look round and accustom ourselves to the new conditions. We shall not be able to get that breathing space and keep the people quiet if there is a total prohibition of news. The only way in which it can be done is by giving them such news as will tend to bring back confidence, and I think that could be very much better done by such a committee as the lecturer suggested than by a total prohibition of news, which is the only alternative. Then the previous speaker said that no instances had been proved of news which had been published having led to disaster in the field. I am very much astonished to hear that. There are a great many cases of that kind, and I have no doubt the lecturer in his reply will tell us a few. I can produce one myself, which

I happened to come across yesterday. I was looking through the 1901 "Lloyd's General Report," and there I came across this very interesting report by Sir Henry Hozier, which I will read as a case in point. He said: "An instance of this kind came under my personal notice in the war of 1866. I was with Prince Frederick Charles of Prussia, who had to advance on Vienna, and his great duty was to hold the Austrian Army on the Bistritz, in order to allow the development of the attack of the Crown Prince on its flank and rear. It was of the utmost importance to Prince Frederick to know what Austrian force was in front of him, since, unless the whole force was there, it would be imprudent to hazard a general attack. On the morning of the battle he could not find out what the force was, but about 10 a.m. a telegram reached him from London, announcing that that morning an official intimation had appeared in a Vienna newspaper, stating that the whole Austrian force was concentrated under Field-Marshal Benedek on the Bistritz. The telegram had been sent from Vienna to the German Embassy in London, was at once despatched from London to Prince Frederick Charles in Bohemia, and within half an hour his army attacked all along the line. The result of that telegram was the loss to Austria of the leadership of Germany, and the ultimate establishment of the present German Empire under a Prussian Emperor." That is one instance, and I have no doubt the lecturer in his reply will give us a great many more.

**Mr. Charles Lowe**, formerly Berlin correspondent of *The Times*: I simply want to say a few words with reference to the complaint of Captain Harold Fisher that the lecturer has offered us no concrete instances of the disastrous effect of giving uncensored news. In this respect I think that perhaps the most classical instance in modern times occurred during the Franco-German War, and I may say, incidentally, that the story was once personally confirmed to me by Field-Marshal Count Blumenthal, who was Chief of the Staff of the Crown Prince during the campaign. After the decisive defeat of MacMahon at Wörth and elsewhere, he gathered together his shattered forces and retreated westwards in the direction of Châlons, as it was thought, with the intention of falling further back on Paris. The Germans pursued on a frontage of 40 miles, but through the supineness or otherwise of their cavalry divisions, they lost touch with MacMahon, and, as a matter of fact, at last did not really know where he was. Thus, enveloped in the "fog of war," they continued their westward march under the assumption that he was retiring on Châlons and Paris, till one day Headquarters received a telegram from Berlin, which had been forwarded from London—a telegram had appeared in the *Daily News*, I think, or, at any rate, in one of our great dailies—from the French side, indicating that MacMahon had changed his line of route, and, instead of retiring on Paris, was doubling back on the Meuse with intent to relieve Bazaine at Metz. I may add that the intelligence had originally been published in the *Temps*. On receipt of this momentous news the Germans right half-wheeled their 40 miles of front, and in this way succeeded in overtaking and surrounding the French at Sedan, and in bringing about the fall of the French Empire.

I may also mention that, in a volume published not very long ago, entitled the "Bernstorff Papers," dealing among other things with the career of that Count Bernstorff who was Prussian Minister in London in 1870, the son relates that the whole staff of the Embassy, during the earlier course of the French campaign, were almost exclusively engaged

in collating and appraising news from the seat of war and despatching it to Berlin in order that it might then be re-transmitted to Headquarters at the front.

**Brigadier-General J. Long:** I do not think it needs many words from me to emphasize the importance of what many speakers have said of to some extent "muzzling" the Press during war, in spite of what one speaker said to the contrary. You only want to look at the last great campaign in the Far East to bear out that view. Japan never would have won that campaign—at least, many military students consider so—had it not been for the marvellous control she held over her Press. We all owe our thanks to the lecturer for bringing this subject forward. He mentioned one point of very great importance when he said that the Army and Navy must watch themselves that they do not publish information, because there is no doubt about it that they do publish very full information in the lists of wounded which are circulated. It would make very little difference to the unfortunate relatives of the men killed or wounded if these lists were only published periodically, the statement being made that: "The following casualties have occurred within the last fortnight." It would convey no information then. After all, it would cost the country very little, when it is pouring out millions during a great campaign, to notify individually the people concerned, and not publish these great lists in newspapers, which can do no possible good to a country's cause. Then there is one point that Mr. Gwynne unfortunately did not touch on—and I do not know how it is going to be dealt with—and that is how are you going to muzzle the House of Commons? We suffered badly in the last war from that. That you can never muzzle. There is not much doubt that the talking in the House of Commons prolonged the South African War by possibly eighteen months. If Mr. Gwynne could propose a plan for that also I think he would receive the country's gratitude.

**Captain Chas. Slack:** There are one or two points I would like to refer to in regard to Mr. Gwynne's suggested committee, and that is, how is he going to prevent foreigners giving information to the British Press in case of a war? You could not stop French or German correspondents from giving information. There is another point also, namely, that he has not made any reference to the dissemination of false news. That is a very important point, which requires only one instance to bring home to your minds, and that is in the Marengo Campaign, when Napoleon caused, I think it was, about 8,000 conscripts to be assembled at Dijon, and to be reviewed with the intention of diverting the public's attention from his crossing the Alps, which ultimately led to his successful campaign in Austria.

**Dr. T. Miller Maguire:** I fear that I say a great deal too much here, as the Secretary knows to his cost, but the spirit moves me just to throw out a few words for alteration if not for discussion, as it would be a pity for the proceedings to close so soon. I am afraid this Institution is becoming altogether too passive. This Institution lives more by the fighting element than by those pacific notions which were promulgated by Mr. Angell quite recently, and it was evident that his views do not seem to thrive very much in this assembly. It is a curious fact that the moment we hear about the "zittlichkeit" Anglo-Saxon race going into an era of universal peace promulgated by some wandering

sophist of a Cabinet Minister, we are assembled to find out how we best can prevent the circulation of war news in this same Anglo-Saxon community, falsely so-called to the disgust of its martial Keltic members. Two of the principal points in connection with war are secrecy and celerity. With regard to secrecy, in modern times I think it is perfectly clear from what one learns in this Institution that very much depends in these multitudinous armies, armed to the teeth, which are facing each other on the frontiers, on the operations during the first few days—that is on the initiative. After the first defeats, after the disasters of the first week, it does not make much difference whether a MacMahon goes back to Paris or round to Sedan. He will be defeated and taken prisoner anyhow. Nor will Gambetta in his balloon save Metz after the disasters of Rezonville and Gravelotte. Whether the English journalist was kind enough to inform the people in Paris first, or the people in Berlin first, at any rate the German cavalry did not find out where MacMahon was, either by their own studious scouting, or by their own staff's studious labours in the Press. They found it out by a perfectly neutral person like the learned lecturer, sitting in his own office, so we are told.

**Mr. Charles Lowe:** They found it out through their Intelligence Department.

**Dr. Miller Maguire:** But from whom did they get the news?

**Mr. Charles Lowe:** It does not matter where they got it from.

**Dr. Miller Maguire:** Certainly not to the commanders of the Third and Fourth Armies, but it makes all the difference from the point of view of this discussion to stop news coming from the people themselves. The extreme right of the Fourth Army dragoons must have collided with MacMahon's extreme left in 24 hours, anyway.

**Mr. Charles Lowe:** It was the other side, the French side, that sent the news.

**Dr. Miller Maguire:** Sent the news to the French?

**Mr. Charles Lowe:** No, the news came from the French.

**Dr. Miller Maguire:** The news came from a correspondent, I take it, in France to a certain journalist in London, a very distinguished man. The people in Berlin got it from the *Times* in London, and being satisfied that the English people on the paper in London had got accurate information they transmitted it, not to a Frenchman, but to a German in their Embassy in Germany, from which it was transmitted to the right flank cavalry officer of the German Army between the Belgian frontier and Paris. Is that not so?

**Mr. Charles Lowe:** Yes.

**Dr. Miller Maguire:** Quite right, absolutely so. I should like to know exceedingly how any suggestion of the lecturer would prevent such disasters occurring through neutral States giving the information in modern wars, when the movements are so rapid as they were between August 25th and September 1st, 1870, or more rapid with modern appliances?

**Mr. Charles Lowe:** Because if there had been a censorship in France it would have been impossible for that telegram to have been forwarded

from France to London. It was the forwarding of that uncensored telegram from Paris to London that resulted in this colossal disaster to the French Army.

**Dr. Miller Maguire:** Not at all! The disaster was due to the same causes as led to Wörth and Spicheren, and I should be quite ready to prolong this agreeable conversation with my friend, but my minutes are ebbing out, as well as your time, Sir. Admitting that the tremendous disaster of Sedan occurred because of the extraordinary and all-pervading and triumphant Anglo-Franco energy of the late departed saint, Mr. Delane, I think the sooner the war was over the better, if a nation goes to war in that condition. There is very little doubt about it that a nation ought to be ready for war. The French could have been told in time by their own staff to get ready for war, and were warned in time as the fools in town here have been warned in time. The French were told in time by their own staff to get ready for war by journalists and soldiers. They were warned exactly of what would occur months before; they had the best possible information from Berlin, from attachés, and they did not get ready for war. If a committee was to edit the Press, our Press would follow or accompany the degenerate army. Parliamentary speeches are dangerous to the last degree, from every point of view. Cannot you suggest a Committee of Legislators to suppress them and exclude them. The sooner we know what kind of people we have to deal with and get rid of them in times of peace the better. We want men, free men, powerful men, able men, men with foresight. Muzzling the Press will not give us these things. I have just been reading the life of a distinguished lady, Miss Nightingale, who tells us the state of things that existed in the country at the time of the Crimean War. Why, Sir! But for my late friend, Dr. Russell, we would have suffered most horribly in the Crimea. Because we are badly governed by Departments as it is, are we now of our own accord—we who have had the honour, like I have had myself of writing for the Press since I was 15—are I to be told that if I am spared to old age I am to be edited? Nothing has arisen in the course of this debate that would convince me that if the Press had been edited by the cabal that surrounded Marshal Lebeuf and M. Olivier, France would have done a bit better in the war against Germany. Would it have done better? It would have done worse—or it could not have been worse. If our Cabinet had been guided by committees of the Press before the war of 1899—if it had edited and censored the Press as well as the Generals—would it have done a bit better? I listened to every word Mr. Gwynne said most attentively, because I know he has much more experience of these matters than I have, he has made admirable suggestions. Beware of bureaucratic tyranny; maintain the freedom of our race in *The Press*; keep your eyes open and staring on corruption and folly. Thus, and not by secrecy and obscurantism, will you promote efficient celerity, able initiative, and readiness and despatch and success. Meanwhile I thank Mr. Gwynne—whose journal is an honour to literature—for his lecture.

**Mr. H. A. Gwynne**, in reply, said: I only wanted to establish the principle of co-operation between the Press and the naval and military authorities on the outbreak of war—that such a principle should be established before the outbreak of war, and that a committee such as I suggested should be formed immediately, if possible. My critics know perfectly well that blank silence is impossible to-day. I am sorry

it is impossible, but it is, and it is no use talking. There are the facts, and with those facts I tried to deal. One of my critics talked about the impracticability of getting ten men to represent the Press, having the confidence of the Press, and controlling the Press to a certain extent. I admit there is a great deal in what he says, that it would be difficult. But at any rate the suggestion is an honest attempt to deal with this enormously difficult problem. It is quite possible that ten men may quarrel, or that there may be a tremendous split between the naval and military authorities and the ten men. At the same time I am sure that the principle of co-operation between the Press and the naval and military authorities in times of conflict is the only way out. Captain Fisher talked about doctored news as against blank silence, and said that he preferred blank silence. I think I prefer blank silence on the whole, but it must be remembered that it is not what we individually prefer, it is what the country will take. The country will not take blank silence, and there is an end of it. With regard to doctored news, I never suggested for one moment that doctored news should be circulated; in fact, I have studiously avoided going into details because I could not say what kind of news such a committee would give forth. They might merely confine themselves to details, or a summary of events of a few days before—I do not know; and therefore I think a discussion on what they would do or how they would do it is rather beside the question at the present moment. With regard to the question of secrets being given away by the Press I think it was beside the question. We have now got new organizations: we have got wireless; we have got quicker communication; we have airships; we have all kinds of things. We have had no European War for many years, and we have to take precautions. We have a Press totally unaccustomed to restrictions of its news. In the South African War any paper could send out practically as many correspondents as it liked. It praised this General and damned the other General. Of course, it made the great mistake of putting the blame on the wrong man in condemning the regimental officer, who did practically all the work in South Africa. There was the case of a big war where there was no restriction. There was a censor, of course, but I think a vast amount of information was given away to the Boers through Delagoa Bay. The whole question is one of great difficulty because of this absence of restriction. There will be a lot of things to think about on the outbreak of a war, and I wanted to eliminate this particular question, and I urged immediate action, so that when a war came, in that particular matter the naval and military authorities would be free of pre-occupation. They can say "We need not bother about the Press; that is already arranged for; that is all right now." That will be of enormous value to those in charge of operations in time of war, and I believe it would satisfy the Press.

**The Chairman:** Before closing the proceedings, perhaps I may be granted just two or three minutes to make a small contribution to the discussion, because by the accident of my position in the much-abused War Office I have been privileged to have a certain amount of special information in regard to this subject that Mr. Gwynne has so ably dealt with. The problem that has been discussed has, as a matter of fact, engaged the very closest attention of official and Press authorities for the last few years, and during the last two, at any rate, some considerable progress has been made towards arriving at a solution. In general, I

think we may say that those who have to look at the problem from the two opposed, or, perhaps, opposite sides, have at last succeeded in coming to a mutual understanding, based on the one hand on frankness of communication, on the other on a subordination of private to national interests, and, generally, on mutual confidence and trust. At any rate, a distinct understanding exists in regard to news in peace time, and having, as I say, some special knowledge of the matter, I am glad to pay my tribute here to the wonderful powers of organization and to the high spirit of patriotism by which the Press of the United Kingdom have brought these transactions to this stage. From this understanding in peace time I think the passage is assured to an equally serviceable agreement in war, with machinery very much on the lines of those that Mr. Gwynne has sketched. The fact is, that it is now common ground that in regard to operations of war some measure of silence is necessary in the interests of the State, and the Press are prepared to agree to a much larger measure of silence than was perhaps the case a few years ago. With the assurance that all disabilities that have to be imposed are imposed on all alike, Press interests are now, I think, contemplating quite a rigorous censorship in time of war. So far so good. But I venture to think that those who are responsible for the matter have a very difficult job in front of them. Those who have discussed the matter in the last few months, and we who are here this afternoon, are mostly either officials or Press men, but I think it would be extremely difficult to make absolutely certain that unaided we are competent to gauge the feeling of the public, that is, the man in the street, the relatives of the officer or man in the field, and the like, all of whom have less special interests in whatever may have to be done. I spoke in general terms just now of a measure of silence on the part of the Press. I think the lecturer's committee could readily come to an agreement which would satisfy *them* as to where that line is to be drawn, but are they not possibly in danger of mistaking the measure of what the public will stand? I think Mr. Gwynne is prepared to admit that there are difficulties in that. In other words, how far will the nerves of the public stand silence, and with how little news will they be content? I think in that direction a great deal of discussion and research are still necessary. I do not know whether the lecturer would be prepared to answer for the public at large but I think there are very great difficulties in the way. Take, for instance, the prohibition of all casualty returns—how long would the public stand that? And after all, is not the British public, as a fact, in the habit of being rather suspicious of reticence, whether official or otherwise? Is it not inclined to argue from reticence that things are at their very worst rather than that they are at their very best, or even good at all? I think the sketch the lecturer has given is of enormous advantage to those who have to deal with the matter, but I do hope that in some way or another some sort of discussion will be provoked which will enable those who have to settle the question to be in a position to have some reasonable idea as to how far they can go in controlling the news service. Finally, I have to close the proceedings by presenting, on behalf of everyone, our very best thanks to Mr. Gwynne for his extremely able paper.

**Colonel Sir Lonsdale Hale:** On behalf of the Council, I thank you, Sir, for so kindly taking the Chair to-day. We are always very anxious to get in the Chair somebody who knows a great deal about the subject dealt with, and we are extremely obliged to you for your presence.

## THE TRUE ACCOUNT OF SARATOGA.

By MAJOR A. W. H. LEES (late), 3rd (Reserve) Battalion,  
South Wales Borderers.

I HAVE read Burgoyne's despatches and all books I could find on the campaign of Saratoga, but with the exception of the memoirs from which most of this article is compiled, no account enables the reader to understand the details or course of events in any of the battles in which Burgoyne was engaged. For further information, the reader is referred to the memoirs of the Baroness v. Riedesel, née Frederica v. Massow, daughter of General v. Massow, who, accompanied during the earlier stages by her friend, Lady Harriet Acland, made the whole campaign with her husband, Major-General v. Riedesel.

Friederich Adolphus Freiherr von Riedesel was born June 3rd, 1738, at his ancestral castle at Lauterbach in Rhinehesse. The family of Riedesel belonged to the old feudal nobility, and is mentioned as early as the twelfth century, and now represented by Freiherr von und zu Riedesel-Eisenbach.

Von Riedesel, after serving in a Hessian battalion and spending some time in England, where he was extremely popular, returned to Germany and served on the personal staff of Duke Ferdinand of Brunswick throughout the Seven Years' War, and with great distinction at the victory of Minden, after which he received a squadron in the Hessian Hussars, though he continued to serve on the staff. The Duke of Brunswick employed him principally in the Intelligence Department of the Allied Army, and as staff officer to various columns. He was next appointed lieut.-colonel of the Brunswick Hussars, and as commander of a cavalry brigade was severely wounded when leading a brilliant cavalry charge against the troops of General Conflans. On August 16th, 1761, he again distinguished himself in action, and on August 10th of the next year he routed a force of 2,000 men under St. Victor, and later on captured Menneringhausen, on both occasions being specially mentioned by Duke Ferdinand.

At this time he was only 22 years of age. In 1767, v. Riedesel was appointed Adjutant-General of the Brunswick Army, and in 1776 promoted to Major-General and appointed to command the Brunswick troops destined for service in America under Burgoyne. Exchanged some time after the surrender at Saratoga, he was appointed commandant of Long Island, a post of great importance garrisoned by picked British troops, and later commander of the German troops detailed for the defence of Canada.

Major-General v. Riedesel was a man of exceptional ability. He is noted as being "full of courage and daring;" "of great

industry." "To coolness and discretion in danger he united that quickness in action which he always knew how to exercise at the right moment." "He was impulsive, sensitive, vehement and passionate, but equally given to noble and generous promptings." Burgoyne testified to his popularity both with the German and British troops. Von Riedesel had many friends in our service, and formed a high opinion of the military qualities of Sir Guy Carleton, Sir Henry Clinton and Lord Cornwallis. After his return from America he was promoted to Lieut.-General; he had held this local rank in America. He commanded the Brunswick troops in Holland. In 1794 he was appointed Commandant of Brunswick, and died there on January 6th, 1800.

The German troops which formed part of Burgoyne's force, comprised a company of Jägers, a regiment of Brunswick heavy dragoons (dismounted), five battalions of Brunswick infantry, and the Hesse-Hanau infantry and artillery. The British troops comprised the 9th, 20th, 21st, 24th, 47th, and 62nd Foot, a battalion of Grenadiers, and one of Light Infantry formed from the flank companies of the regiments in Canada, and a detachment of Royal Artillery.

Von Riedesel's self-control was wonderful considering that he was bound to subordinate all his ideas to those of Burgoyne, whose talents as a General were conspicuous by their absence, though on the actual field of battle he was more in his element. Von Riedesel's suggestions were systematically pigeon-holed, and on two occasions when he asked for permission to attack and destroy isolated rebel forces, permission was refused him. During the campaign Generals Frazer (24th Foot) and Phillips (R.A.) gave full credit to our Allies, and General Burgoyne in his orders did them scanty justice, but, afterwards in England, though he exonerated v. Riedesel, he damned the Germans with faint praise, and consequently the popular opinion in England was unfavourable to them. The criticisms on the Brunswickers were not in accordance with actual facts.

Let us now consider the campaign. Long before it opened, v. Riedesel initiated a system of light infantry training, ensuring the intelligent use of cover, and rapidity of movement and fire, which received Burgoyne's complete approval. The statement that the Germans were heavily equipped is unsupported except, perhaps, in the case of the dragoon regiment, who are believed to have marched in their long boots, and certainly wore their sabres, but it was always intended that they should be mounted. It is on record that all silver lace was removed from the officers' uniforms, as it was well known the American riflemen would pay them particular attention.

The first occasion on which the Brunswickers were closely engaged was on July 7th at Hubbardton. Burgoyne's order was: "Brigadier Frazer with 20 companies of English Grenadiers and Light Infantry shall march to Castletown and Skenesborough and attack the enemy who have retreated by land; General

Riedesel with his corps of reserve under Breymann and the Infantry Regiment of Riedesel shall *follow* the corps of Frazer and support it in case of attack." Von Riedesel, after marching 14 miles, *overtook* Frazer, and they *agreed* that Frazer should march three miles further and both bivouac for the night. Next morning (July 7th) both should start together, and Frazer, if attacked should *wait* for v. Riedesel. This arrangement was carried out, and v. Riedesel hearing heavy fire did not wait for his main body, but pushed on with his advanced guard. A galloper arrived from Frazer asking for support, and v. Riedesel sent him back to say the Germans were pushing on as rapidly as possible. When v. Riedesel arrived on the scene the British were hotly engaged, and the rebels were turning their left flank. Seeing the critical situation, v. Riedesel at once ordered his Jäger company to attack, and directed the remainder of his advanced guard against the rebel right rear. The band, loudly playing, advanced with the Jägers (80 men), who were opposed by 400 rebels. The Jägers, after exchanging a hot fire, promptly charged, drove off the Americans and captured their battery of 12 guns, the whole of the artillery in the field. The Brunswick Grenadiers attacked at the same time and the enemy retired. The remainder of v. Riedesel's force arrived after a forced march, but no enemy was left to meet them. General Frazer, a perfectly straightforward man, acknowledged the vital importance of v. Riedesel's attack, as did Burgoyne in a less generous manner.

**Order from Headquarters, July 10th, 1777.**

The rebels evacuated Fort Ticonderoga on the 6th, having been forced into this measure by the presence of our Army. On one side of the lake they ran as far as Skenesborough. On the other side as far as Hubberton. They left behind their artillery and baggage. Brigadier Frazer, with one half of his brigade and without artillery, met 2,000 rebels strongly fortified, attacked and drove them from their position. The latter lost many of their officers, 200 were killed, more wounded, and 300 captured. Major-General von Riedesel, with his advanced guard, consisting of the company of Jägers (80 men) Light Infantry and Grenadiers, came up in time to support Brigadier Frazer, and by his judicious orders, and the bravery with which they were executed, he, as well as his troops, shared in the honour of the victory. . . . The rapid progress of our arms—for which we cannot sufficiently thank God—gives great honour to our troops. The greatest praise is due to General von Riedesel and Brigadier Frazer, who, by their bravery, supported by officers and soldiers, have rendered the greatest service to the King. The highest honour is due to the troops from the fact that, in spite of the many fatigues they have undergone—through inclement weather and without bread—they have never shown the least insubordination. Therefore on next Sunday there shall be divine service in front of the Army and the advanced guard, and in the evening at sunset there shall be firing of cannon and small arms. This shall also be done at Ticonderoga, Crown Point, the camp at Skenesborough, at Castletown, and in the camp of Colonel Breymann. The commander of each regiment shall himself

read this order to his regiment, and Major-General von Riedesel will see to it that this order shall be sent to the detached corps of the left wing. Brigadier Hamilton will send it to Crown Point.

(Signed) BURGOYNE.

Rather a quaint idea! It reads as though the reward of the troops was to be a church parade followed by blank firing.

With reference to the unfortunate expedition to Bennington there is much interesting information. Writing to Duke Ferdinand of Brunswick, General v. Riedesel says:—

“ Unless a total change is made in the system of the Army, it will be impossible to execute with it rapid movements, so much difficulty is experienced by our having no teams and being so far away from our bateaux that the Army is unable to advance three German miles without waiting again eight and ten days for our necessary supplies to be brought up.”

On July 22nd v. Riedesel drew up a lengthy and exceedingly able memorandum, which he handed to Burgoyne, in which attention is drawn to the fact of the Army being tied down to the river Hudson, and that they could not follow up any success; and that unless detachments were sent out to act vigorously and break up rebel gatherings, the Americans would endanger the communications. “ This latter circumstance may *in future* be even more detrimental to us than at present.” That the only means was to adopt pack-transport; that it could be organized in three weeks, as Skeneborough and the Connecticut were free from the enemy, and every inhabitant had from three to four horses. He then suggests how the seizures are to be made. In another letter he says the horses of the Americans are only used for riding in to take the oath of allegiance and riding out to give information to the enemy.—How like “ Brother Boer!”

Burgoyne put this document in his pocket, and *three weeks afterwards*, when all the surrounding circumstances had changed, sent for v. Riedesel and produced instructions for Colonel Baum’s expedition. The troops detailed were: Brunswick Dragoons, 200; Indians, 100; Corps of Peters, 150; Volunteers, 56; Captain Frazer’s Company, 50; Total, 556. As some of these were not forthcoming, 100 Germans were substituted.

Von Riedesel politely but emphatically objected to the “ change of circumstances,” “ the composition of the detachment” and “ the direction of the march,” which was to be *towards* the enemy and not *behind* our Army as he had originally suggested. He also said it should be decided if Baum was to fight or forage. Burgoyne overruled all objections and said that he wished Baum to attack the enemy in order to relieve pressure against Colonel St. Leger, who was besieging Stanwix. It was impossible for v. Riedesel to say anything further.

Finally Burgoyne heard of the magazine at Bennington, and riding over to Baum’s detachment ordered him not to march on Manchester but direct on Bennington, still nearer to the enemy.

Let us next examine how the much abused Colonel Baum endeavoured to carry out his orders. On August 12th he

marched from Battenkill, near Saratoga, to Cambridge, where he attacked and dispersed a detachment of rebels. On the 13th he reported to Burgoyne by despatch rider that Bennington was said to be occupied by 1,800 rebel militia. On the 15th Burgoyne received a report from Baum that he had been attacked by 700 rebels, whom he had driven off, and asking for reinforcements. Burgoyne sent his A.D.C., Sir Francis Clarke, Bt., to v. Riedesel to arrange for the reinforcements. Von Riedesel gave his opinion that the situation of Colonel Baum was "very precarious," and advised that he should be at once ordered to fall back on the reinforcements, meeting them half way. This was not done, but Colonel v. Breymann was ordered to march with his reinforcement. Colonel Baum was accompanied by three British officers, Captain O'Connell, as interpreter, Lieutenant Durnford as engineer, and Colonel Skene as intelligence officer. The latter appears to have been the evil genius of the expedition.

The morning of the 16th found Baum entrenched awaiting the expected reinforcement. Towards 6 a.m. parties of armed men appeared on his flank and rear, and on pointing this out to Colonel Skene, that officer assured Baum that they were "Royalists" who had come to join him, and they were allowed to bivouac. Shortly afterwards he was attacked from the rear but drove the rebels off. Later on a stronger force advanced, and then the so-called "Royalists" fired into the backs of the unfortunate Germans. The Indians and provincials fled, and after holding out for two hours and expending all his ammunition, Colonel Baum placed himself at the head of his dragoons, ordered them to sling their carbines, draw their sabres, and led them against the encircling rebels, who by that time numbered some 5,000 men. Twice the dragoons broke through, but were headed off, and Baum fell mortally wounded. Only seven dragoons escaped, the remainder were killed, wounded or taken. With reference to the misleading account of the mysterious "Captain Glick," so often quoted by would-be historians, it is only necessary to point out that no such name occurs in the list of Brunswick officers serving in America.

It was unjust to blame Burgoyne for sending the German heavy dragoons on this expedition, for it was expected they would ride the horses, to be commandeered from the inhabitants. The roads were in a shocking condition when Colonel v. Breymann marched at nine o'clock on the 15th with the Brunswick Grenadiers, the Rifle Battalion, and a section of the Hesse Hanau Artillery, 642 of all ranks. The Company of Jägers also joined him. No transport was available, and the reserve ammunition had to be carried by the artillery. The whole force had to ford the Battenkill, and the guns had to be man-handled up every hill. The guide lost his way, and v. Breymann was obliged to halt seven miles short of Cambridge, but sent an officer to Baum to announce his approach.

Early on the 16th the advance continued, but the gun horses broke down and horses and carts had to be requisitioned. Colonel v. Breymann heard no firing, but at 4.30 p.m., when halted, Colonel Skene, like a demon in the pantomime, suddenly appeared with the information that Baum was only two miles distant, but said nothing of Baum's defeat, "of which he appeared totally ignorant." Colonel v. Breymann therefore pushed on with renewed energy. As the advance continued, v. Breymann called Colonel Skene's attention to a considerable number of armed men who were visible, occupying a hill on the flank of the advance. Colonel Skene affirmed they were "Royalists," but upon his riding towards them he was received with a volley. Von Breymann at once ordered the Rifles to attack them, and sent the Jägers and Grenadiers to the right. The guns came into action on the high road against a log hut full of rebels, and these were quickly driven out. It was quite evident that the Americans were in great force between Colonel v. Breymann's command and the force, under Baum, which he had been ordered to support.

The first determined attack of the rebels was severely repulsed; v. Breymann counter-attacked and drove them from three successive positions, but they were continually reinforced. Fighting continued till 8 p.m., when the ammunition was exhausted, and v. Breymann lost heavily while endeavouring to withdraw the guns, the teams being destroyed. He then retired in good order under cover of the night, with most of his wounded, destroyed the bridge behind him, and after halting the night at Cambridge rejoined Headquarters. There was no pursuit. Two of his officers were killed, and Colonel v. Breymann, Major v. Barner, commanding the Rifles, and four others were wounded; five were taken prisoners.

#### BATTLE OF STILLWATER OR FREEMAN'S FARM.

September 19th, 1777.

The Army advanced in three columns. The right, under Brig.-General Frazer, comprised the British Grenadier and Light Infantry Battalions—the Brunswick Grenadiers and Brunswick Rifle Battalion. These moved along the heights. The centre, under Brig.-General Hamilton, comprised the 20th, 21st, 62nd and 9th Foot, and moved on Freeman's Farm. The left, under Major-General v. Riedesel, comprising the remainder of the Brunswickers and the wing 47th Foot, moved in the valley of the Hudson. Artillery was with each column. The terrain was densely wooded, with occasional clearings, and Burgoyne or his staff appear to have made no adequate arrangements for communication between the columns. Von Riedesel's column was obliged to construct three bridges under fire, and towards one p.m. heard firing on their right. Major-General Phillips, R.A., offered to try and get into touch with the centre column, where

Burgoyne was known to be, and rode off with Major Bloomfield, R.A. About two p.m. the latter returned with the report that the Brunswick Rifles had been hotly engaged on the extreme right of the Army. Von Riedesel having heard nothing from Burgoyne all day, and as the distant firing increased rather than diminished, sent Captain Willoe to get information. It was not until five p.m. that Willoe was able to return with an order from Burgoyne that v. Riedesel, after leaving sufficient men to cover the supply trains and reserve artillery of the Army, was to take as many men as he could spare and attack the right of the enemy near Freeman's Farm. Von Riedesel started at once with his own regiment and a section of artillery, preceded by two companies of the regiment, "v. Rhetz," as advanced guard, and hastened through the woods to an eminence from which he beheld the centre column in action. The 20th, 21st, and 62nd were drawn up in a line in an open space surrounded by woods, and had already repulsed six assaults, each made by fresh bodies of Americans. The Royal Artillery were all out of action, there being no ammunition, and the whole of the gunners being killed or wounded. The British regiments lost 50 per cent. In his notes v. Riedesel says: "The 20th, 21st, and 62nd Regiments, under the brave Brig.-General Hamilton were forced to withstand a severe fire lasting four hours, which ruined them, but did not make them retreat."

Von Riedesel led his two companies forward at the double, cheering loudly and with drums beating, and attacked the flank of the enemy. The left of the British had fallen back, but, seeing the Brunswickers, came forward again. The Hessian guns came into action on the left of the British line, and fired grape. At almost the same moment the regiment of v. Riedesel arrived, joined the two advanced guard companies and poured in a crushing fire. The Brunswickers and the survivors of Hamilton's brigade then rushed forward together with fixed bayonets, and the rebels gave way all along the line. The 9th Foot were in reserve. In a private letter v. Riedesel says he could have arrived an hour sooner "had he received the long-wished-for order." The British and Brunswick Grenadiers, the 24th Regiment, the Light Infantry Battalion and the Brunswick Rifles were engaged all day on the extreme right. Brig.-General Frazer (24th) gave the most splendid acknowledgments to these Brunswickers under Colonel v. Breymann, in a circular letter to all the English Generals. Burgoyne hardly mentioned them.

During these operations the American General Lincoln, with a strong force of Militia, got round Burgoyne's Army, and made a determined attack on the forts at Ticonderoga, with the intention of capturing Quebec. He took prisoner four companies of a British regiment with some guns, and captured a ship and bateaux. He made four assaults on other forts, but was repulsed with heavy loss. Brig.-General Powell commanded there, and the Brunswick Regiment Prince Frederick was greatly distinguished. Lincoln then attacked four (or two) companies of

the 47th Foot at Diamond Island, but was so resolutely received that he was driven off with a loss of 60 men. The 47th, led by Captain Aubrey, pursued the rebels with such vigour that the ship and bateaux were re-taken; the rebels never rallied again, and Canada was saved.

For more than a fortnight neither Army made any decisive movement, though there was much severe work between the outposts. Burgoyne had at this time about 5,000 effectives, while the Americans counted at least 6,000 Regulars and 10,000 Militia behind their entrenched camps.

Burgoyne consulted v. Riedesel and Phillips on October 4th and 5th, when v. Riedesel said that as it did not appear possible to make a wide turning movement through the dense woods, without risking the loss of the guns, supply train, and bateaux, which were all on the Hudson, in his opinion the Army should retire across the river and get into touch with Lake George. The other Generals agreed, but Burgoyne said a retreat would be "disgraceful," and that he preferred to make a reconnaissance in force. On October 7th, Burgoyne, Phillips, and v. Riedesel, with eight guns and 1,500 men drawn from all the regiments except the 47th, moved out to the south-west of the camp, forming, as v. Riedesel says, a detachment three-quarters of a mile from the enemy's left; "in a miserable position, where we could see nothing of the enemy. We were amusing ourselves by firing at him with artillery." On the left were half the British Grenadiers with the Hesse-Hanau Artillery, in the centre 300 Germans under Lieut.-Colonel v. Specht, on the right the British Light Infantry under Lord Balcarres, half the British Grenadiers and the 24th Foot, all under Brig.-General Frazer. The Americans made a well-conceived attack in overwhelming numbers. They held the whole line under fire and threw their principal weight on the English left. Major Acland was severely wounded and taken prisoner, and his men fell back in confusion. The Hesse-Hanau guns were lost, four of their officers severely wounded, and the left of the Germans exposed. Von Specht reinforced his left and conducted a desperate defence. The Royal Artillery fought their guns magnificently. Owing to a mistaken order the British Light Infantry were withdrawn from the right of the Germans, and the rebels were soon attacking both flanks of v. Specht's command. The position was critical, when the 24th Foot moved rapidly from the extreme right, and led by General Frazer, came up to prolong the right of the Germans, but before they could unite Frazer was mortally wounded, and the Americans got between the Germans and the 24th. Major Forster took command, and the 24th were, in their turn, charged in front and on both flanks. This was approximately the situation when Burgoyne ordered the whole force to retire on the camp. The Brunswickers and the 24th fell back in good order, but the whole of the guns fell into the hands of the rebels, the teams having been destroyed, and Major

Williams, R.A., who remained with his battery, was captured, after nobly upholding the traditions of his corps.

It was nearly dark, the Americans pushed the pursuit fiercely, and before the British and German regiments could be reformed, the enemy assaulted the whole line of entrenchments. The key of the position was a large redoubt near Freeman's Farm, at this time held by only 200 Brunswickers, under Colonel v. Breymann. On the left of this redoubt were two houses, which, in the morning, were held by some Canadians, but these had since been withdrawn, and v. Breymann was not told of the withdrawal. He was holding out with desperation, fighting at close quarters, when the rebels crept through the unoccupied houses and fired into the left and rear of the Brunswickers. Von Breymann was killed, and the survivors of his 200 driven out of the position. In the camp below there appears to have been much confusion, though the long line of the trenches down to the Hudson was still held. Hearing of the loss of the redoubt Burgoyne ordered Col. v. Specht to retake it. In the camp the Germans and English were all mingled together, but v. Specht managed to get about 50 of his men out of the mob and started, in the dark, to retake the redoubt; he was, however, led by a traitor into the midst of the victorious Americans and promptly captured. As night had fallen the engagement was broken off.

During the 8th the Army prepared for retreat, and the covering troops were under fire all day. The advanced guard, 9th and 47th Foot, Brunswick Grenadiers and Captain Frazer's corps under v. Riedesel, reached Dovogat at three a.m. on the 9th and v. Riedesel, after reconnoitring, reported to Burgoyne that only a weak detachment of the enemy held the other side of the Hudson, but the advanced guard received no orders except to halt, and later on, "to everyone's astonishment" the Army was ordered by Burgoyne to encamp, and remained the whole day at Dovogat, near Battenkill. The passage could easily have been forced, and the Army could have marched all night as "it was not very dark," and could have been saved, but the baggage would have been lost. It was then thought the march would commence at daybreak, but Burgoyne ordered the troops to a fresh position, where they remained till four p.m. Firing on patrols and on the bateaux was frequent. Owing to this delay the rebels rallied all the towns on the line of retreat. At four p.m. the retreat was at length continued, during which the rearguard formed from the British regiments was severely and continuously engaged, and the baggage of the regiments lost. At night on the 9th the Army reached Saratoga and crossed the Fishkill, leaving, as rearguard, on the enemy's or south bank, Brig.-General Hamilton's brigade, 20th, 21st and 62nd. The Army encamped; the bateaux were under fire all night.

On the 10th, Burgoyne instead of continuing the retreat ordered the troops to entrench, and despatched Lieut.-Colonel Sutherland with the (9th and ?) 47th and Captain Twiss of the

Engineers to repair the bridge over the Hudson opposite Fort Edward. This was the crossing place reported on by v. Riedesel on the previous day. According to the report of Colonel Sutherland on the 10th "That he had met none of the enemy and that the bridge was half finished," it is evident that, had the army continued marching, it would have reached the heights of Fort Edward before the enemy, or crossed the river higher up. Sutherland's detachment, however, was recalled, though Captain McKay's company, which was left at the bridge, did actually escape the subsequent capitulation, and reached Ticonderoga in safety. The bridge was afterwards destroyed by the rebels. During this abortive expedition, the Americans at 2 p.m. occupied Saratoga, and compelled Hamilton's rearguard to fall back across the Fishkill on to the main Army, though some American brigades, which tried to force the passage, were driven back by the artillery. The outposts and working parties were attacked throughout the night of the 10th-11th, and the whole camp was more or less subjected to a continuous artillery fire.

Before daybreak on the 11th the rebels forded the Fishkill, surprised a detachment of the 62nd, and shortly afterwards captured the whole of the bateaux, which they eventually used for massing troops on the other side of the Hudson, and for reinforcing Fort Edward. The Army was under fire front and rear all day, and the outposts, both British and German, lost heavily.

At last Burgoyne sent for Phillips and v. Riedesel, and the latter advised that, as the crossing at Fort Edward was probably by that time lost, the Army should abandon all baggage, retreat at once, and cross the river four miles above the fort, but Burgoyne could not make up his mind, and during the night the rebels erected fresh batteries and reinforced Fort Edward.

The Baroness v. Riedesel, in her delightful memoirs, is far less reticent than her discipline-loving husband. She writes: "General Phillips said: 'Poor woman, I wonder at you, although completely drenched, you yet have the courage to think of going further in this weather. I would that you were our commanding General. He considers himself too fatigued to go further, and intends staying here all night and give us a supper.'" The Baroness adds that Burgoyne was "*hilarious* with champagne."—A very ladylike way of expressing it!

On October 12th, there was constant fighting, and at three p.m. Burgoyne summoned a formal council of war at which were present Lieut.-General Burgoyne, Major-General Phillips, Major-General v. Riedesel, Brig.-General Hamilton and Brig.-General v. Gall. Some of the points placed before the council are rather quaint, it would be a pity not to give them:—

*First.*—Wait in this position for coming fortunate events.

*Secondly.*—To attack the enemy.

*Thirdly.*—To retreat, repair the bridges on the march, and thus, with the artillery and baggage, force the ferry near Fort Edward.

*Fourthly*.—To retreat by night leaving the artillery and baggage behind, cross above Fort Edward, or march round Lake George.

*Fifthly*.—In case the enemy should move more to the left to force our passage to Albany.

Von Riedesel considered the lengthy debate a waste of valuable time, as he had long before made up his mind and urged the only possible course. At length it was decided that as every proposition, save the fourth, was clearly impossible, the fourth had better be adopted, v. Riedesel insisting on a night march, being supported by all except Burgoyne. Then it was discovered that no rations had been issued to the Army, and v. Riedesel went off to see this done. At ten p.m. he reported by the Quartermaster-General that the advanced guard was rationed, and formed up ready to march and asked for orders. The answer was: "The retreat is postponed. The reason why is not known." On the following day the retreat of the Army had become utterly impossible, for during the night it was entirely surrounded by the Americans.

On the 13th, Burgoyne summoned the last council of war. Present—generals, brigadiers, and commanders of regiments, and entered into communication with the American General Gates (a retired British officer) as to terms of capitulation. The rebels stipulated that "the Army should surrender as prisoners of war. The troops should ground their arms in the entrenchments where they now stood." In reply all the members of the council declared that they would sooner spill their last drop of blood, or die of starvation, before they would submit to such humiliating conditions. Major Kingston was sent to General Gates with the answer that all negotiations must cease unless he relinquished his proposed articles, the entire Army being resolved "To throw themselves with the greatest desperation upon the enemy rather than accept such conditions." The armistice ceased, and finally the American general granted honourable terms, which were accepted, and the surrender was *un fait accompli*.

The exact number of troops concentrated by General Gates was 22,350 round Burgoyne, and 2,650 on the opposite bank of the Hudson, so that Burgoyne, whose effectives were reduced to 3,500 combatants, surrendered to an investing force of 25,000 men. Well might v. Riedesel write: "There is not, perhaps, a single instance in history, or certainly very few, where troops could be reconciled to a capitulation with so much honour."

Immediately prior to the surrender v. Riedesel's first care was to save the Colours of the Brunswick regiments. The Colours were removed from the poles and sewn into a mattress upon which the Baroness v. Riedesel slept nightly, until the conclusion of the campaign, when they were safely conveyed to Brunswick and restored to the regiments which had borne them so bravely. The officers of our 24th Regiment are believed to have



## EXPLANATORY NOTE.

19TH SEPTEMBER—


1st Position is shown by a dotted line.  
2nd Position is shown by a thin line.


7TH OCTOBER—

Position is shown by a *heavy block line*.

**N.B.—Note direction of true meridian.**







burnt theirs, and probably the other British regiments did the same. Von Riedesel never published any justification of his conduct, but he sent the fullest details to the Prince. A letter written to Duke Ferdinand of Brunswick immediately after the surrender is worth quoting :

" Your Serene Highness will understand into what a desolate position our fine manœuvres have placed me and the troops of your Highness. The reputation I have gained in Germany has been sacrificed to certain individuals, and I consider myself the most unfortunate man on earth."

Again, commenting upon Burgoyne's despatches, v. Riedesel writes :

" It seems that General Burgoyne has been kind enough to save the honour of General Riedesel—yea, even to speak with distinction and praise in regard to his conduct. . . General Riedesel had rather be deprived of all praise than see his troops robbed of the same glory in a public and unjust manner."

Major-General v. Riedesel and his wife were well received in England after the war; during their stay in London before returning to Brunswick, they were, one evening, invited to take tea at the Court when no one but the Royal Family were present. The Baroness v. Riedesel was seated between the Queen and the eldest Princess. She was obliged to relate a great deal of her adventures to the ladies, and she was fully equal to the task, for she had experienced much, and knew how to relate it in an interesting manner. She excelled, indeed, in carrying on a conversation. The King stood near the fireplace conversing with the general upon more serious affairs. The former also was so obliging as to carry on the conversation in the German language. Von Riedesel and his wife remained until nearly ten o'clock with the Royal Family, whom the Baroness describes as extremely amiable. She writes : " The Royal Family have, in fact, the gift of taking all constraint from one, so that we felt as if we were with a happy family of our own rank."

I will conclude this article with an extract from a letter of Major-General Phillips to Lord George Germaine :

*Virginia, March 20th, 1779.*

" I take the liberty of going beyond the limits allowed me by your Lordship to publicly acknowledge in my report the good conduct of the German troops (under the command of Major-General von Riedesel) in the service of His Majesty. The conduct of the officers and soldiers was exemplary, and they are to be respected as faithful companions in misfortune of their comrades the English soldiers, during the manifold changes in their unfortunate situation. I have found in General Riedesel the greatest possible attention to the duties of his position. He was always the same in his care for his German troops, in maintaining order, and in keeping up harmony and good-fellowship between the English and German troops. In short, he was thoroughly imbued with the duties of His Majesty's service."

## BRITISH MILITARY ADMINISTRATION IN THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY.

By the late MAJOR G. C. MERRICK, D.S.O., R.A.

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TO give a clear description of the institutions existing at any particular period nearly always involves a considerable knowledge of what has gone before, and it is, therefore, not at all easy to understand the working of our military institutions at whatever period we take them, as there is little recorded as to their earlier stages of development. The object of the present series being to present a clear picture of British military institutions at the time of the Peninsular War, as a preliminary to the study of a campaign, this opening chapter will begin with a short sketch of those institutions at an earlier period still.

Beginning at about the year 1700 A.D., it will be found that the simplest way to get a grip of our military system is to examine the estimates which were presented to Parliament every year. We find that what are now combined in one set of estimates, in those days appeared in two or three.

Army estimates for cavalry, infantry and staff made up one estimate, ordnance estimates for artillery, engineers and armament another; the army and the ordnance were distinct and separate. Further, both these estimates were divided into two parts, "ordinary" and "extraordinary," which correspond roughly to "peace" and "war" expenditure.

As regards the Army we find the estimates for "ordinary" expenditure drawn up under the heads of: Regiments, at so much each; Staff, at so much each; Contingencies. The whole sum, estimated for, was voted by Parliament and the necessary instalments were issued as required by order of the Treasury. But regiments and staffs were scattered all over Great Britain, and in the then state of commercial development, no machinery, such as banks, existed for the issue of the money to units either in bulk or in detail.

Something had to be devised: the first thing obviously was to appoint some central person to hold the money, after it had left the Exchequer (where all public money was kept), and a series of other persons to act as distributing agents. Accordingly we find that a paymaster-general was appointed by the Government, and each regiment or other person receiving pay was invited to nominate an agent who would receive money on his behalf and who would have his office near that of the

paymaster-general in London, the business centre of the country. These agents were the distributing agents of the paymaster-general, and they later became agents to the regiments for all kinds of other duties and for the supply of stores.

The pay for a regiment was inclusive, that is, it was the total cost of the regiment to the public, exclusive of arms, and the whole amount was paid to the colonel, or rather to his account with his agent. It was left to the colonel to arrange for all the various supplies, clothing, equipment, etc., which a military body requires. Clothing, equipment, food, recruiting, pensions to officers, pensions to widows, medical attendance, all these had to be paid for out of the pay of the regiment, and an elaborate system of stoppages grew up, which later on led to the perpetration of frauds, both on the public and on the soldier.

It was from the first apparent that some outside authority was necessary to act as a check on colonels and their agents, and this check was provided by the Secretary at War.

This official was permanent, and from his office emanated all orders and instructions as to recruiting, pay, stoppages, clothing, etc. These regulations appeared in the shape of royal warrants, and came out as the occasion demanded, not at stated intervals. Other regulations were published by the commanders when armies took the field and these also found a home in the War Office, which was the only permanent office then in existence, for there was no clear line of division between purely administrative and purely military matters. As regards the disposal of the regimental pay, however, the colonels of regiments had a fairly free hand, the inspection and examination of accounts not being of a searching nature. It became stricter and stricter, or rather less and less lax as time went on.

The estimate for staff, which included everything not regimental, was made in a lump sum. The establishment of the staff was not fixed; it usually comprised a number of officers commanding expeditions and their staffs, a few other generals, an adjutant-general and quartermaster-general, and sometimes a Commander-in-Chief. Some of the generals were employed in temporary commands such as North Britain and Ireland, which were then disturbed areas. Others, summoned by order of the King through the Secretary at War, were formed into a board, which gave advice on any military question which required investigation.

The adjutant-general and quartermaster-general, when active operations were not in progress, seem to have belonged to the staff of the War Office, and it gradually became the custom for certain orders to issue through the adjutant-general, that is under his signature. When troops were in the field this was the invariable rule. There was also attached to the War Office establishment a small medical headquarters, chiefly concerned, in early times, with the purchase of drugs, the

nomination of regimental surgeons, and the formation of medical staffs for expeditions.

The troops, which were maintained in Great Britain, were not kept in fixed stations, they were moved about from place to place as required. In the winter they were generally in quarters, that is, they were billeted on innkeepers; in the summer they were in camps. Occasionally they were in barracks. The Army was an army in occupation of Great Britain, and the country can hardly be said to have been divided into districts, though Ireland and North Britain were permanent military commands.

The inspection of the troops was carried out by officials known as muster-masters and occasionally by general officers who got special letters of service to review certain regiments. These inspections were instituted chiefly with a view to the prevention of fraud, to see that the full establishment of men was kept up, and that clothing and equipment was in good order. For muster purposes the country was divided into districts, and each muster-master reviewed the troops which happened to be temporarily in his district.

As stated above, orders and regulations of a permanent nature mostly came from the War Office, sometimes direct from the Secretary at War, sometimes through the adjutant-general. Discipline and training were the same thing, and it seems likely that the Board of General Officers was utilized in helping to draw up the training manuals occasionally issued by authority.

The system by which the artillery and engineers were administered was similar to the above, the machinery of the Board of Ordnance combining the functions of the Secretary at War, the Paymaster-General, the agents, the Adjutant-General, etc. (These two corps were more centralized and their administration was therefore easier). Thus we find that the Army as we know it, the infantry, cavalry, artillery and engineers, were controlled by two separate departments, the War Office for the two former, the Board of Ordnance for the two latter.

Each of these two authorities issued orders and regulations on every kind of subject, disciplinary, financial, administrative, each controlled the expenditure of the money voted for their respective services, and each had a paymaster-general and a system of agents.

The regiments of infantry and cavalry in Great Britain were, unless collected for an expedition, directly under the War Office, and those of artillery and engineers under the Board of Ordnance. In both cases the staff considered necessary was appointed on the authority of the heads of these two departments. From a military point of view Great Britain itself was one district, administered directly from the War Office by means of a number of generals, appointed, on letters of service, for

limited periods. The artillery and engineers were administered as a corps directly by the Board of Ordnance.

The above may roughly be termed the peace organization. War brought into play an entirely new set of departments. First of all the money for the cost of the war had to be found, and, as in those days records were not carefully kept, previous experience did not give much assistance except in so far as it was known that expenditure would be large. Exactly how much the various items would cost, or even exactly what the items were, was not clearly appreciated. It was usual then for Parliament to vote a sum for the "extraordinary" expenses of the war without specifying exactly how it was to be expended; the allotment of expenditure was left to the Commander-in-Chief. The money voted, however, was not paid in to the Paymaster-General, and its expenditure was not checked by the Secretary at War, it was issued to the Commander-in-Chief, and the details of expenditure were eventually checked by a sub-department of the Treasury, the Comptrollers of Army Accounts.

The war equivalent for the Paymaster-General and the regimental agents of peace, was at first not a single department, but a series of expending departments, such as those of the Quartermaster-General, Chief Engineer, Bridge-Master, Commissary-General. Each of these, acting under the authority of the Commander-in-Chief, drew bills on the Treasury for the sums they required and accounted for them direct to the Auditors of Imprest (imprest = advance). Again, just as the expenditure of the agents was checked to some extent, by the Secretary at War, on behalf of the King and Parliament, so was that of these expending officers on behalf of the Treasury. The means employed for this check were the Comptrollers of Army Accounts, whose office, however, was in Great Britain.

In these times, 1700—1740 A.D., the Commissary-General had not reached the important position he held later on, he was merely one accountant among many. He was a Treasury official, or clerk, and his subordinates were also clerks or commissaries; he was responsible for the quality and purchase of bread, meat, supplies, fuel, forage. As a rule these articles were obtained from contractors who delivered them into magazines, in charge of commissaries. Payment was made by the Commissary-General by means of bills drawn on the Treasury in favour of the contractors. When the Army moved, the Commander-in-Chief, in consultation apparently with the Quartermaster-General, decided what amount of supplies were to be taken in carts with the Army and what arrangements were to be made for dépôts. As regards the former a staff of commissaries marched with the wagons and saw to the issue of rations, about twice weekly.

The supply of ammunition was a distinct service.

The Board of Ordnance had a separate organization; it had its own paymaster, its own commissary, its own everything,

the counterpart of that of the Army. The train, as it was called, carried all the ammunition which was required for infantry, cavalry and guns; it also issued the arms required by a regiment when its establishment was increased, and it armed new regiments. When arms had been issued the ordnance struck them off charge and the officers commanding the units concerned accounted for them.

As regards the medical services there was a regimental establishment, *i.e.*, every unit, regiment, or train had its own doctor, but for an expedition an "extraordinary" and temporary service was organized. This varied in numbers, usually consisting of perhaps a dozen all told. These army medical officers had nothing to do with hospital administration except, to some extent, as inspectors. A purveyor supplied the army hospitals with what was considered necessary—bedding, food, shelter, etc., and he, acting under the authority of the Commander-in-Chief, drew bills on the Treasury in the same way as the head of every other department.

When the size of an expedition and its destination had been fixed, transport was arranged by a Transport Board. At first a branch of the Admiralty, and later independent, this Board received instructions as to the place of embarkation and chartered the transports, which were victualled for the voyage by the Victualling Office.

War then involved "extraordinary" expenditure, expenditure on what we now term the departments, in short, the departments only came into existence for war. Wagons, supplies, medical instruments, stores, etc., were purchased or hired by the departments concerned, the accounts of each being examined and checked, long after the expense was incurred, by the Comptrollers of Army Accounts. When an expedition reached the theatre of war this system of check reproduced itself, each department still bought and hired, but under the authority of the Commander-in-Chief, instead of under that of the Treasury, the Commissary-General sometimes taking the place, with regard to the Commander-in-Chief, of the Comptrollers with regard to the Treasury. Later on, in 1780, the accounts of each spending department underwent in the theatre of war a preliminary examination by a Treasury official, the Commissary of Accounts. As regards internal administration each department managed itself.

## SOME REASONS FOR THE SHRINKAGE IN THE TERRITORIAL FORCE, AND SEVERAL SUGGESTED REMEDIES.

By MAJOR F. K. WINDEATT, 5th Bn. Devon Regt.

AT the present time more serious criticism is being directed upon the Territorials than has ever been devoted to that force or its predecessor, the Volunteer Force; and I propose to deal with some of the causes which have resulted in the failure to reach the numbers which it was anticipated would be attained under the Territorial and Reserve Forces Act, 1907.

The questions as to failure in discipline and organization which Lord Roberts contends exist, are rather beyond the scope of these remarks, and I propose chiefly to deal with the failure in numbers.

The establishment of the Territorial Force is 314,366. The Secretary of State for War, in answer to a question in the House of Commons on March 20th, 1913, stated that there was a deficiency of 49,065 officers and men. On May 1st the deficiency was over 60,000, and on June 1st, 61,657.

What, then, are the reasons for this?

To account for this, it is necessary to go back to the time of the old Volunteer Force, and to compare the circumstances which existed previous to April 1st, 1908, when the Territorial Force took the place of the Volunteer Force.

The Volunteer Force had never been treated seriously from its formation by either of the great political parties or those responsible for the defence of the country, but it was permitted to exist, and from the isolated companies which were formed under the original movement the force was gradually consolidated into battalions and brigades. When the Volunteers came into existence in 1852, they were practically all riflemen, and ever since that time the bulk of the Volunteer Force consisted of infantry. The result of this was that, treated as an independent army, it was of no tactical importance, as the other arms of the service required to render it an efficient tactical unit were wanting. There were no guns to take the field with the infantry; no Army Service Corps or Army Medical Corps, and an insufficient number of engineers and cavalry.

The Territorial Forces Act, 1907, remodelled the force by providing for the formation of divisions with the proper proportion of all arms, and this resulted in the reduction of the number of the infantry and the addition of those branches in which the Volunteer Force was either entirely lacking or greatly deficient. Consequently, under this scheme the Territorial Force Artillery was formed from the Volunteer Garrison Artillery, which up to that time, with the exception of the Honourable Artillery Company's Field Artillery Battery, was the only form of field artillery in the Volunteer Force.

Similarly the Volunteer Engineers were allotted to the Territorial divisions, and the Territorial Royal Army Medical Corps was created.

Army Service Corps had in some cases existed under the Volunteer Force, but in nothing like the numbers required, and this branch also was brought in as a component part of the Territorial division. Thus the Territorial division became, if (and it is a very big if) efficient in numbers, discipline and organization, a working unit. At any rate, what had been more or less an armed mob was apportioned on paper into units of all arms in the proper proportions.

To effect these changes the formation of the Volunteer Forces, more particularly as to the Infantry, was greatly changed, as out of the superfluity of the infantry it was necessary to obtain the men required to make up the establishment of the newly-created branches. A natural result of this was the reduction of the establishment of infantry and the cutting down of battalions to half battalions, companies to half companies, and, in some cases, companies or half companies to sections, and the merging in many cases of what had been two battalions into one, and two infantry recruiting areas into one, with concurrent recruiting areas for other units at certain places.

In large towns probably the change in the infantry was not very noticeable, as in such cases the unit had always been the battalion, and if that battalion was reduced to, say, half a battalion, there was very little difference, as the headquarters remained there and also the band of the battalion, which is an extremely important feature as far as recruiting is concerned in the Territorial Force.

In an agricultural county, however, the infantry battalions are chiefly composed of isolated companies having headquarters at a country town, and to a great extent are worked as a complete unit under the company commander. Under the Volunteer system, given a keen and efficient captain, these country companies, composed of men from the same town, were generally good. They usually had a company band, which, although frequently a source of trouble, and always an expense, was undoubtedly instrumental in attracting recruits.

The men of Blacktown, who formed A Company, had a spirit of rivalry with the neighbouring B Company, stationed at

Whitetown, some ten miles away. They felt that the honour of their own town was involved in the efficiency of their company, and played up for it just as they did when they shot in the company team for the regimental cups and shields.

The company commander of such a company knew his men and was in touch with them, and at their weekly parades they drilled as a unit, that of their own company. In those days the adjutant used to come round once a fortnight during the summer months and see the company on parade, and the Blacktown men did their best work to show him that they were as keen as their Whitetown rivals.

In these days it is almost impossible for an adjutant of a country battalion to do this owing to the increase of area and the lack of travelling facilities, to say nothing of the duties he has to perform which have nothing whatever to do with the efficiency of his own battalion.

Let us examine the result of the Territorial Act upon an infantry battalion in such a district as I have described. There were too many infantry in the county and not enough of the other branches, so the area had to be enlarged for an infantry battalion, and two of the Volunteer battalions became one. They were both probably under strength, and what used to be the 6th and 7th Volunteer Battalions Blankshire Regiment became, say, the 4th Battalion Blankshire Regiment (T.F.).

This necessitated a good deal of internal arrangement. One of the colonels had to go or become supernumerary; the same thing applied to two of the majors and one of the adjutants, and out of 16 captains eight only could be kept on; but these changes were not vital, although it undoubtedly resulted in the loss of some of the best officers.

However, this is what happened, and the old 6th Battalion became the Right Half and the 7th the Left Half Battalion. Each of these battalions, perhaps, had a special title, and having been merged they could not continue to keep both, so the simplest way out of the difficulty was to do away with both of them, which, except in very special circumstances, was the solution. Again, one battalion were Rifles, the other drilled as infantry of the line, and here again one of them had to go under; the same thing applied to the regimental march, if it did not happen to be that of the County Regiment to which they belonged.

These points were not really of supreme importance, they have occurred before in the Regular Army, but at the same time it meant the abolition of those marks of distinction which are of great importance in a regiment's traditions. They undoubtedly appealed to the older Volunteers, but having regard to the fact that the Volunteer Force was not, taking the general average, a long service force, these points were not such as would continue to bear appreciable weight with any considerable number.

If those now serving in the Territorial Force, excepting officers and N.C.O.'s had been questioned, it is probable that many of them had forgotten, if they were not quite ignorant of, the peculiar distinctions and privileges of the Volunteer battalion to which their unit formerly belonged. The loss from these causes could not, therefore, be regarded as material.

I think there is a greater difficulty than those I have mentioned. When the old Volunteer battalion was cut down to half a battalion, Blacktown (A Company), from being a company became a half company, and similarly Whitetown (B Company). Now these towns being geographically the most convenient, were merged into one company, and, we will say, became E Company.

Captain X of Blacktown was senior to Captain Y of Whitetown, so was appointed to command, and Blacktown became the headquarters of the company. Now, in a Volunteer company a sergeant-instructor was usually posted to each company, but as a Territorial company only one could be allowed, and he, we will say, had to reside at Blacktown, and in future had to look after Whitetown as well.

However, he was a full time man and had to divide his time between the two, although unfortunately since the railway strike the train service, where there is any in rural districts, is generally so bad that his work was made more difficult to get through, particularly as with the exception of musketry on the range he could not start instruction until the evening.

But if it became hard for the sergeant-instructor to do his work, how was Capt. X affected?

He is, we will say, a professional or a business man, and although he knew his Blacktown men and could turn up without much inconvenience to instruct them on two or three nights a week, it was quite a different thing to do double work, and half of that at Whitetown, ten miles away, with no train service or a motor car to take him there. If Captain Y, who had lost his command and was consequently supernumerary, happened to be keen enough to go on instructing his old company, with the fact before him that when they went to camp he had to stay at home, or possibly be allowed to attend and draw a subaltern's pay if the establishment were short in that rank, then he (Y) might take charge of the Whitetown half company, and the instruction would have proceeded as before.

Possibly, however, Y did not think it good enough, and then there was sometimes a subaltern who could take charge, but if Y happened to be the only officer at Whitetown, then it became the duty of Captain X to see that the company was properly instructed.

Now, X, a busy man as a rule, could only give up his evenings to Territorial work and the fact that he had to go 20 miles for each parade at Whitetown made it difficult for him to do so as often as he would have wished, and when he did,

he had little time or opportunity of getting to know the men as he knew his own Blacktown men.

However good an officer Captain X might be, the Whitetown men had a liking for their own officer Y, who had lost his job.

What then was the result? Unless Captain X was an altogether exceptional man, or with unlimited time and money to spend over the work, although he might still have kept his Blacktown men together, he found it more and more difficult to do the same with his other half company at Whitetown. It was not his fault. He was putting in a good deal more time to it than before, but the company being divided meant double work for him and extra personal expense, which often was never repaid him. However hard he worked he could never quite take the place of Captain Y, who lived in the place and knew and was known by all the people there. There is a clanship in small towns which will always tell in these matters.

I am not finding fault with the system adopted in cutting down battalions to half battalions, and consequently companies to half companies. It was the only way of carrying out the scheme of apportioning the force under the Territorial Forces Act, but in discussing the reasons of the shortage in men one arrives at the conclusion that the system is partly responsible for the decrease in numbers. Both Blacktown and Whitetown each used to have a Volunteer company of from 90 to 100 men under its own captain, and the two companies combined now only raise 100 and I know of a case where three fairly large towns cannot do even that.

But I do not suggest that the instances quoted by any means exhaust the subject. The extension of the week's camp to one of a fortnight (although the longer period is far too short for the adequate training of Territorials), caused the loss of many of the best of the Volunteer Force.

Some non-commissioned officers were clerks, shopkeepers, foremen, men in responsible positions, who, at a pinch and some inconvenience to both employers and themselves were able to get away for a week, but could not possibly put in the second week. It may be said that leave of absence from the training can be given, but if that man is the colour-sergeant or a section commander, or even a squad commander, his absence will certainly retard the progress of the company.

The £5 fine was talked of too much in Parliament when the Act was introduced, but the powers of the section have been so rarely put in force that it need not now be regarded as a serious obstacle to recruiting. The same may be also said of the application of military law to the Territorial Force, because the majority of the recruits do not appreciate what it means, although if the effect were fully explained to them they would probably refuse to join the force.

A more serious reason for the deficiency in men must be laid to the ever-increasing craze of the boy, youth, or young

man of the present day to enjoy himself in his leisure time, and to the greatly multiplied opportunities which exist for the purpose.

Twenty years ago in our small towns which then furnished compact Volunteer companies, there were not the social facilities which are now to be found.

In a town of 4,000 population there have arisen within that period two political clubs, a branch of the Y.M.C.A., and a church institute. For a comparatively small annual subscription a young man may, according to his taste, become a member of one or other of these institutions, where he has the use of comfortable club rooms, refreshments, cards, billiards and newspapers. Twenty years ago, when I joined the ranks of the Volunteer Force, there were none of these places, and the lads of 17 to 18 were glad to become Volunteers for the sake of having something to do to fill up their time during the evenings. The sense of patriotism was probably not much higher, in the majority of cases at any rate, than it is now, but there was less opportunity for amusement. Another attraction of still more recent growth is the picture theatre, and it cannot be said that the usual programme of this form of entertainment is conducive to recruiting in the Territorial Forces.

The reasons that I have already mentioned account to some considerable extent for the lack of progress in the force, but there is one more, and I think the greatest reason of all. It is the apathy of the public. We get no encouragement from the people as a whole. There is no pride in the Territorials upon the part of the people. It may be said that there is little reason for pride in a force which is undoubtedly unprepared to take the field, but no sympathy is shown by the vast majority of the people of Great Britain with those, who, whatever their shortcomings may be, are honestly trying to do a service to their country, and who, in endeavouring to achieve this object, give up their leisure, forego amusements, and often incur personal expense and loss in their particular calling.

Until the Government of this country tell their countrymen with no uncertain voice that their services are wanted it will be difficult to persuade young men that there is any serious need for the maintenance of the Territorial Force. They will continue to regard us as peculiar people, who take our recreation in that manner, just as some of us hunt, shoot, play golf, or look on at a football match.

In the House of Commons on March 20th, 1913, during the debate on the Army Estimates, Mr. Harold Baker, the Under-Secretary for War, stated there would be no alternative to the voluntary system until the Unionist party took it up. He said: "If they do not take up conscription or compulsion in some form it never will be taken up."

Colonel Seely has since stated that it would be manifestly impossible to assert with confidence that the Territorial Force

a few days after mobilization would be able to overcome an organized invasion by 70,000 trained troops. Taking this statement with that of the Under-Secretary, one is inclined to conclude that the protection of the country, even in these days of airships and aeroplanes, is so well assured that the shortage of the Territorial Force is not really a serious matter. Can it then be wondered at if the youth of the nation show so little inclination to serve?

The deficiency of 16 per cent. which existed when Colonel Seely introduced the Army Estimates in March was 19 per cent. on May 1st, or nearly a fifth of the establishment, and as the year passes the percentage must necessarily increase, for after April the number of recruits is inconsiderable, whilst men are every month struck off on account of expiration of period of service, death, illness and change of residence.

Are we, then, to assume that this shrinkage can continue to any extent without the consideration of an alternative scheme for obtaining an efficient citizen army?

The present attitude is cold comfort for those Territorial officers who are truly convinced that things are not well with the force. How are they to get men to join in the face of such indifference?

There is only one way, and that is to put forward bribes as an inducement. I say "put forward" advisedly, and not "increase," as the advantages accruing to a Territorial may for all practical purposes be regarded as non-existent, that is to say, as far as the nation is responsible.

What are they? Exemption from service in two capacities, that of High Sheriff and of juryman. The first is an office which is the lot of very few of the Territorial officers, and the second is one for which, having regard to the fact that the majority of recruits in the Territorial Force are under the age of 19, very few serving in the ranks possess the qualification, *i.e.*, that of being an occupier of house property of a value of not less than £20, or in Middlesex, of £30.

We may, therefore, take it that the bribes as they exist at present are not such as are likely to attract any man who is not influenced by a desire to serve his country without any inducement of this nature.

The only other bait consists of the funds which are subscribed by patriotic members of the public to provide prizes for competition at the annual prize shoot of the Territorials of each locality, and as to these, a man who is quite a good shot may win a couple of pounds.

Were it, however, a question of giving bribes I can suggest several which may have the effect of reducing the deficiency which now exists.

To attract those who at present are not sufficiently imbued with what should be the first duty of every able-bodied man

who enjoys the privileges and obligations of a civilized nation such as ours I would suggest:—

That every efficient member of the Territorial Force:

1. Be relieved from the reduction of the contribution from his wages or salary imposed under the National Health Insurance Act, and that every employer of such a man be similarly relieved.
2. Be entitled to travel for purposes either of his calling or for recreation by railway at a reduced fare.
3. Be paid for attendance at all parades.
4. If liable to Income Tax, to be allowed a special abatement.
5. If liable for rates to be allowed a special abatement.
6. Be granted an Old Age Pension at the age of 60 or 65 instead of 70.

I have not thought out this method of raising recruits further, as it is not one that appeals to me as sound, but doubtless it would not be difficult to suggest other privileges which would place the man who gives his services in a more favourable position than he who abstains. At the same time we should remember that those advantages would not make him an efficient soldier, although the number of the Territorial Force might greatly increase.

My suggestion, however, has this about it, that whereas under the present system the Territorial gets practically no benefits, he would, if the proposals mentioned were adopted, get something for his sacrifice.

To my mind, the old method of every freeman, or the modern equivalent of every voter bearing arms is more desirable.

With a man who gives his entire time to the State it is obvious that he ought to receive a fair pecuniary remuneration, but with a purely citizen force, where a man only devotes his spare time to military service it may not be advisable to deal with him in the same way.

The voluntary force must be actuated by the principle that duty to the country is the keystone. In such a force it must be acknowledged that this duty is due from every able-bodied individual of whatever station in life, and that seems to be a higher ideal than any nation outside Utopia is ever likely to realize as long as it is left only to volunteering for service.

In the last few years great strides have been made in teaching the doctrine of duty to country by the creation of the movement with the boys of the nation: Officers' Training Corps, Cadet Corps, Boy Scouts, and Boys' Brigades.

It is only the example of the leaders of the nation that is wanted to complete the success of these movements. The boys have eagerly adopted these schemes.

If the youth of the nation is definitely told that it is necessary for the defence of the country that all should qualify for the defence of the country by serving in the Territorial Force for a few years, comprising a period of, say, six months' recruit training during the first year, that is, *before*, and not *after*, the force is mobilized, shall we find that our young men will fail to respond?

I have more faith in the honour of my countrymen than to think that they would not be ready to sacrifice so little in comparison with the young Frenchman who is now willingly, at the call of his country, adding a third to the two years of service which he was formerly required to give for France; but before our young men can be expected to give such service it must be clearly proved to them that it is really required. If they are merely led to believe that it is an excellent thing to become amateur soldiers for the benefit of their health, for the sake of discipline, or to keep them out of mischief in their spare time and not for the necessary protection of their country, the voluntary movement will never be regarded as more than playing at being soldiers, something not really essential for the safeguarding of the nation.

If the Territorial Force is necessary, let it be real, and one in which the burden is fairly distributed over the nation instead of being borne as it now is by the few who believe that their country needs them.

SEARCHLIGHTS ON BOARD MODERN WAR VESSELS.

Translated from the Italian of Captain E. Pinelli.

By P. SMILES, ESQ., R.N.

UP to now the number and position of the searchlights on board our men-of-war have been based on no sound principles, whether in regard to the special conditions under which they are employed, the position of the look-out stations, or the arcs of training of the anti-torpedo boat guns.

The problem has always been put forward in such a way that we have been forced to make use of the existing state of affairs on board in order to determine the best positions for the searchlights. When we bear this restriction in mind, it is obvious that we are practically deprived of all choice in the matter, as we can do no more than make the best of the possible situations afforded us by the funnels and masts, which alone offer, especially in modern ships, clear and elevated positions. On this account almost all navies have been driven to employ platforms built on the sides of the funnels, a solution which is by no means satisfactory.

For obvious reasons the projectors ought to be stowed in protected positions during the day, but it is to be feared that as time goes on the searchlights, which are extremely delicate instruments, will deteriorate, and this state of things will be aggravated still more, if, as we have every reason to believe, searchlights increase in size and number on board future ships.

Besides, even when the lights are struck down behind armour in the day time, their mountings, which are indispensable to them, remain always exposed to damage from the enemy's fire, and from the blast of their own big guns, so that we run the risk of keeping the projectors themselves safe, but of having nowhere to mount them when the day action is over.

When choosing positions for the lights it would be of inestimable advantage if they were not tied down to any one point in the ship, so that they could be grouped together as much as possible at the best angle of visibility, as we must bear in mind that it has for some time been admitted that the most favourable position for a searchlight, with regard to the guns with which it is working, is that which maintains as nearly as

possible an angle of 30 degrees between the line of fire, and the beam of light which illuminates the target under fire. It is obvious that these conditions cannot be carried out in their entirety on board a ship, so that we shall have to limit ourselves to keeping the searchlight positions as far as possible from the batteries of anti-torpedo boat guns.

On board ship as well as on shore it pays to keep the duties of the different lights absolutely distinct, and when we consider the conditions under which these work we see the necessity of having two categories of lights—"Searching Lights," whose duty it will be to sweep the horizon slowly, uniformly, and with fixed elevation, and "Gun Lights," to illuminate a target which has already been picked up.

The problem of the best means of disposing searchlights on board a man-of-war is closely bound up with the way in which we propose to employ them in the case of a torpedo attack. This is a problem already long discussed, and on which the following opinions are generally held:—

(1) The best way of avoiding torpedo attacks is to keep the ship darkened.

(2) All ships ought to have a perfect look-out service, and in this connection it is difficult to understand why, granted the great importance of this service in the case of a sudden attack by torpedo craft, it is still considered that any seaman without special training is competent to perform this all-important duty. It would rather seem necessary to institute a special branch of "Look-outs," chosen each year from the recruits gifted with the best eyesight, and well trained in picking up torpedo craft. These "Look-outs" would keep watch in pairs from convenient stations divided into two groups and well protected from the weather so as to assure to them the most favourable possible conditions of visibility. The principal station would be in charge of a lieutenant who would be able to switch on all the lights on his own authority, and who would warn by a special signal the anti-torpedo boat guns best placed for opening fire at once. This is certainly a big responsibility, but it is justified by the supreme importance of not losing even an instant in the most critical moments following the discovery of the enemy's torpedo craft proceeding to the attack.

When the hostile destroyer has been sighted it will be our aim to dazzle it by keeping it in the beam of one of our lights, and for this purpose a projector which can be mechanically controlled from a distance is practically indispensable.

(3) It is probable that the first boat to be picked up will only be making a feint attack, and that the decisive one may come from a totally different direction. The "Look-outs" would, therefore, have to be specially trained on this account never to let themselves be distracted from the most important task assigned to them, and to increase their vigilance in their own special sector.

(4) When the hostile craft has been finally picked up by a light, the commanders of groups of anti-torpedo boat guns on the engaged side will open fire at once without waiting for authority. These minutes are too precious to the safety of the ship for any other course to be taken.

(5) One of the "Gun Lights" will at once take in hand, so to speak, the enemy's craft upon which fire has already been opened, while the "Searching Light" will take up again its former duty of sweeping the horizon. It is obvious that when, proceeding as we have said, all the "Gun Lights" are employed in illuminating torpedo craft which are still dangerous, the "Searching Lights" will have to take over the duty of "Gun Lights," since there will no longer be anyone to relieve them when they have picked up a new destroyer.

(6) If a ship finds that she has been discovered for certain by the enemy's torpedo craft, the captain with one simple and conventional signal will order all the "Searching Lights" to sweep, and in such a case they would do this together, their speed being regulated according to the length of the arc assigned to each. Each sector would be swept at a fixed angle of elevation, varying according to the height of the projector above the water-line, so as to ensure that any hostile torpedo craft must be picked up, and will remain as long as possible under the fire of the small and medium calibre guns before getting within practical torpedo range. The "Gun Lights" will in the meantime light up the torpedo boats as they are successively picked up in the sector assigned to them.

If we admit the advantages possessed by such a system of employing our searchlights, we see at once how in the case of a converging attack the number of projectors installed on board our modern ships is generally insufficient.

The height above water-line which has been found to be in practice the most convenient for the lights is that of 8-12 metres for the "Searching Lights" and 30-35 metres for the "Gun Lights," and these heights are generally recognized as the best. Taking into consideration the great speed of modern torpedo craft, we should not assign an arc of a length greater than 45 degrees to any "Searching Light."

If we decide to employ our lights as has been explained shortly above, we shall need eight projectors for the "Searching Service," while in the case of the "Gun Lights" various necessities force us to limit their number. There should, however, never be less than four of them, that is to say, one for every arc of 90 degrees.

Granted the great importance of the modern warship of large displacement, we should remember that we ought to and must devote a greater space in it to searchlights, which, to all intents and purposes, take at night the place of the eyes of this colossus, whose Achilles' heel lies just in its very weakness against submarine attack.

A disposition which answers to the needs which we have touched upon is that shown in the attached sketch. It comprises 12 lights, eight "Searching" and four "Gun" lights, all of 90 cms. and 150 amperes, and mechanically controlled from a distance. The "Searching Lights" are mounted on disappearing supports worked on the system of telescopic masts, which can be lowered by some simple mechanism into protected positions below the upper deck; the "Gun Lights" are installed on each mast. In the sketch are shown eight supports for the "Searching Lights," disposed in two groups, each of four, the one forward and the other aft. Each support can be locked into position at two different heights.

By this simple arrangement we obtain the important advantage of giving to each light separately, and to all of them together, a large field of illumination. So, for example, it is possible to direct the four beams of the lights of one group on one beam, by securing in the lower position the two supports on the side it is wished to illuminate, and locking the other two in the higher one; or one can in the same way arrange that all the lights in the fore-most group should bear right aft. So, too, can the four lights of one group be trained parallel to one another on the same target, and in certain cases this might constitute an advantage of some importance.

Besides, all the eight "Searching Lights" would be able to light up a wide arc of the horizon by keeping their beams motionless, which might prove most useful when the ship is at anchor and well protected by nets or other obstructions.

Naturally each support would have to be fitted with a removable platform and all the other needful accessories. If a ship had the big guns on her forecastle and quarterdeck mounted in triple turrets, the supports could be placed so as to rise up between the guns when they are trained fore and aft, and to these they might be stayed.

The "Gun Lights" are in the sketch disposed in the tops, and lifts fitted for the purpose, and working up and down the masts, would serve as a means for striking the projectors down behind armour and for remounting them again at night.

In addition to these 12 fixed lights it would be of advantage in very long ships to keep on board also two special projectors made very light which could be set up at will wherever needed.

To sum up, we may say that a rational disposition of the searchlights on the centre line, which comes as a natural result of the mounting of all heavy guns in the same manner, affords the following advantages:—

(1) It meets the need for an easy, quick and safe means of striking the projector down into a place of safety in the daytime.

(2) It makes use of the most convenient position which the ship offers as regards visibility when considered in conjunction

with the positions of the look-out stations and the anti-torpedo boat batteries.

(3) It allows of the employment of the searchlights in every case in the manner which we consider the most useful.


(4) It permits the maximum concentration of beams in every sector, since the whole 12 searchlights can make their beams converge on a single point on the most vulnerable sectors, that is to say, the beam.

(5) Except when the ship is engaged right ahead or astern, it allows of the large calibre pieces being worked at the same time as the searchlights, an advantage which would be very appreciable in the case of night operations, improbable though not impossible of fulfilment, against defence works on shore.

It is certainly true that it is the gun which will decide the battle, but before the decisive action is fought out the torpedo will take a most important part in the series of skirmishes which precede any great naval battle.

It is vital that nothing should be overlooked in the modern ship of the line, which forms so important a part of any fleet, that can aid in defending it against torpedo attack, whether by day or night, and it would seem that the main strength of such defence lies in a well-thought-out and rational organization of the "look-out" service, in which the searchlight plays such an outstanding part.

SIDE ELEVATION OF ITALIAN SUPER-DREADNOUGHT



DECK PLAN



## NAVAL NOTES.

### BRITISH EMPIRE.

APPOINTMENTS, PROMOTIONS AND RETIREMENTS.—The following were the chief of these events during November :—

*Appointments*—Vice-Admiral Sir Cecil Burney, K.C.B., K.C.M.G., to be Vice-Admiral commanding Second and Third Fleets, in succession to Vice-Admiral Sir Frederick T. Hamilton, K.C.B., C.V.O., to date December 5th. Rear-Admiral Stuart Nicholson, M.V.O., to be Rear-Admiral in the Home Fleets at the Nore, in succession to Rear-Admiral Charles Dundas of Dundas, to date December 5th. Rear-Admiral Godfrey H. B. Mundy, M.V.O., to be Admiral-Superintendent of Devonport Dockyard, in succession to Vice-Admiral Robert H. S. Stokes, to date December 11th. Captains H. D. R. Watson, M.V.O., to "Essex"; Lord Dunboyne (retired) to "Hermes" for meteorological duties; R. W. Glennie to be additional Naval Assistant to Hydrographer; G. L. Slater to "Bulwark"; A. P. Davidson to "Aboukir" and Third Fleet group; R. N. Bax to "Prince of Wales," as Flag-Captain to Rear-Admiral Bernard Currey; J. S. Dumaresq, M.V.O., to "Vernon" for special service; T. W. B. Kennedy to "Lowestoft"; P. W. Dumas, C.V.O., to "Roxburgh"; Hon. H. E. H. A'Court to "Iron Duke"; J. C. Tancred to "Marlborough"; J. D. Edwards to "Falmouth"; S. S. Hall to be Joint Secretary to Royal Commission on Oil Fuel; R. Y. Tyrwhitt to be Captain (T) in command of Destroyer Flotillas, First Fleet; C. F. Lambert to be Fourth Sea Lord of the Admiralty; S. A. Hickley to "Argonaut" and Third Fleet group; J. U. Farie to command Second Destroyer Flotilla; J. R. P. Hawkesley, M.V.O., to "Active"; H. W. Grant to "Hampshire." Commanders J. D. Allen to "Enchantress," in command; P. E. Parker to be Assistant to Director of Naval Ordnance; W. B. Compton, M.V.O., to command Portsmouth Torpedo-Boat Flotilla; B. J. H. Ward to be Flag-Commander to Vice-Admiral Sir Robert Lowry, K.C.B.; Hon. M. R. Best, M.V.O., to Staff of Royal Naval War College, Portsmouth; W. J. C. Lake to be Flag-Commander to Vice-Admiral Sir Cecil Burney, K.C.B., K.C.M.G. Engineer-Rear-Admirals W. F. Pamphlett to Staff of Admiral Sir Richard Poore, Bart., K.C.B., C.V.O.; S. Rawling to Staff of Vice-Admiral Sir Cecil Burney, K.C.B., K.C.M.G.

*Promotions*—Captain T. D. W. Napier, M.V.O., to be Rear-Admiral (October 24th); Engineer-Captain W. G. Mogg to be Engineer-Rear-Admiral (November 26th); Lieutenant M. F. B. Whyte (retired) to be Commander (retired) (November 20th).

*Retirements*—Rear-Admiral John A. Tuke (October 24th); Engineer-Rear-Admiral William Sharp (November 26th); Engineer-Commander W. H. James, with rank of Engineer-Captain (November 25th); Lieutenant J. Marshall, with rank of Commander (November 12th).

**THE MEDITERRANEAN CRUISE.**—According to programme, a division of the First Battle Squadron, with the Third Cruiser Squadron, First Light Cruiser Squadron, and eight vessels of the Third Destroyer Flotilla, accompanied by the dépôt-ship "Blenheim," arrived at Gibraltar from England on November 3rd, under the command of Vice-Admiral the Hon. Sir Stanley Colville. The 22 vessels left on the 5th, after coaling, for Palma and Pollenza Bay, Majorca, where they met the cruisers "Defence," "Duke of Edinburgh," and "Warrior," of the First Cruiser Squadron (Mediterranean). The ships left in company on November 8th, and on the same day three battleships, three battle-cruisers, five light cruisers and six destroyers of the Mediterranean Fleet and Fourth Battle Squadron left Malta. Combined exercises were held at sea under the direction of Admiral Sir A. B. Milne, and on their conclusion the whole of the combined fleets proceeded to Malta, arriving on the 11th. The arrival there of so large a force was a notable event, and probably unprecedented. There were seven battleships, ten battle and armoured cruisers, and ten light cruisers, with a torpedo flotilla numbering 14 destroyers and three submarines. The destroyers included only one half of the Fifth (ex-Third) Destroyer Flotilla, which has been appropriated for duty in the Mediterranean, as the second division of eight vessels did not leave Devonport for their new station until November 19th. On the previous day, the squadrons at Malta had separated for independent cruises. The battle and light cruisers of the Mediterranean Fleet, with the First Battle Squadron Ships, arrived at Alexandria on the 21st, and the First Cruiser and First Light Cruiser Squadrons arrived at Port Said on the same day. An extensive programme of festivities was organized at both ports in honour of the visit, and on the 22nd 1,500 bluejackets proceeded to Cairo, where they were met by an equal number of soldiers of the British garrison, and after being entertained at the barracks were reviewed by Lord Kitchener. While these squadrons were at Port Said and Alexandria, the Third Cruiser Squadron was at Limasol and Larnaka, Cyprus, the "Devonshire" being at the former and the "Antrim" and "Roxburgh" at the latter port. The "Argyll," of this squadron, had been detached to return to England. There remains the Fourth Battle Squadron, which left Malta on November 19th for Algiers on a week's visit, during which there was much reciprocal entertaining between the officers and visitors on shore, the arrival of the ships coinciding with the opening of the season. The training cruiser "Cumberland" also arrived at Algiers on the 25th, and in the same week the Dutch warship "Koningen Regentes," the Danish cruiser "Valkyrien," and the Russian cruiser "Oleg" were also there. On November 26th the various squadrons left Port Said, Alexandria, Cyprus, and Algiers, and while the Fourth Battle Squadron proceeded to Gibraltar, the others went to the Piraeus, arriving on the 28th. Here a French squadron was present under the command of Vice-Admiral Boué de Lapeyrère, and the King of Greece dined on board the "Inflexible" and "Voltaire" with the British and French Admirals. The Italian battleship "Saint Bon" was also present. Before returning to England to give Christmas leave, the ships of the First Fleet, under Vice-Admiral Colville, were to visit Toulon from December 8th to 11th.

**SHIPS AT MEXICO.**—About the middle of November, it was decided to despatch two warships to Mexican ports in the Atlantic, and two others to ports in the Pacific, to afford protection to British subjects and property if necessary. The "Suffolk" and "Berwick," therefore, left Barbados

on November 22nd for Tampico and Puerto, and the "Algerine" and "Shearwater" left Esquimalt for the western seaboard of Mexico. Unfortunately, the "Algerine" lost her propeller in a heavy sea off Cape Flattery, and had to return for repairs.

**THE "NEW ZEALAND'S" CRUISE.**—The last port to be visited by the "New Zealand," battle-cruiser, in her voyage round the world, which began on February 6th, was Halifax, Nova Scotia, where she arrived on November 21st. This was the only harbour on the eastern seaboard of Canada which it was possible for the vessel to visit, owing to the lateness of the season. The City Council of Halifax presented an address to Captain Lionel Halsey and his officers and men on the 22nd, and the vessel left on the 30th for England. Owing to the non-arrival of a collier she was to make the trans-Atlantic passage with oil fuel.

**BATTLESHIPS BEGUN.**—Work upon the three contract-built battleships of the current shipbuilding programme has now been actually begun. These were the vessels which the First Lord announced on June 5th last were to be accelerated in view of the situation created by the rejection of the Canadian Naval Aid Bill. Orders were then issued by the Admiralty that the ships should be begun at the earliest possible date instead of in March, 1914. The "Ramillies" was laid down at Dalmuir by Messrs. Beardmore on November 12th, immediately following the launch of the "Benbow." The keel of the "Resolution" was laid by Messrs. Palmers at Jarrow on November 28th, on the same day that the keel of the "Murray," destroyer, was laid at the same yard. The "Revenge" was reported to have been begun at the Vickers' yard, Barrow, in the same week.

**BATTLESHIPS LAUNCHED.**—Three battleships were also launched during November, the "Benbow," "Warspite," and "Emperor of India." The "Benbow" was launched at the Beardmore yard at Dalmuir on November 12th by Lady Randolph Churchill; the "Warspite" at Devonport by Mrs. Austen Chamberlain on November 26th; and the "Emperor of India" at the Vickers' yard, Barrow, on November 27th by Lady Islington. The first and third vessels belonged to the 1911-12 programme, and were rather overdue. The "Warspite" is an oil-burning battleship of the 1912-13 programme, of which the "Queen Elizabeth" had been launched from Portsmouth dockyard in the previous month. These three vessels brought up the total number of British Dreadnoughts in the water to 33, including the battle-cruiser now in the Royal Australian Navy. Of this number, 27 are in commission. At the end of November, Germany had 22 Dreadnoughts afloat, with 17 in commission; Austria three afloat, with two in commission; and Italy six afloat, with one in commission. In ships afloat, Great Britain had, therefore, 33 Dreadnoughts to the 31 of the Triple Alliance, and in ships in commission, 27 to their 20.

**SHIPS UNDER TRIAL.**—The battleship "Iron Duke" began her official trials from Portsmouth on November 17th, and during the month was engaged in steaming and other tests. Her 30-hours' trial at four-fifths horse power was concluded at Plymouth on November 20th, the specified horse power being easily maintained. On the night of the 18th, the 30-hours' trial was interrupted owing to the "Iron Duke" going to the rescue of the steamship "Scotsdyke," which was on fire off St. Catherine's Point. The crew were taken off without loss of life and landed. A 24-hour trial at varying speeds was

concluded on the 23rd at Plymouth, and two days later the vessel began her eight-hour's full-power trial, which finished at Spithead. Her gun trials were fixed to begin on December 4th. The "Birmingham," light cruiser, carried out her gun trials satisfactorily in November, and the "Linnet," "Lysander," and other destroyers of the "L" class completed their trials.

**NAVAL PROGRESS.**—Replying for the Navy at the Lord Mayor's Banquet on November 10th, the First Lord of the Admiralty said that next year there would be 150,000 sailors and marines in the regular professional service, which would exceed the largest numbers ever raised for the Navy in the greatest crisis of the Napoleonic Wars. It would be his duty to present Estimates substantially greater than the sum originally voted in the present year. Referring to the submarine and air services, he said that the former, thanks to the foresight of Lord Fisher, was more than twice as powerful as that of the next strongest naval Power; while "the British seaplane, although still in the empirical stage, like everything in this sphere of warlike operations, has reached a point of progress in advance of anything attained elsewhere."

**FEES AT OSBORNE.**—An official notice was issued on November 3rd reducing from £75 a year to £40 a year the fees payable at the Royal Naval Colleges at Osborne and Dartmouth in respect of not more than 25 per cent. of the naval cadets entered after that date. The reduced scale will only be allowed in cases where the pecuniary circumstances of the parents are, in the opinion of the Admiralty, such as to justify it, and is to be reserved, up to a maximum of ten per cent. of the entries, for sons of naval, military, or marine officers, or civil officers under the Board of Admiralty. Previously the privilege of reduced fees was only granted to "a limited number" (unspecified) of the sons of these officers. The effect of the new order was thus to fix the proportion at ten per cent. for officers' sons, and to extend the principle to the sons of civilians.

**THE FIRST MATES, R.N.**—In November, there were appointed to ships afloat the first contingent of mates who had been trained under the new scheme for promoting selected warrant and petty officers to commissioned rank. The number in the group was 13. These officers had undergone courses in gunnery and torpedo at Portsmouth, on passing which they became acting mates, and then six months' instruction in navigation, etc., at Greenwich, on concluding which they were confirmed as mates on October 17th. They will serve afloat for not less than two and not more than three years, their promotion to lieutenant being dependent upon obtaining satisfactory watch-keeping certificates, etc.

#### ARGENTINA.

**"RIVADAVIA'S" TRIALS.**—After having certain defects made good, the new battleship "Rivadavia" resumed her trials in October. In the previous month some turbine buckets became twisted during speed tests off the Maine coast, and the vessel was obliged to return to her builder's yard at Quincy, Mass., when it was reported that super-heated steam had caused the buckets to curl. A day or two after her return there was an explosion and fire on board, which resulted in the death of a draughtsman who was in the vessel's paint room, and was believed to have accidentally ignited a quantity of gas in lighting a cigar. According

to the *Army and Navy Register*, of November 15th, however, the speed trials carried out up to that date had been successful. The average high-speed runs were slightly over 22.5 knots, the horse-power being 39,750 and the revolutions 270 per minute. These trials were followed by gun trials, in which the structural portions of the ship withstood the shock of firing without injury. The "Rivadavia" is of 27,600 tons displacement, or 30,600 tons at full load, and has a length of 585 feet. Her armament includes twelve 12-in. guns, twelve (not sixteen, as was formerly reported) 6-in. guns, and sixteen 4-in guns. She is to be delivered for service early in 1914.

**FLOATING DOCK.**—Messrs. Vickers, Ltd., will shortly complete a floating dock to the order of the Argentine Naval Commission for use at Buenos Ayres. It will be double-sided, of the Clark and Standfield's "Box" type, with a length of 300 ft., a breadth of 60 ft., and with a width at entrance of 45 ft. The lifting capacity will be 1,500 tons, the dock being intended for the accommodation of torpedo boat destroyers and light craft generally up to a draught of 16 ft. The draught of the new Argentine destroyers is from 7 ft. to 10 ft. The dock will have self-contained pumping and electric lighting installations.

#### AUSTRIA-HUNGARY.

**THE "SZENT ISTVAN."**—Some delay appears to be taking place in the progress of the fourth battleship of the first Dreadnought division, which is to be called the "Szent Istvan." This is the only vessel of the four which is being built in Hungarian territory, as a concession to national sentiment, the Danubius yard at Fiume, where she is in hand, having previously built only small cruisers and torpedo craft. Her keel was laid on January 29th, 1912, and at the end of 20 months the ship was still on the stocks, although the other three Dreadnoughts took on the average only 13 months each to be put into the water. It is now reported that she will not be ready for trials until December, 1914, at the earliest, and will not be in commission until the following year. Until she is launched, the construction cannot be begun of the battleships of the second Dreadnought division, which it is proposed to build at Fiume.

**NEW BATTLESHIPS.**—Credits for two new battleships were asked for at the meeting in October of the joint council of Austrian and Hungarian Ministers. These two vessels will cost £6,000,000, and are to be completed in 1916. A further pair, at the same cost, are to be included in the Estimates next year, to be completed in 1917. The Delegations were expected, according to reports in the Press, to vote the supplies for the first two at their autumn meeting without modification, and it was stated that slips to accommodate them were already available at Trieste. One ship, however, was expected to be allotted to Fiume.

**NAVAL BASE AT SEBENICO.**—It was again reported in November that the Austrian Navy Department is to establish a naval base at Sebenico, on the Dalmatian coast, about 70 miles south-east of Trieste. The town, of 29,000 inhabitants, is a favourite resort of tourists. It was visited nearly four years ago by Admiral Count Montecuculi, then Marine Commandant and Chief of the Navy Department, accompanied by his staff, and sites for fortifications were said to have been approved. It is understood that a wireless station was erected there some time ago.

## CHILE.

LAUNCH OF THE "ALMIRANTE LATORRE."—The first of the two battleships for the Chilean Navy building at the yard of Messrs. Armstrong, Whitworth & Co., on the Tyne, was launched on November 27th, by Mme. Edwards, wife of the Chilean Minister, and named the "Almirante Latorre." Her keel was laid in December, 1911, and the vessel has occupied, therefore, a longer time than usual on the stocks, but she is reported to be due for completion by December, 1914. Compared with contemporary battleships, she is very large and powerful. Her displacement is 28,000 tons; horse-power, 39,000, with Parsons turbines and Yarrow boilers; speed, 23 knots; armament, ten 14-in. and sixteen 6-in. guns, with four torpedo tubes; and armour, 9-in. to 6-in. for the main belt, 4½-in. side above belt, and 10-in. and 6-in. for the guns. For purposes of comparison, the following are the corresponding figures for the British battleships of the "Iron Duke" class, designed in the same year:—Displacement, 25,000 tons; horse-power, 29,000; speed, 21 knots; armament, ten 13.5-in. and twelve 6-in., with four torpedo tubes; and armour, 12-in. for the main belt, and 9-in. to 8-in. for the side above the belt. Although the 14-in. gun has not been adopted for the British Navy, three armoured vessels built in British yards have been or are being equipped with it, the two Chilean battleships and the Japanese battle-cruiser "Kongo."

## DENMARK.

TORPEDO-BOAT DESTROYER LAUNCHED.—The "Svaerdfisken," a small torpedo-boat destroyer, was launched from the Royal Dockyard at Copenhagen for the Danish Navy on October 25th. This was the third and last of the new destroyers to be launched this year. Reference was made to their construction in these Notes last month, but as the particulars then given, on the authority of the *Navy League Annual*, differ from those published later by *Engineering*, the following information is taken from the issue of that journal for November 14th:—"The boat . . . is of 168 tons displacement, and has an engine of 3,400 horse-power, the estimated speed being 26 knots. One of the previous boats made 26.3 knots on her trial trip. The armament consists of one 75-mm. gun and four torpedo-firing appliances."

## FRANCE.

BEGINNING OF THE "FLANDRE."—The keel of the new battleship "Flandre," one of the four in the 1913 programme of construction, was laid at Brest on October 9th. Vice-Admiral Chocqueprat, the Maritime Prefect of Brest, drove the first rivet in the keel, in the presence of the leading dockyard officials and numerous officers. The "Flandre" is expected to be ready for launching in ten or eleven months.

MEDITERRANEAN CRUISE.—The First Squadron of the French Fleet left its base at Toulon in October for a long cruise into the Levant. At the end of that month, the ships were at Alexandria, when Admiral Boué de Lapeyrère and about 40 officers took the opportunity to visit Cairo, where they were hospitably entertained by the Khedive and Lord Kitchener. The French Admiral also entertained British and Russian officers and officials on board his flagship, the "Voltaire." The projected visit of the

squadron to Smyrna was abandoned on account of the danger of floating mines, but Vourla, in the Bay of Smyrna, was visited from November 21st to 27th. On the way thither, the French ships, in steaming through the Rhodes Channel, met an Italian squadron, under the command of the Duke of the Abruzzi, which was moored in the harbour, and salutes were exchanged. Three days later, the squadron was due at the Piræus, where it was to meet 26 British warships of the squadrons of the First Fleet which were cruising in the Mediterranean under the command of Vice-Admiral the Hon. Sir Stanley Colville.

### GERMANY.

**BATTLESHIPS' FOREIGN CRUISE.**—In the first week of November, it was announced that the new battleships "Kaiser" and "König Albert" would make a three months' cruise to West African and South American ports. These vessels are the newest German battleships in commission, and are also the first to be equipped with turbine machinery. The cruise which they are to make is stated to have been arranged principally as a test of their seagoing capabilities. Although it is practically a new departure to send battleships on such a voyage, the battle-cruisers "Von der Tann" and "Moltke" both crossed the Atlantic on similar cruises soon after they were completed. The new light cruiser "Strassburg" will accompany the battleships, and the three vessels will first proceed to West Africa and then cross the Atlantic to South American ports.

**NAVY ESTIMATES.**—A preliminary summary of the Imperial Estimates for the next financial year was published in the *North-German Gazette* on November 22nd. According to the Berlin Correspondent of *The Times*, the estimated expenditure on the Navy amounts altogether to £24,397,607, which is made up of £11,053,130 recurring ordinary expenditure, £11,873,977 non-recurring ordinary expenditure; and £1,470,500 extraordinary expenditure. The cost of keeping the ships in commission is estimated at £3,349,500, which is an increase of nearly £500,000. First instalments are voted for one battleship, one large cruiser, two small cruisers, a flotilla of destroyers, and £950,000 for submarines.

**NAVAL PROMOTIONS.**—On the occasion of his visit to Kiel on November 15th, for the swearing in of a contingent of recruits, the German Emperor proceeded on board the battleship "Kaiser," which has replaced the "Deutschland" as the vessel specially set apart for his Majesty's use when visiting his fleet. He promoted Vice-Admiral von Ingenohl to the rank of Admiral, and the new flag of that officer was then hoisted in the battleship "Friedrich der Grosse." Admiral von Ingenohl succeeded Admiral von Holtzendorff as Commander-in-Chief of the High Sea Fleet in January last. He had formerly commanded the Second Squadron, and had been Commander-in-Chief of the German Squadron in China.

**SUBMARINE CONSTRUCTION.**—The German Admiralty is reported to have ordered a submarine for experimental purposes from the Fiat-San-Giorgio Company, of Spezia. This Italian firm has supplied submarine designs to several navies, including the British, a submarine now building by Messrs. Scott's Shipbuilding Co., of Greenock, being of the Laurenti type as constructed at Spezia. The 22nd German submarine was reported to have been launched at Danzig in November. Guns are now being mounted by the later vessels, the weapon adopted being a 14-pounder.

**GREECE.**

CONSTRUCTION PROGRAMME.—A programme of new construction has been drawn up by Rear-Admiral Mark Kerr in consultation with the Hellenic General Staff, which includes two cruiser-destroyers of 5,600 tons, to be of the type of H.M.S. "Arethusa"; four torpedo-boat destroyers, six submarines, and ten seaplanes. It is also recommended that a second Dreadnought battle-cruiser like the "Salamis," building in Germany and almost ready for launching, should be authorized. The King of Greece received in audience on November 17th, the officers of the British Naval Mission, and expressed to Rear-Admiral Kerr his conviction that when the Mission had completed its task the Greek Navy would be in the highest state of efficiency.

**ITALY.**

BATTLE PRACTICE.—It has been stated that the autumn battle practice of the Italian Fleet was carried out this year on a larger scale than ever before. Every commissioned ship took part in the firing, the conditions for which were more severe than on former occasions. The scene of the practice was the Gulf of Aranci. For the battleships and cruisers with heavy high-powered ordnance the opening range was fixed at 8,000 metres, and all the targets were towed. The King of Italy was present on board the "Dante Alighieri." The authorities have decided not to publish any particulars of the practice, but according to Italian papers the results showed a marked increase in efficiency for all classes of battle weapons. This is believed to be the first time that towed targets were exclusively used in Italian battle practice. The armoured cruiser "Amalfi," which carries four 10-in and eight 7.5-in. guns, is stated to have been the best ship in the Second Squadron. In addition to individual practice, both by day and night, the vessels, according to the Roman *Tribuna*, fired in divisions, and the King's prize for the best divisional firing was won by the First Division of the First Squadron, which includes the newest ships, headed by the Dreadnought "Dante Alighieri."

NEW BATTLESHIPS.—Work is to begin early in 1914 upon the first vessels of a new class of battleship, designed by Major-General Ferrati. It seems evident that this must be the "Dandolo" class, of which the "Dandolo" and "Morosini" were understood to have been laid down at the end of 1912. The delay may no doubt be explained by a lack of financial provision, and to the necessity of installing new plant in the ordnance factories to manufacture the larger guns required by the ships. The "Mazzini" and "Mamelii" will complete the class. Considerable divergency of opinion regarding their design has been revealed during the year, and it was stated in November that no definite settlement had been made. The details published in the Italian Press, however, showed that the vessels would have a displacement of 30,000 tons, a length of 692 feet, a main armament of eight 15-in. guns, a speed of 24 knots, and a complement of 1,300 officers and men. It was said that they would take between four and five years to build, and would cost £3,400,000 each.

STRANDING OF THE "SAN GIORGIO".—The armoured cruiser "San Giorgio" went aground on the night of November 20th, on the Sicilian coast after passing through the Straits of Messina. Rear-Admiral Bagni and his staff were aboard her at the time of the mishap. The cruiser was said to have been in the act of avoiding a merchant steamer passing through the Straits, which are narrow and difficult to navigate, and

according to one account the navigating officer may have confused the light-houses of Cape Peloro and Pezzo. To save the vessel it was reported necessary to lighten her considerably, and possibly to remove the guns. Several of her watertight compartments filled when she ran ashore at the speed of 14 knots, and at the end of November she was still lying in about four and a half fathoms of water on a bed of sand and rock. It was the "San Giorgio" which was severely damaged in 1911 by going aground at Posillipo, which prevented her taking part in the opening phases of the Turco-Italian War.

#### JAPAN.

**NEW BATTLESHIP BEGUN.**—A Reuter telegram from Tokio on November 20th, announced the beginning at Yokosuka of the fourth battleship of the Fuso class, and it was stated that the new vessel will have a displacement of 30,600 tons. With the laying down of this ship, Japan has twelve Dreadnoughts built and building. Four battleships of the "Satsuma" and "Kawachi" types are completed, as is the battle-cruiser "Kongo," which arrived in Japanese waters on November 5th. Three sister ships to the "Kongo" are in hand. Lastly, there is the class of four "super-Dreadnoughts," to which the new ship at Yokosuka belongs. These latter vessels have been designed for 22 knots speed. Their armament has been given by some accounts as twelve 14-in., and by others as ten 15-in. guns. They will also carry sixteen 6-in. guns.

**SUBMARINE LAUNCHED.**—A submarine of the "Lauboeuf" type was launched for Japan at Chalons-sur-Saone, France, on November 11th.

#### RUSSIA.

**FIRST BLACK SEA DREADNOUGHT LAUNCHED.**—The battleship "Imperatritsa Maria" was launched at Nikolaieff on November 1st. She was the first of the three Dreadnoughts laid down in 1911-12 for service in the Black Sea to take the water. The design of the trio differs in some details from that of the four Baltic Dreadnoughts launched in 1911 and now completing, although the size of the two classes is practically the same. Instead of 16 4.7-in. guns, the Black Sea vessels have 20 5-in. in their anti-torpedo defence armament; their speed is 21 instead of 23 knots; their bunker capacity is smaller; but there is an increase in armoured protection. The main armament of twelve 12-in. guns is to be carried in four triple turrets in both classes.

**GUNNERY PRACTICE.**—Experiments have recently been carried out by vessels of the Black Sea Fleet with the obsolete battleship "Tchesm " as a target. The damage caused by the firing caused the ship to founder. A 12-in. shell which entered slightly below the waterline amidships cut a clean hole through the 16 inches of compound armour which the "Tchesm " carried, and sent her to the bottom. The "Tchesm " was launched at Sebastopol in 1886. The armoured cruiser "Bayan" has received the prize offered by the Tsar for the ship holding the gunnery record in the Baltic Fleet.

#### SIAM.

**NEW CRUISER.**—Early in November, the Siamese Government provisionally placed an order with Messrs. Armstrong, Whitworth & Co., Ltd., for a small protected cruiser. Their Navy at present includes only one such vessel, the "Maha Chakrkrri," which also serves as a royal yacht.

## UNITED STATES.

NAVAL DISPLAY AT PANAMA.—In a speech at the Navy League Trafalgar Day Banquet, Mr. Page, the United States Ambassador, announced that the British Government had accepted the invitation to participate in the international naval gathering and review by the President, which were being organized to celebrate the opening of the Panama Canal. This display will take place early in 1915, and the international fleet will pass through the waters of the Canal. It has been arranged that the American battleship "Oregon," which in 1898 made the voyage of 13,800 miles around Cape Horn to join the Fleet off Cuba in time to assist in the battle with Admiral Cervera's ships, will lead the international procession, and Rear-Admiral Charles E. Clark, now retired, who then commanded her as a captain, has accepted the invitation of the Secretary of the Navy to be in charge of the vessel again at the formal opening of the Canal. Although the ceremony will not take place until January, 1915, ships will be passing through the Canal before then, as on October 10th the waters of the Atlantic and Pacific were joined by the bursting of the Gamboa dyke, which flooded the Culebra Cut, and on November 17th the small steamer "Louise" passed right through the Canal with several officials on board. It was announced in November that, as a first step towards protecting the Panama Canal by naval force, the five submarines of the "C" class had been ordered to leave Guantanamo, Cuba, for Colon, to take up their station there. They were to go through the canal as soon as possible and supplement the Panama defences in protecting the Pacific terminal, in accordance with the General Board's recommendation regarding the use of submarines in this connection.

MEDITERRANEAN CRUISE.—The nine battleships of the Atlantic Fleet arrived at the Mediterranean ports according to the programme of their cruise on November 8th. The flagship "Wyoming" passed six battleships and battle-cruisers, five light cruisers, and five destroyers of the British Navy on manoeuvres, under Admiral Sir A. B. Milne, about 20 miles out from Malta, at which port she arrived on November 8th. She was stated to be the biggest warship ever seen at Malta. Rear-Admiral Badger entertained the Governor, Sir Leslie Rundle, and Admiral Superintendent, Rear-Admiral S. H. Carden, to luncheon on board his flagship on the 10th. On the following day the ship proceeded to Naples, joining the "Arkansas" and "Florida," which arrived on the 8th. Here the Italian battleship "Amalfi" was present. On the 18th, the "Wyoming" went on to Villefranche to join the "Delaware," "Utah," "Solace," and the colliers, and the whole fleet assembled at a rendezvous off Gibraltar on the 30th to return to the United States. The other ports of call were Marseilles, where the "Vermont" and "Ohio" visited, and Genoa, where the "Kansas" and "Connecticut" spent their three weeks. At a dinner given in Rome by the American Ambassador, Vice-Admiral C. Millo, the Italian Minister of Marine, proposed the toast of the American Navy, to which Rear-Admiral Badger responded. Shooting matches and similar events were arranged with local organizations. In a message of greeting to the officers and men on their arrival in Europe, the Secretary of the Navy said: "I hope the sojourn will add to their experience and information, since the cruise was arranged chiefly for that purpose, and is merely a forerunner of other cruises which will enable all men in the Navy to see something of the world."

## MILITARY NOTES.

### BRITISH EMPIRE.

APPOINTMENTS, PROMOTIONS AND RETIREMENTS.—The following were the chief of these events during November:—

General Sir Laurence J. Oliphant, K.C.B., K.C.V.O., retires on retired pay, dated November 5th. Consequent on the above the following promotions to take place from the same date: Lieut.-General Sir Francis R. Wingate, G.C.V.O., K.C.B., K.C.M.G., D.S.O., Sirdar of the Egyptian Army, to be General; Major-General Edward C. Bethune, C.V.O., C.B., Director-General of the Territorial Force, to be Lieut.-General. Colonel (temporary Brigadier-General) Henry H. Wilson, C.B., D.S.O., Director of Military Operations at the War Office, to be Major-General.

THE MILITARY MANOEUVRES COMMISSION, 1913.—The Military Manœuvres Commission, consisting of two representative gentlemen appointed by each County Council concerned in connection with the arrangements required in the manœuvre area for 1913, held its final meeting at the War Office on November 13th.

The Secretary of State for War attended and congratulated the Commissioners on the success of their efforts, especially as regards the control of motor traffic and the police arrangements, in both of which respects a greater measure of success had been attained than had been possible to anticipate. He expressed thanks on behalf of the Government and the Army Council for what the Commission had carried out.

The reports of the Chief Compensation Officer and the Chief Constables of the counties concerned were laid before the Commission, and it is extremely gratifying to know that the conduct of the troops was on all sides stated to be exemplary. The courtesy shown by soldiers of all ranks towards civilians was especially remarked on by the Manœuvres Commissioners, and they recorded the excellent impression His Majesty's troops had made on all with whom they had come in contact.

The Chief Compensation Officer referred in his report to the large amount of hospitality extended by all classes, both rich and poor; the troops had been welcomed everywhere: in many cases, too, in which damage had unavoidably been done, no claim for compensation had been made; he hoped that those whom it had been impossible to thank individually would realize that the troops were none the less grateful.

WAR OFFICE MOTOR TRIALS.—The trials of type motor vehicles under the War Department subsidy scheme were completed early in November. They consisted of running 1,500 miles over very hilly routes, and also of a high speed test at Brooklands track, under the observation of military officers. At the end of the trials the vehicles were opened out for a detailed examination of all their parts.

As a result of the trials and the examination, the War Department has decided to award certificates provisionally to the firms mentioned below, subject to minor alterations, which have been mutually agreed upon, being embodied in all future models of their subsidy type vehicles. These certificates enable the owners of exactly similar vehicles to those passed at the trials to obtain the War Department subsidy:—

Messrs. Clayton & Co., Huddersfield (Ltd.), Union Works, Huddersfield ("Karrier" cars) ...	Class A: Lorry.
Messrs. Walker Bros. (Wigan) (Ltd.), Pagefield Iron Works, Wigan ... ... ...	Class A: Lorry.
The Wolseley Tool and Motor Car Co. (Ltd.), Adderley Park, Birmingham ... ... ...	Class A: Lorry, and Class B: Lorry.

Class A lorries carried on the trials a gross load of 4 ton 10 cwt. on the chassis, and the Class B lorry a gross load of 2 ton 15 cwt. on the chassis.

The War Department has also awarded a certificate to Messrs. W. H. Dorman & Co. (Ltd.), Stafford, to the effect that the engine entered by them in the trials has been tested by the War Department and proved suitable for use in Class A subsidy type lorries.

**TERRITORIAL FORCE: DEPUTATION TO THE PRIME MINISTER.**—On November 26th the Prime Minister received a deputation from the Council of County Territorial Force Associations, when the following proposals were laid before him:—

- (1) That the daily minimum separation allowance be raised to 1s. 6d. for the wife and 6d. for each child.
- (2) That contributions under the Insurance Act now paid by a Territorial soldier or his employer be paid in future by the State.
- (3) That employers be allowed £30 free of income tax for each Territorial soldier in their employ.
- (4) That preference be given to Territorial soldiers, after members of the Regular and Special Reserve Forces, when seeking Government service.
- (5) That increased funds be given to Associations to improve regimental and detachment headquarters.
- (6) That provision be made for the supply of boots, shirts and socks to Territorial soldiers.
- (7) That a system of education of boys be adopted, which would enable them to render service for home defence.

#### AUSTRIA-HUNGARY.

**INCREASE OF THE ARMY.**—Under the new proposals lately brought forward by the military authorities it is proposed to bring the annual recruit contingent up to 270,000 men, from which number, however, those exempted as breadwinners, etc., of families, must be excluded. Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Tyrol provide a further quota of 9,000 recruits. Of the total the Army and Navy take 182,000 (as against 159,000 by the Army Bill of 1912), the Austrian Landwehr 36,000 (hitherto 28,000), and the Hungarian Landwehr 34,000 (hitherto 25,000). The peace establishment is thereby raised by some 20 per cent., *viz.*, from 463,000 to 560,000.

The increase in the numbers is chiefly to be employed in raising the strengths of units, some of which are very weak, in adding men to the regiments stationed on the frontiers, and in bringing mounted units up to their establishments. Machine-gun detachments are also to be formed, and for these services, and for the provision of field, mountain and garrison guns, urgently required, there has been set aside about one thousand million krone, of which 800 million are non-recurring, making an all-round increase in the Army Budget of 560 million krone against the former Budget of 460 million krone. The expenditure of the 800 million is spread over the next five years.

### BELGIUM.

**MACHINE-GUNS WITH DOG-DRAUGHT.**—The Belgian Army has lately been experimenting with dog-draught for machine-guns, the gun being drawn on a miniature carriage by two dogs. Each machine-gun company is organized in three sections, each of two guns and four ammunition limbers. Prior to the recent manœuvres the company carrying out the experiments accomplished a march of 120 kilometres divided into three stages, on one particularly hot day the unit making a march of 30 kilometres without any falling out or undue delays; on the following day the company crossed the Meuse in boats with the advanced troops, and seized the further bank, the dogs giving no trouble, entering the boats readily, and on arrival at once making for their carriages. It is claimed that the animals are in no way disturbed by fire, by the movements of the troops, or by the large numbers of soldiers by whom at times they find themselves surrounded, and that they follow readily wherever their leaders take them. It is further stated that guns thus drawn are practically invisible during movement, and completely so when halted, inasmuch as the dogs lie down in their harness, moving forward when the leader, having selected the fire position, motions to them to advance. During ten days' manœuvres the gun-dogs kept their condition admirably, and as a result of the satisfactory report on these experiments, all the Belgian machine-gun companies (1 company per infantry regiment) are to be supplied with dog-draught at the rate of 40 dogs per unit.

### FRANCE.

**RECRUITING.**—Statistics published during November showing the distribution of the new contingent of 20-year-old recruits among the various branches of the Army give further proof of the unexpected excellence of their physical condition. One hundred and eighty-seven thousand were accepted for the combatant and 6,970 for the auxiliary services. Out of the men of the 1912 contingent, who are a year older, 205,735 went to the combatant and 17,038 to the auxiliary services. The average of physical fitness is therefore considerably higher in the younger contingent. The class is, moreover, over 50,000 stronger than was expected.

**A NEW ARMY CORPS.**—The Chamber, on November 20th, adopted without debate a bill establishing a new army corps district. The effect of the measure is to create a XXIst Army Corps, which will be stationed between the VIIth Army Corps (Besançon) and the XXth Army Corps (Nancy).

ARTILLERY IN THE MANCEUVRES IN THE SOUTH-WEST.—General Maitrot, the military correspondent during the manœuvres of the *Echo de Paris*, criticizes the artillery employed with the troops during the operations. He expresses regret at its weakness, both in regard to number of guns and weight of metal. He was greatly in hopes that the new 10.5 c.m. gun would have made its appearance—the weapon which is to make good the superiority at present enjoyed by the German 10.5 and 15 c.m. guns. He admits that the French 155 m.m. gun is good enough to oppose these, but there are, he complains, not enough of this type. He equally deplores that the 6th Cavalry Division had to take the field without the new horse artillery gun so long and so anxiously awaited. He closes his comments with a comparison of the organization of the French and German artillery—one very unfavourable to the former. *Le Temps* also writes about the French heavy artillery: It is admitted that the 120 m.m. De Bange gun made up in some respects for the deficiency in heavy field guns, but complaint is made that it does not and cannot altogether fill the present gap. The experimental 120 m.m. Schneider howitzer, with which a detachment took the field, is declared not to have been altogether satisfactory, or to have provided any real solution of the long-debated howitzer question. The gun is said to be very heavy in draught, and also in the firing position, and it is further pointed out that while the French artillery has but one howitzer, the Germans have two, a heavy and a light. The northern of the two armies had a detachment of two of these howitzers with two ammunition wagons, each having a team of six and carrying three of the detachment on each gun or vehicle. There was also an observation carriage with three men, one battery, three supply and one forage wagon.

MECHANICAL TRACTION FOR ARTILLERY.—*La France Militaire* has recently devoted much space to the discussion of this question, and states that a Panhard or Levassor traction engine is designed to draw a long 120 m.m. gun complete with its ammunition wagon at a speed of 12 kilometres per hour, while coming into action and limbering up do not occupy more than 30 minutes for the battery. "The time is coming," says *La France Militaire*, "when we must consider the application of mechanical traction, not merely to heavy, but to all artillery."

MECHANICAL TRACTION AT THE MANCEUVRES.—During this year's manœuvres mechanical traction of all kinds was employed—passenger motor cars for the manœuvre direction, commanders and umpires; heavier traction for the supply of the staff and meat supply for the troops; cars of both above descriptions for aerial and telegraph services; heavier traction still for big guns and parks. An expert mechanical traction officer was told off to Army Headquarters for general supervision of the whole. The traction wagons were partly hired, partly supplied by the military authorities; the passenger cars were for the most part collected by the corps authorities. The drivers were some military, some civilian, and in the latter case they provided their own petrol and cleaning materials; the military drivers had these supplied to them. Where the troops were too far off to be supplied by means of horsed vehicles, the mechanical traction was considered as an extension of the railway. The wagons were formed into columns under different commanders, each of whom kept a record of the capacity of his column during 24 hours, and of all orders received, petrol expenditure, repairs, etc., in fact everything was to be noted for rendering a report to the General Staff at the close of the manœuvres.

## GERMANY.

**CREATION OF A RECRUITING SECTION AT THE WAR OFFICE.**—A Cabinet order has been lately published authorizing the creation of a recruiting section in the Prussian War Office. This new section is to deal with matters which have hitherto been treated in other branches of the War Office, but will mainly concern itself with recruiting and re-engagements, the *personnel* of the Reserve and of the Landsturm, with furloughs, with the promotion of the *personnel* of the Active and Reserves forces, with instructional establishments, the training of recruits and of colonial troops.

**IMPROVEMENT IN THE POSITION OF N.C.O.'S.**—The new Army Law makes considerable ameliorations in the position of non-commissioned officers: thus the premium awarded to them on completion of 12 years' service is raised 50 per cent.; the allowance given while awaiting civil employment has been increased from 12 to 20 marks per mensem, etc. Further, an office, or offices, have been established where information may be obtained as to civil employ; the obtaining of furloughs while seeking such employ is facilitated; better quarters are to be provided for non-commissioned officers in barracks; and the number of posts on the railways and in the post office for which ex-non-commissioned officers are eligible has been increased.

**NEW METHOD OF PACKING AMMUNITION FOR TRANSPORT.**—The military authorities are about to adopt a new system for the packing of infantry ammunition in transport. Boxes are to be replaced by bandoliers, and it is claimed that thus closer packing can be arrived at—280 rounds now taking the room hitherto occupied by 225, while the distribution is greatly assisted and expedited. The bandoliers are made of grey canvas, very light and strong, and contain each 14 compartments, holding a metal charger and five cartridges, or 70 rounds in all. The infantrymen are to retain their present pouches, holding 150 rounds, but on going into action each man will be further issued with one of these bandoliers, thus raising the rounds carried on the person to 220. It is claimed that men engaged in distributing ammunition can easily carry ten of these bandoliers, while the hands are left free. The provision of these new methods for packing and distributing ammunition will be only gradually introduced, but each infantry company has already been supplied with 120 bandoliers for instructional purposes.

**NEW CAVALRY ARMAMENT.**—The creation of the seven new regiments of Jäger zu Pferd has been marked by a change of armament. These regiments will only carry swords during peace, and on the outbreak of war or on field service the sword is to be replaced by the sword bayonet at one time in use by the infantry, the cavalry carbines being so arranged that the bayonet can be fixed to them. It is suggested in some military papers that there is an intention of withdrawing the sword altogether from the cavalry when proceeding on field service.

## GREECE.

**REORGANIZATION OF THE ARMY.**—By the Royal Decree published at the end of August last, the Greek Army is to be reorganized and materially augmented. So far as the contents of this Decree are at present known, the new Army of Greece will be organized something after the following:—Up to the present it has been organized only in divisions, but for the

future six army corps are to be provided, having their headquarters respectively at Larissa, Athens, Janina, Salonika, Seres, and Kozani. For the present each army corps will contain two divisions only, but when the scheme of reorganization is carried out in its entirety, each will be composed of three divisions; in the same way, while at first a total of no more than 11 divisions will be retained, the number will eventually be raised to 18. The headquarters of the 11 divisions are, or will be, established at Larissa, Athens, Missolonghi, Salonika, Kilis, Seres, Drama, Konica, Janina, Veria and Kozani. The country will be divided into military districts corresponding to the sum of the divisions to be established, and each district will be responsible for raising all the troops necessary for the establishment of the division, and also for a reserve division. Each division will contain three infantry regiments each of three battalions, an artillery regiment, a squadron of cavalry, a company of sappers, and the usual departmental troops. There are at the present moment no more than 33 infantry regiments, and these must therefore be increased in number to 54, if each of the 18 divisions is to have three regiments, each of three battalions. There is no intention of augmenting the present number (12) of Evzone or Rifle battalions. The strength of the cavalry will also remain, as at present, at three regiments, forming a cavalry brigade, the headquarters of which are at Seres. The field artillery, comprising now four regiments, will be at once raised to six regiments, each of six batteries, and in the course of time it is the intention to provide each division with such a field artillery regiment. Eighty batteries of quick-firers are already on order at Schneider's works. The mountain artillery, hitherto organized in two regiments, each of two divisions, each of two batteries, is to be augmented to six divisions, giving a total of 12 batteries, and will eventually be still further increased. The technical troops are also to be greatly augmented, battalions replacing companies—four bridging companies will thus become four bridging battalions. To provide for all these augmentations more men are required, and a new law has been framed for drawing larger annual levies from the manhood of the country. At the present, men are liable to military service during 31 years, *viz.* :—two in the Active Army, 11 in the Active Army Reserve, eight years in the Territorial Army, and ten in its Reserve, the first 13 years providing the first line, the next 8 and 11 the second and third lines. Under the new law men will be liable for 35 years' military service, divided as follows:—two years in the Active Army, ten in the First Reserve, nine in the Second Reserve, seven in the Territorial Army, and seven in its Reserve. The military authorities reckon, under the new regulations, on an annual recruit contingent of 25,000 (against the present levy of 13,000), and expect that this will provide an army of some 470,000 at the end of 21 years.

## AERONAUTICAL NOTES.

### BRITISH EMPIRE.

**ACCIDENT TO A NAVAL BIPLANE.**—On the afternoon of December 2nd, the Naval Wing of the Royal Flying Corps lost one of its officers, Captain G. V. Wildman-Lushington, Royal Marine Artillery, by an accident to the Maurice Farman biplane No. 23. Captain Wildman-Lushington, who held the grade of flight commander, accompanied by Captain Fawcett, R.M., as passenger, had flown to Sheerness, and on the return journey, when close to the naval aerodrome at Eastchurch, the machine suddenly side-slipped in descending and fell from a height of 50 feet to the ground. The machine was completely wrecked. Captain Wildman-Lushington was found to be dead, his neck being broken, but Captain Fawcett was not seriously injured. This is the first fatal accident to occur at Eastchurch, where flying has been now in progress for some three years, but is the third to occur to naval airmen, Lieutenant Parke having been killed by a fall at Wembley, and Paymaster Berne having been struck by the propeller of an aeroplane.

**FIRING FROM AN AEROPLANE.**—Some interesting experiments were carried out at Bisley on November 27th by the Birmingham Small Arms Company with the Lewis air-cooled machine-gun, which weighs only 26½ lbs., and which was fired from a 50-h.p. Grahame-White biplane of somewhat ancient type, and which proved the possibility of firing a rapid succession of shots from an aeroplane in flight, and of hitting a 30 ft. target from a height of 500 ft. in 11 out of 14 shots.

No. 1 Squadron of the Military Wing, Royal Flying Corps, has lately been converted into an aeroplane squadron, and the airships which formerly belonged to this squadron have been transferred to the Naval Wing of the Royal Flying Corps. It is considered that the development of airships can be better organized if carried out under a single authority, and as airships are at present more important for naval than for military purposes, it has been decided that the airship work should be allotted to the Navy for the present.

Captain Longercroft performed what was very nearly a record non-stop cross-country flight during November. On a B.E.2 biplane, with a 70 h.p. Renault engine, he flew from Montrose to Portsmouth and back to Farnborough without alighting, a distance of about 630 miles in seven and a quarter hours. He had not exhausted his petrol when he landed. France claims the record with a 650 mile flight, by Seguin on a Henri Farman during October of this year.

### FRANCE.

At Epinal, experiments in bomb dropping from aircraft were carried out recently, from heights varying between 300 and 4,500 ft., at targets

which were plainly visible, as also against targets which suddenly appeared. Photographs were taken of the results; these are not, of course, published. At the same place firing was conducted from aircraft against air targets, the firing being from a 5 c.m. gun and new projectiles of special pattern being used. Practice was made against a captive balloon moored some 7,500 yards distant, and which was moved from time to time so as to necessitate change of elevation, etc. Then followed practice against free balloons moving at varying wind strengths.

It is also stated that at Chalons sur Marne at the end of September experiments were carried out from an armoured aircraft mounting a large calibre gun in a small revolving turret. The craft is described as very speedy and intended specially for the attack on Zeppelins.

#### RUSSIA.

The *Russki Invalid* of September and October contains details of the examinations and tests for obtaining the military pilot's certificate: examination in the tactics and employment of aeroplanes, the technical development of machines, theory of aviation, repairs and mechanism, wireless and photography. Tests in flights, solution of a tactical problem, flight of not less than  $1\frac{1}{2}$  hours as laid down, during which for at least 30 minutes a height of from 3,000 to 3,600 ft. must be maintained; vol plane descent from 1,500 feet to within 450 yards of an alighting point previously indicated; descent from 1,500 ft. as before, finally descending in a spiral course from immediately over the landing place with the engine cut off.

#### NOTICES OF BOOKS.

**From Naval Cadet to Admiral.** By Admiral Sir Robert Hastings Harris, K.C.B., K.C.M.G. Cassells & Co., Ltd.

During his 52 years of naval life Admiral Harris witnessed many startling changes and took part in a large number of events of very great importance, so that he has much to tell in this book of his recollections which is well worth recording; added to which he has all his life been fond of sport of all kinds, and thus his pages are enlivened by many accounts of cheery happenings in good company, of many notable "bags" by gun, and "baskets" by rod and line. Sir Robert entered the Navy when it was still much as Marryatt has depicted it, when, though steam had made its entry into the service, it was still by many regarded as no more than a mere auxiliary to sails, but at a moment, too, when owing to the recent close of the war with Russia, ships were many and prospects were alluring. The author saw a large variety of foreign service, such as is in these days denied to the majority of naval officers, who to-day spend their naval existence between the home ports and the North Sea. He served on the South American station, in South African, North American, and West Indian Waters, and on the China station, always with credit, and never, if one may judge by extracts from his game-book, without enjoying to the full such sport as was to be got. And then, promoted to flag rank, he

was appointed Rear-Admiral of the Mediterranean Fleet, and so came to take part in the international maritime operations in and about Crete, of which so highly interesting a record is to be found in his pages. It is very pleasant, and also eminently instructive, to note how well the British Admiral got on with his colleagues, with the people whom the ships of the Powers had been sent to succour, and even with the insurgents, who apparently were equally ready to wage war with the fleets of Northern Europe as with their own official Government. To most readers, perhaps, the part of this book will chiefly appeal which contains the chapters in which Admiral Harris describes all the measures that he took, when transferred to the command of the South African station, for the maintenance of an efficient blockade of that enormous extent of coast-line during the war with the Dutch Republics; for helping whole-heartedly the sister-service; and for supplying men and armament, sailors, marines and guns, to vulnerable places which it was considered necessary to defend. The Army in South Africa was indeed fortunate in the fact that there was then on the station a naval commander so obliging, so ready with valuable assistance, and so resourceful, during those early days of the war and during the weeks of gloom by which they were immediately succeeded. In the chapter headed "Our Black Time" will be found some highly interesting and significant details of the extraordinary difficulties encountered by the blockading ships when dealing with the question of contraband, complicated as the problem was by the astute manner in which, as Sir Robert tells us, rumours of a circumstantial character were set on foot by Dr. Leyds for the exercise by our naval captains of the right of search, with the object of embroiling us with foreign Powers and causing serious international trouble. It seems also that these difficulties were not made any the lighter by the fact that the law officers of the Crown had not been able definitely to make up their minds, prior to the commencement of hostilities as to what was and what was not "contraband of war."

There is no dull page in this book; it is informing as well as eminently readable, and it is illustrated by many good photographs of scenes the author has witnessed, or of ships he has sailed in or commanded during the half century that he served in the Royal Navy.

**Gordons under Arms:** A biographical muster roll of officers named Gordon in the Navies and Armies of Great Britain, Europe, America, and in the Jacobite Risings. By Constance Oliver Skelton and John Malcolm Bulloch.

This book may fairly be described as a monument—a monument to the fighting powers of the Gordons, and a monument to the industry, intelligence and devotion of the compilers. Every source of information has been tapped, including the Record Office, the War Office, the Admiralty, the India Office, and the notes in the possession of the author of "The House of Gordon." The common ground of inclusion is the use of the surname Gordon, either alone or in hyphened combination with other names. The name appears to have suffered no change in the spelling when it passed into foreign languages.

The book begins with an interesting description of the "Making of the Muster." The difficulty of course was to decide where not to search. The amount of material presenting itself for examination was enormous, and, as is always the case in research work, increased instead of diminished

as every page was turned. No trouble or expense was spared to follow up a promising trail. On one occasion we are told, a Canadian college professor crossed the Atlantic, spent several weeks in scouring the country, and then searched through 17 unindexed War Office letter-books—all with the object of running to ground the father of one of his pupils, which he did successfully. The muster roll itself naturally occupies the bulk of the book. It contains no less than 2,154 names—Gordons, every one of them. Each man is given a number, and the Christian names are arranged alphabetically, except the first 69, whose Christian names cannot be ascertained. Each entry contains a short account of what is known of the individual with a record of the source of information. Relationships are easily traced by means of the cross references. After the muster roll comes an index "containing the names of all the kinsfolk of Gordon officers," and itself covering 62 pages. There are six excellent coloured reproductions of pictures.

The work that has been thus devotedly carried through has "proved beyond a shadow of doubt that tradition is right. . . . in crediting the Gordons, root and branch, with a great aptitude for arms." But "another useful index which may be applied is the extraordinary energy which the Gordons have displayed in raising troops." Then follows a list of 22 occasions, between 1632 and 1867, when bodies of men were raised by members of the Gordon family for service in different parts of the world. And we are told, in the introductory chapter—of which every word is worth reading—many interesting facts about Scotch clannishness in general and the Gordon clan in particular. "We are often asked to contemplate regiments rising like gourds when the Empire was in danger, a notion carefully fostered by modern writers. . . . who wished to convey the impression that clanship and chieftainship were still (*i.e.*, roughly, during the 18th century) powerful factors in the social organism. So far as the rank and file was concerned, this is as amiable a delusion as the idea that such recruits were men of gigantic size. The real fact is that the recruits for these levies had to be bought at a heavy price. . . . had to be gentled with promises of leases or extended holdings, and sometimes had to be forced into the ranks under a variety of pressures." A letter of 1778 says "The spirit of clanship has absolutely ceased as to its more important consequences all over the Highlands and more especially in this country." This, observe, applied to the rank and file; as to the officers, "the applications outran the opportunities."

Another very interesting fact about the Gordon family is that, strictly speaking, many of them were, and presumably are, not Gordons but Setons. For "more than half the Gordons in the North are descended from the two natural sons of Sir John Gordon (d.1394), and the rest are really Setons, the descendants of their cousin, Elizabeth, the heiress who married Sir Alex. Seton." But history has always regarded them as Gordons. "It appears that, contrary to popular impression, up till the 19th century, descent through the mother was regarded as of at least equal prestige with descent through the father."

A puzzle still unsolved, is presented by one of the greatest Gordons in history, *viz.*, "Chinese" Gordon, great grandson of David Gordon; "In spite of the most laborious investigation. . . . we are as far off knowing David's origin as ever. . . . The failure to find a father for David is all the more disappointing because . . . "Gordons under Arms" is

largely the result of the desire to solve this puzzle." Here is a great opportunity for a family Sherlock Holmes.

The Irish Gordons are difficult to trace; the American Gordons, though full of gaps, have been followed up with the painstaking care that we are accustomed to associate with literary effort from the other side of the Atlantic.

Soldiers of fortune are romantic figures on the pages of history, but it is interesting to note that the prudence which we expect to find in our northern friends was conspicuous in the family we are considering. "It was precisely the same wisdom (as in the case of Kenmure, where the 6th Viscount lost his head, and his son removed the consequent stigma upon his house by sending all his sons into the rival army), which made the wife of the second Duke of Gordon send three of her sons into the Services; for her husband and his father had nearly wrecked the house with their Jacobitism, tentative though it was." But all soldiers will be proud to read that "if it was a sense of self-preservation which made these ennobled Gordons turn from the House of Stuart to the House of Hanover, it was mainly the military opportunity, afforded by each rising in turn, rather than a strong dynastic bias, which affected the rank and file, for the Gordons possess in a pre-eminent degree the soul of the soldier, rather than the finesse of the politician."

It is earnestly to be hoped that the living Gordons of to-day will see to it that a goodly tale of sons shall bear arms in a manner worthy of their forbears.

**Les devoirs des Maires en cas de mobilisation générale.** By Paul Dislère, Second Edition. 8vo. 2s. (Paul Dupont). Paris, 1913.

(*Instructions to Mayors in the event of General Mobilization*).

The work is divided into four parts:—Peace; period of strained relations; mobilization and concentration; and war.

*In peace*, the normal duties of the municipal authorities are: Keeping up the lists of men to be called up and their places in the ranks; keeping the return of addresses, of the condition of dwellings or billets; keeping a watch over strangers, more particularly in the neighbourhood of fortifications; protection of the pigeon-houses of carrier-pigeons.

*During the period of political tension*, the Mayor should ask the parents of reservists from home to keep their sons on the look-out, take steps to replace the doctor or surgeon liable for mobilization, make preparations for the billeting of troops on the march, set a watch on all fountains and watering places, and arrest vagrants.

*On mobilization* the gendarme who brings the order for mobilization summons to the Town Hall the Mayor, or in his absence the Deputy or any Town Councillor. The Mayor receives from the gendarme a packet containing (a) mobilization forms; (b) summary instructions briefly detailing the duties of Mayors; (c) requisition forms; (d) a table showing how the days of mobilization correspond with the dates of the calendar; (e) finally the warrants summoning the civil members of the committees of supply, and their assistants.

The Mayor counts the forms, gives a receipt for them to the gendarme, then *in his presence* fills in, or has filled in, one of the forms, writing the date in letters, and the day of the week of the first day of mobilization.

The Mayor immediately summons before him the Town Clerk, the Schoolmaster, the Town Councillors, and, if necessary, sufficient neighbours for filling in the forms, on the lines of those filled in before the

gendarme. He summons at the same time the express messengers to post up the bills in the villages in accordance with the list enclosed, and obtains the necessary materials for affixing the bills (e.g., paste, paste-pots, brushes, etc.). As soon as a placard is pasted up, the Town Crier should give notice of it in the town. The bells are rung; the case is, in fact, similar to that of "public peril," as provided for by the law, and prompt steps are taken to inform the population of the gravity of the situation.

The citizens gathered at the Town Hall fill up the mobilization forms; the Mayor now acts on the "Summary Orders" enclosed in the packet.

He makes the Town Clerk fill in the days of the month to correspond with the first day, second day, etc., on the mobilization diary. This diary then serves as a calendar for the period of mobilization; opposite the words "first day of mobilization," is entered up, in addition to the date, the day of the week; the subsequent days of the week are then written in order below. This calendar is posted on the door of the Town Hall as soon as completed.

The Mayor recommends men about to rejoin their units to provide themselves with two shirts, a pair of drawers and a pair of boots in good condition broken in for marching. He should also—*de minimis non curat*—request them to have their hair cut.

With the help of the Town Council he considers the question of help to be afforded the families of men called to the Colours.

If supplies are requisitioned, he has a part which calls for infinite prudence, authority and tact. He must, together with his colleagues, exert himself personally to smooth over the petty difficulties which arise between the troops and the townspeople; he should induce the latter to share their food supplies with their fellow countrymen on the march, reminding them that they will receive payment for their goods, and he should assist the officers in watching that the troops do not claim more than the daily supply of food customary in the country.

He keeps a watch on persons suspected of espionage, organizes the service for guarding the railways, fixes the hours of sale in the markets, watches particularly for frauds in food contracts, closes theatres, balls, concerts, etc., if necessary; and forbids firing at carrier pigeons.

Now suppose hostilities commence. The obligations of the Mayor become greater and more delicate. Should the enemy's troops approach, he must request the women, children and old men to leave the theatre of operations. The able-bodied men and the local fire-brigade remain at their post, and take steps to provide a water-supply in case of fire.

The Mayor may have the painful task of complying with requisitions made by the hostile army; after a battle fought in his jurisdiction, he should have the dead collected, their identification plates discovered, steps taken for burial: he must never forget the demands made by the exigencies of the public health in the case of threats of an epidemic.

The Mayor must take steps to prevent the scoundrels who rob from carrying on their gruesome trade. These persons must be mercilessly hunted down.

It is his duty to collect arms left on the battlefield, soldiers' effects, stores, etc. He will also collect evidence of decease, and make inventories of effects found on dead bodies.

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
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
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